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OPERATION ORDERS.

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1307

A TECHNICAL STUDY.

BY

HANS VON KIESLING,
Hauptmann im Generalstabe.

TRANSLATED BY THE GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE.

WITH TWO MAPS.

LONDON:

PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

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
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PART I.

THE ATTACK.

PREFACE.

IT has been my experience that battle orders are less practised at all our exercises in applied tactics than are orders for the march, for deployment, for bivouac, etc. Among those of our young officers who study tactics seriously there are few who cannot write satisfactory orders for the march or bivouac of a division; but when it is a question of issuing orders either for or during a battle, and of issuing them under the practical conditions of the battle-field, the number of experts will be found to be considerably reduced, especially if orders for detachments smaller than a division have to be issued rapidly, perhaps from the saddle. The war-game is almost the only means of training in applied tactics at the disposal of the regimental officer; but war-games are often too much concerned with the preliminaries of the battle, and there is no time for the discussion of the most important part, viz., the actual conduct of the fight. Besides, the direction of war-games which deal with the battle itself, requires a more complete system and greater skill than the direction of games which do not go beyond reconnaissance, deployment, and the advance to the battle-field.

I therefore acceded with pleasure to the suggestion of some young comrades of mine to prepare a series of exercises which should illustrate phases of a modern battle, with the special object of emphasizing training in the preparation of orders. After the publication of the new "Regulations for Medical Services in the Field," it appeared desirable to complete these exercises by working out the battle orders of the medical officers, and also to prepare routine orders, to which so little attention is paid. The examples of orders which I here present are the result of these exercises. They are the consequence of a series of informal discussions, and have no pretensions to be models. In fact it is not possible to give models of orders, for this would lead to a formal system, and every formal system in which form is emphasized at the expense of matter, is an evil. In the composition of orders the individuality of the composer must find expression. But some training, some method of emphasizing essential points and of expressing the meaning clearly, is indispensable. Guidance in this is often welcome, for it saves the beginner much time. Such guidance shows him how to work and gives him the means of beginning his work in the right way. I maintain that constant, regular practice is essential if orders are to be clear, brief, and at the same time complete. The object of this book is to lay the foundation for such practice.

VON KIESLING.

München,
January, 1907.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

WHEN I published these pages three years ago, I did so with some anxiety, for I was aware of the difficulty of the task which I had set myself. To-day I am conscious that my work has been on the right lines. The hearty commendation with which my German comrades have received my work, and the great good will with which it has been met everywhere, and with which its many defects have been overlooked, justify me in concluding that it has supplied a widely felt want.

I have therefore agreed to the request of my publisher, and now present my little book to military readers in a new edition, which has been considerably altered and brought up to date.

The appearance of a new edition of the "Field Service Regulations," and of a number of new manuals, has made it necessary to introduce new terms and to change a number of expressions; the great importance which machine guns, telephones, etc., have acquired in the modern battle has made it desirable to consider them also in the text. The feeding of the troops has been placed on a new basis by the introduction of field kitchens, and it has become necessary to discuss their employment and the duties of the supply officers.

The introduction of the various means which the progress of science makes available to an increasing extent causes the organization of our army to become continually more complicated. Improvements in armament, and in the communication and supply services, have been introduced and require consideration. It is a difficult task to give the necessary orders for the employment of these various organizations correctly and at the right time; instruction is necessary if nothing important is to be forgotten and orders are still to be clear, simple, and to the point. In using the expression the "technique" of orders in this connection, I mean thereby the confidence in issuing orders which is acquired by deep thought and constant practice. This confidence depends upon personal experience, practice in the use of terms, and upon clearness of intention, acquired by a logical system of mental training and by development of character.

"The Field Service Regulations" direct that there is to be no fixed form for battle orders. Orders may therefore be given either verbally or in writing, but always in such a way that there is no doubt as to the responsibility of the issuer for them, that his intention and will are clearly expressed, and that none of the units under his command are forgotten in the order. If all this is achieved, the order is a good order, more especially if it is expressed briefly and emphatically in clear, military language.

The germs of success or failure appear in the orders. The best intention and the most correct solution of a difficult problem are of little use if the commander in question cannot, either personally or by means of his staff, give them expression in correct order. Not only is the end to be attained of importance, but also the method of attaining it, though the latter may vary greatly in various circumstances.

I hope this new edition will find its place, and gain as many friends as the first.

HANS VON KIESLING,

*Neuburg on the Danube,
March, 1910.*

GENERAL IDEA.

A Red army coming from the north is advancing on München,* on the front Aichach—Schrobenhausen; a Blue army is advancing through München against it. The Danube forms the frontier between Red and Blue. Ingolstadt is a Red frontier fortress.

SPECIAL IDEA.

The 11th Infantry Brigade (10th and 13th Inf. Regts.), which had originally been kept back at Ingolstadt as a reinforcement to the general reserve, was ordered on 21. XI., to advance by Pfaffenhofen to the Ilm, in order to join the left wing of the Red army, which was intended to reach the Glonn on the line Unter-Weikertshofen—Weichs on 23. XI. with the object of seeking and attacking the enemy's army. The most northerly column (1st Army Corps) of the Red army was marching on the Aresing—Hilgertshausen—Ainhofen—Weichs road.

On the night of 22–23. XI., the following telegram reached the bivouac of the brigade at Reichertshausen by way of Ingolstadt:—

“Altomünster,
22. XI., 4 p.m.

“The enemy's army is advancing on the Glonn through München. The army will attack the enemy and will cross the Glonn on 23. XI., on the line—Unter-Weikertshofen—Weichs. Your brigade to advance to-morrow, 23rd, as early as possible by Petershausen.

“Army Headquarters.”

* In order to facilitate reference to the maps, the German names of places have been retained in place of the English equivalents, *e.g.*, München, not Munich. For the same reason distances are given in metres and kilometres instead of in yards and miles.

The infantry regiments referred to in this book all consist of 3 battalions. Each battalion has 4 companies. The companies in a German regiment are numbered from 1 to 12. Thus, No. 9 Company is the first company of the third battalion. In the following pages companies are usually described by their number and regiment, without reference to the battalion to which they belong.

The German field artillery is organized in brigades, which are subdivided into regiments. Each regiment has two *Abteilungen* of three batteries. It is important to remember in reading this book, that the corresponding unit to our field artillery brigade is the *Abteilung*, not the brigade.—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

The brigade marched from Reichertshausen at 6 a.m. on 23. XI. At 7.45 a.m. the point of the advanced guard (1st Bn., 13th Inf. Regt.) reached Petershausen (by way of Ober-Marbach). The brigade commander was between the advanced guard and the main body. The main body was marching in the following order:—

2nd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt.
3rd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt.
10th Inf. Regt.

At that moment a cavalry orderly arrived with the following order:—

“Eglersried, 23. XI., 6.45 a.m.

“The enemy’s army reached the south bank of the Glonn yesterday afternoon, on the line Gross-Berghofen—Jedenhofen (inclusive).

“The army advances to-morrow, 23rd, to and over the Glonn and attacks. 1st Inf. Div. by Fränking—Edenpfaffenhofen on Weichs (exclusive)—Jedenhofen.

“The 11th Inf. Bde., which is under the orders of the 1st Inf. Div., will advance to Ziegelberg (west of Petershausen) and be at the disposal of the divisional commander.

“Headquarters, 1st Inf. Div., Edenpfaffenhofen.”

Required the instructions and orders of the brigade commander on the arrival of this order. It is to be assumed that the only officers of the brigade staff are the brigade major (*adjutant*) and one orderly officer.

Reconnaissances have established the facts that the Glonn is everywhere fordable by infantry, but that mounted troops must, generally speaking, use the bridges. It is a bright, fine day in late autumn.

Composition of the 11th Infantry Brigade:—

10th Inf. Regt.
13th Inf. Regt.

Each infantry regiment has a machine gun company of six guns.

Each battalion has a telephone detachment, provided with 13,000 yards of cable and four instruments.

Each company has a field kitchen; supply officers are attached to each battalion.

THE ACTION OF, AND ORDERS ISSUED BY, THE BRIGADE STAFF.

I. *a.* The staff rode forward to Ziegelberg and gave the order to the main body, “Pass the word for regimental commanders to come to the front.”

b. The following order was issued verbally to the advanced guard commander as the staff rode by:—“Occupy the bridge at Petershausen with one section; reconnoitre towards Asbach and Kollbach. The

advanced guard will turn off to Ziegelberg; the brigade staff is going to that place. The advanced guard commander will accompany the brigadier."

II. The brigade staff reached Ziegelberg at 8 a.m. As it rode forward, the sound of guns, increasing in volume, was heard from a westerly direction. Hostile artillery was observed from the hill at Ziegelberg, apparently in action at Jedenhofen against Red artillery on the north bank of the Glonn in the neighbourhood of Aufhausen, which could not be seen at the moment. Small parties, presumed to be hostile cavalry, were observed in the Glonn valley between Asbach and Jedenhofen.

From time to time fairly heavy infantry fire was heard from the west.

A. At 8 a.m.* the brigadier gave the following verbal order to the advanced guard commander:—"The enemy's army is in position on the other bank of the Glonn on the line Gross-Berghofen—Jedenhofen (exclusive); our army will attack.

"The brigade is in échelon in rear of the left flank of the 1st Inf. Div., which is attacking on the front Weichs—Jedenhofen. The brigade will deploy in this valley, north of Ziegelberg (this place he points out) facing Asbach, and will be at the disposal of the divisional commander.

"The advanced guard will cover the deployment of the brigade by occupying the small wood south of Ziegelberg; it will send a small detachment to hold the bridge at Asbach. It will reconnoitre by Ebersbach—Asbach towards Jedenhofen and the country north of Vierkirchen, and will discover the position of the enemy's right flank. It will observe in the direction of Aufhausen. It will report on the situation there, particularly as to our own troops. It will reconnoitre the ground towards Ebersbach and Asbach with the view to the advance of the brigade. The brigade staff will move in a quarter of an hour to the southern edge of the small wood."

B. The following verbal order was issued at Ziegelberg to the commanders of the 10th and 13th Inf. Regts. who had arrived in the meantime (8.15 a.m.):—

"Ziegelberg.

23. XI., 8.20 a.m.

"The enemy is in position on the far side of the Glonn, on the line Gross-Berghofen—Jedenhofen (inclusive). Our army will attack. The brigade is in échelon in rear of the left wing of the 1st Inf. Div., which is advancing against the line Weichs—Jedenhofen. The brigade will form up in this valley facing the hills at Ziegelberg.

"The 13th Inf. Regt. will be on the right in one line, with its left on Ziegelberg.

"The 10th Inf. Regt. will be on the left with its left east of that clump of bushes† over there. Two of its battalions will be écheloned in second line on the left.

"The 10th Inf. Regt. will reconnoitre through Asbach and Petershausen, towards the woods south of Asbach, and towards

* At this time the point of the advanced guard was approaching Ziegelberg.

† Supposed to be 500 metres east of Ziegelberg on a level with the northern edge of that place.

Kollbach. It will observe and be responsible for the security of the left flank. It will send one section to the railway bridge south of Petershausen, and strong cyclist patrols through Kollbach and Rettenbach on Vierkirchen. The field kitchens of the 13th Inf. Regt. will be south-west of Sollern, those of the 10th Inf. Regt. will be south-east of Sollern.

"The brigade headquarters are moving to the south edge of that small wood, which is occupied by the 1st Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., to reconnoitre."

C. At 8.25 a.m. the brigadier gave the brigade orderly officer the following order:—"Take four cyclists from the 13th Inf. Regt. and ride by Lindach to Edenpfaffenhofen, and find out where divisional headquarters are. Report my dispositions and find out the situation of the 1st Inf. Div., which you will accompany. Keep me informed of all important events and of the information which comes in about the enemy. If the cyclists allotted to you are not sufficient, ask the divisional staff to let you have some orderlies. Orders and reports to be sent to Ziegelberg. Start at once."

D. The brigade major (*adjutant*) had, meanwhile, prepared a written order for the 2nd line transport, which was despatched by cyclist orderly.

"Ziegelberg.

23. XI., 8.30 a.m.

"The army is engaged on the line of the Glonn. The brigade is deploying at Ziegelberg, west of Petershausen.

"2nd line transport will move to Lampertshausen (west of Steinkirchen). It will be prepared to move either towards Jetzendorf or Steinkirchen, and will reconnoitre routes towards the Glonn valley and Gerolsbach. Supply wagons to be at the head of the column. Keep communication with brigade headquarters at Ziegelberg.

A. B.,

Lieutenant and Brigade Major."

ORDERS ISSUED BY THE ADVANCED GUARD COMMANDER ON RECEIPT OF BRIGADE ORDERS.

a. Verbal order issued at 8.10 a.m. to the point, which had just reached Ziegelberg:—"The point will advance through Ziegelberg to the extreme corner of the small wood in front of us, which juts out towards Asbach, and will halt there and not advance beyond the southern edge of the wood; the remainder of the company is following."

b. Verbal order at 8.20 a.m. to the commander of the vanguard company (1st Bn., 13th Inf. Regt.):—

1. "Pass the order back, 'Company commanders to come to the commanding officer.'"

2. "The enemy is in position on the far side of the Glonn. Our army will attack. Hostile artillery is in position at Jedenhofen.

"The brigade is deploying in this valley, facing Asbach. It is in échelon in rear of the left wing of the 1st Inf. Div., which is attacking on the line Weichs—Jedenhofen.

"The advanced guard is to cover the deployment of the brigade.

"No. 1 Company is to advance to the furthest corner of the wood which juts out towards Asbach (the point has been already sent there), and will watch the valley of the Glonn from Ebersbach to Petershausen. It will reconnoitre the ground east of Jedenhofen through Asbach. It will examine the ground between the edge of the wood and Asbach, with a view to the brigade advancing over it to attack. Sketches will be sent to me. It will occupy the bridge at Asbach with half a section. If the enemy attacks, the southern edge of the wood is to be held.

"No. 2 Company will advance to the western part of the wood; Nos. 3 and 4 Companies to the centre of the northern edge of the wood. All reports to the latter place.

"1st line transport (less S.A.A. carts) will join Nos. 3 and 4 Companies."

c. Verbal order at 8.30 a.m. to the assembled commanders of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Coys, 13th Inf. Regt.:—"The enemy has occupied the southern bank of the Glonn. The enemy's artillery is in action on a hill near Jedenhofen, which can be seen from here over the edge of that wood.

"The brigade is deploying in this valley facing Asbach. It is in echelon in rear of the left wing of the 1st Inf. Div.

"The 1st Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., will occupy the small wood in front to cover the deployment.

"No. 1 Company has been ordered to the east part of the wood.

"No. 2 Company will advance to the west part of the wood which juts out towards Ebersbach, and will watch the ground towards Edenpfaffenhofen, Aufhausen, and Ebersbach, as well as the hills on the west front, whither the 1st Inf. Div. is expected to advance.

"It will reconnoitre through Ebersbach towards Jedenhofen and to the east of that place. It is important to discover the position of the enemy's right. It will examine the ground between the edge of the wood and Ebersbach, with a view to attack. In case of attack, the southern edge of the wood is to be held.

"Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. and the machine gun company, under Captain B, will take up a position behind the centre of the northern edge of the wood. The shortest way to Nos. 1 and 2 Coys. will be marked.

"The field kitchens will be assembled behind the wood, and will move under a senior under-officer of No. 4 Company from Ziegelberg to Sollern, the hamlet on the next hill on our right. A supply officer will take over command of them at that place.

"The telephone detachment will establish communication with Nos. 1 and 2 Companies.

"I am going first to Nos. 1 and 2 Coys. and then to Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. All reports to be sent to the latter. The commander of the machine gun company will accompany me."

ORDERS ISSUED BY THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS ON RECEIPT OF
BRIGADE ORDERS ISSUED VERBALLY AT 8.20 A.M.

13TH INFANTRY REGIMENT.

a. Verbal order at 8.25 a.m., immediately on receipt of the brigade order, to the regimental adjutant:—"Ride and meet the regiment, and direct the leading (2nd) battalion behind this hill (491, west of Ziegelberg), and the 3rd Bn. to Ziegelberg.

"Tell the battalion commanders to come to me at Ziegelberg."

b. Verbal order at 8.45 a.m. to the two battalion commanders:—"The brigade is forming up behind this ridge, facing it. 13th Inf. Regt. on the right of 10th Inf. Regt. The 2nd Bn. will form up behind hill 491 (pointed out on the ground), near that yellow field. The 3rd Bn. will form up behind Ziegelberg. Close up to 200 metres. Send out scouts. When they have issued their orders, battalion commanders will please come to me to be informed as to the situation."

c. Orders issued by the O.C. 2nd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., at the moment when No. 5 Company reaches hill 491:—"No. 5 Company halt. No. 6 Company will form up on the right of No. 5 Company at 30 paces interval. No. 8 Company will form up behind No. 5. No. 7 Company behind No. 6. Send out scouts.

"The telephone detachment will form up behind No. 7 Company. S.A.A. carts will join their companies."*

d. The supply officer of the 2nd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt. (the supply officer of the 1st Bn. was with the supply wagons), after he had met the regimental adjutant and received his instructions, galloped to the point where the Petershausen road turns off towards Jetzendorf and drew up the field kitchens of the regiment in column on the road. He then marched them to Sollern, where he placed them in a covered position, west of that place, close to the lane leading to Thann. He next left a few reliable men in charge of the field kitchens and formed the remainder into a requisitioning party. He instructed the latter to seize any supplies there might be in Kreithof, Sollern, and Lindach. As he was in an enemy's country he considered he was justified in doing this. He conferred with the supply officer in charge of the field kitchens of the 10th Inf. Regt., whom he met shortly afterwards, and agreed with him that all supplies requisitioned should be taken to Sollern and divided between the two regiments.

10TH INFANTRY REGIMENT.

a. Verbal order issued by the regimental commander at 8.25 a.m. to the regimental adjutant:—"Ride back to the regiment and send

* The S.A.A. carts marched together in rear of the battalion, with the remainder of the 1st line transport.

the battalion commanders to me. I will be at the railway crossing south-west of Petershausen. Send the supply officer with the regiment to that point too. Tell the 1st Bn. to send a cyclist officer to me, and six cyclists to the church at Petershausen to wait for the cyclist officer."

b. Verbal order issued at 8.45 a.m. to the assembled battalion commanders:—

"The brigade is deploying in this valley facing this ridge (pointed out on the ground). 10th Inf. Regt. on the left of 13th Inf. Regt.

"The 1st Bn. will advance to the north-east corner of Ziegelberg. The 2nd Bn. will be on the left of the 1st, at 300 metres interval and 100 metres distance. The 3rd Bn. will be on the left of the 2nd, with its head at that small clump of bushes.* Reduce the length of columns to 200 metres. Send out scouts.

"The machine gun company will be in a covered position behind the 3rd Bn.

"The 3rd Bn. will send a strong observation post to Wasenhof to watch the south bank of the Glonn from Asbach to Kollbach, and a smaller post to the hill north-west of Petershausen. It will reconnoitre the country over the Glonn south of Asbach—Höckhof—Glonbercha. It will send one section to the railway bridge south of Petershausen. One section of the 13th Inf. Regt. is at the road bridge at Petershausen. Battalion commanders and the commander of the machine gun company, after issuing their orders, will accompany me to Ziegelberg to be informed as to the situation."

c. The cyclist officer, after being told the situation, was ordered to go to Vierkirchen, by way of Kollbach and the neighbourhood of Rettenbach, in order to find out the position of the enemy's right and of his reserves. He was to report to brigade headquarters at Ziegelberg.

d. The supply officer of the 1st Bn. was ordered to take over command of all the field kitchens of the regiment and to move them to Sollern by way of Petershausen. He was told to form them up at the eastern end of the village, so that they could march at once to Ziegelberg. He was to keep in touch with regimental headquarters at Ziegelberg.

e. The supply officer of the 2nd Bn. (the supply officer of the 1st Bn. was with the supply wagons and the 2nd line transport) was directed to accompany regimental headquarters and to remind the latter about bringing up the field kitchens.

While the brigade was forming up, the brigadier and his brigade major (*adjutant*) had gone to the southern edge of the small wood south of Ziegelberg, the brigadier having first directed the senior regimental commander to take over command, to open all messages and to send on those of importance.

1ST BN., 13TH INF. REGT.

NO. 1 COMPANY.

On receipt of the order of the battalion commander, the commander of No. 1 Company, 13th Inf. Regt. (vanguard company), after

* 500 yards east of Ziegelberg, level with the northern edge of that place.

handing over command to the senior lieutenant, rode to the point and reached it as it arrived at the southern edge of the wood and was about to lie down there in observation. From this position the country appeared to him as follows:—

Immediately south of the wood the ground fell in a gentle glaxis-like slope towards the valley of the Glonn, which, with the exception of a small corner of dead ground near its northern extremity, was visible almost throughout its breadth. Towards the west the view was limited, about 800 metres away, by a ridge springing from the western part of the wood. This ridge concealed the valley at Aufhausen and also the greater part of Ebersbach. To the south the view was uninterrupted up to, and in some cases beyond, the line of the hills which form the southern edge of the Glonn valley. The hill east of Jedenhofen was clearly recognizable, and so were the heights south of Asbach. Behind the latter, portions of the wooded area north of Vierkirchen and Rettenbach were visible. Asbach itself, a small village dominated by a church with a conspicuous green-roofed tower, lay in full view.

From the place where this part of the wood turns eastward, a view of the course of the Glonn was obtainable to beyond the far side of Petershausen, and one could see past the southern edge of that place until the distance was shrouded in mist. A church tower, which apparently was that of the village of Kollbach, showed over the bare hills between Petershausen and Asbach. Still farther off could be seen a line of wooded heights.

A small rise, which ran about 50 metres beyond the edge of the wood, seemed to offer a suitable line of defence, for the field of fire was good and the cover satisfactory. The high pine trees which formed the small wood were easy to climb and afforded suitable positions for observation posts. There was little to be seen of the enemy, but the sound of heavy firing was heard from the neighbourhood of Jedenhofen. From that direction and from further west the sound of continuous gunfire was also distinguishable. Hostile artillery was visible in action south of Jedenhofen. Shells were constantly bursting over this artillery and over Jedenhofen; these must have been fired by Red artillery in position on this side of the Glonn.

The infantry fire was particularly heavy from the direction of Ebersbach, but neither Red nor Blue infantry was visible. On the other hand, cavalry could be seen in the valley about 500 metres east of Asbach. Some horsemen were standing on hill 496, west of Kollbach, and were examining the northern bank of the Glonn through glasses, but they soon disappeared again.

A. At 8.35 a.m. the commander of No. 1 Company issued the following verbal order to Lieutenant A., who was in command of the point:—"The brigade is behind at Ziegelberg, the small hamlet which we have just passed through; it is attached to the 1st Inf. Div., which is advancing on our right, behind that line of hills, to the attack across the valley of the Glonn, the southern slopes of which have been occupied by the enemy. The company is covering the brigade in the small wood and will defend its southern edge in case of attack.

"Try and get to Asbach, that village straight opposite us, unseen

if possible, and occupy the bridge over the Glonn at that place. I will send you reinforcements and a signaller later.

"Try and find out what is going on at Jedenhofen and Pasenbach. It is particularly important to discover the position of the enemy's right and of his reserves. Reconnoitre the ground north and south of Asbach with a view to attack. Send me a sketch of the ground as soon as possible. Advance carefully, there appears to be hostile cavalry west of Kollbach. Hostile artillery is in position south of Jedenhofen. Send reports here, where there will be a signalling station."

B. He next issued the following orders to the company which had come up in the meanwhile:—"Form company column. Order arms. Stand at ease."

The company halted about 20 metres inside the wood. The words of command were given in a low tone on account of the echo.

C. The following verbal order was issued by the company commander at 8.45 a.m. to his company:—"The enemy is in position on the far side of the Glonn. Our army is about to attack. The 1st Inf. Div., to which the 11th Bde. is attached, is advancing on our right. The 11th Bde. is in échelon in rear of the left flank of the 1st Inf. Div., and is at Ziegelberg, that small village which we have just passed through.

"No. 1 Company, which is on the right of No. 2 Company in the wood, is covering the brigade and will hold this edge of the wood in case of attack. The remainder of the battalion is behind the wood, about the centre of the north edge.

"The company will occupy that small rise in front of us, No. 1 Section on the right, No. 2 Section on the left, of that small tree. The front of each section will be 100 metres. The section commanders accompanied by the squad commanders will go forward to the position without showing themselves, and reconnoitre. The company will pile arms and Lieutenant D. will identify the country from the map.

"Two under-officers with field glasses, two privates and two signallers of No. 3 Section, will come with me. I will return to the company in ten minutes."

D. The company commander next placed an observation post at the extreme southerly corner of the wood, and another at the easternmost corner. To the first of these posts was allotted the country from Jedenhofen to Asbach. The country between Asbach and Petershausen was allotted to the second, which was directed to keep itself informed as to the movements of the brigade. The under-officers, having been carefully instructed as to their duties, were posted in high trees which offered a good view; a private was placed at the foot of each tree to carry messages. The two signallers were placed near the first observation post and were to establish communication with the troops holding Asbach bridge.

E. The company commander returned at 9 a.m. to the company. He sent two squads and a signaller to the bridge at Asbach to Lieutenant A., and a patrol to get touch with No. 2 Company and with the battalion, and to mark the nearest way to them. He inspected the positions selected by the section commanders, and satisfied himself that the company knew the situation. He then allowed the men to fall out and lie down near the piled arms.

The telephone detachment arrived later and established communication between the company and battalion headquarters.

NO. 2 COMPANY.

Meanwhile, No. 2 Company had reached its position. The following were the instructions issued to it. The company commander had, immediately on receipt of the advanced guard, *i.e.*, battalion, commander's order, issued the following order:—

A. "Lieutenant N. will go forward with the leading squad. He will move through the centre of the wood in front, and then along the edge of the wood opposite Ebersbach to the point of the wood which juts out towards that place. He will halt on the far edge of the wood, the remainder of the company will follow."

B. The company commander then rode forward to the point of the wood in question. There he saw that the view and field of fire were very limited. He therefore waited for the squad and ordered it to advance to the spur which runs towards Ebersbach, until the men could overlook Ebersbach and the Glonn valley, and to lie down there in observation. The squad commander was directed to watch the Glonn valley particularly between Weichs and Asbach, and the heights on the far side occupied by the enemy. He was told that hostile artillery was in action at Jedenhofen: that it was expected that detachments of the 1st Inf. Div. would be in Ebersbach; that that division was advancing by Aufhausen, and that the 11th Inf. Bde., which was forming up behind at Ziegelberg, the place they had just marched through, was attached to it. He was also told that No. 2 Company, which was on the right of No. 1 Company, had to cover the 11th Inf. Bde., and would hold the southern edge of the west part of the wood, and also the highest point of the spur running towards Ebersbach in case of attack.

C. The company commander dismounted, left his horse in the wood, and also halted the company there. He then walked to the highest point of the spur which runs towards Ebersbach, between the wood and Aufhausen.

Here he obtained the following view of the country and of the situation:—

Looking west he saw the whole extent of the valley from Aufhausen to Ebersbach, and also the road connecting those places. Edenpaffenhofen was concealed by a bare spur, above which the wooded area north of that village was visible. Beyond Edenpaffenhofen a line of hills ran towards the Glonn from the neighbourhood of Fränking, the brickworks (*Zgl*) of which could be seen, the highest hills (points 508) being at Fränking and south-west of Aufhausen. A large tract of wood in the northern part of this line of hills shut out all view, but over the more open southerly part, the hills 519 and 513 at Westerholzhausen were apparently recognizable. A glimpse of the valley of the Glonn west of Ebersbach, and also of Jedenhofen and of the country between Jedenhofen and Albertshofen was obtainable over the lowest spurs of hill 508, south-west of Aufhausen.

The hill, on the highest point of which the company commander stood, fell in a convex slope towards Ebersbach; from the highest

point rather less than 100 metres of this slope was visible, the lower part and the village of Ebersbach, of which only the top of the church tower was in view, lay in dead ground. Nor could the valley of the Glonn immediately to the south be seen, but, on the other hand, there was a good view of the hills opposite, which rose gently east of Jedenhofen, and also of that part of the Glonn valley which lies between Ebersbach and Asbach. On the far side of the valley rose a broad round hill (496) between Asbach and Jedenhofen. The part of this hill between Asbach and Kollbach fell away in gentle slopes towards the Glonn. The Asbach—Vierkirchen road and the railway were easily recognizable. To the left of Asbach the eye was caught by the church tower of Kollbach, which showed between the hills; behind it the horizon was bounded by wooded heights, which rose like lines of waves.

The country north of the line Asbach—Kollbach, was concealed by the wood which has been so frequently referred to. The southern edge of this wood was visible as far as the point where it turns slightly north.

Of the battle, the progress of which was announced by heavy gun and rifle fire, this much was to be seen :—

A long line of Red artillery was in position on the ridge south-west of Aufhausen, in action against hostile artillery between Albertshofen and Jedenhofen. Along the north bank of the Glonn, north and north-west of Jedenhofen, lines of Red infantry, extended among the copses, were seen to be engaged with hostile infantry deployed west of Jedenhofen. Rifle fire was also heard from the direction of Ebersbach.

A few wounded were seen on the road from Ebersbach to Aufhausen, going back to the latter place. Above one of the most southerly houses of Aufhausen the red cross flag was waving. About two battalions of Red infantry were just north of Aufhausen in a covered position. A line of wagons was seen trotting along the road which runs westward from Aufhausen. They were, apparently, an ammunition column and soon disappeared from view. Behind hill 508, south-west of Aufhausen, the signalling station of the artillery in position there was seen at work. Nothing was to be seen either of the enemy or of Red troops in the country east of Ebersbach and Jedenhofen.

D. The company commander returned to the company, when he had completed this reconnaissance, and issued the following orders :—

a. Verbally, at 9 a.m., to the whole company.

“The enemy has occupied the far bank of the Glonn. Hostile artillery is in position east of Albertshofen, the enemy has infantry at and near Jedenhofen.

“The 1st Inf. Div. is advancing to the attack on our right (west), apparently through Ebersbach. Our artillery is south and south-west of Aufhausen.

“The brigade is marching by Ziegelberg, the small place we have just passed through, to be at the disposal of the 1st Inf. Div.

“The 1st Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., has been ordered to cover the brigade; No. 1 Company is on our left, Nos. 3 and 4 Companies are at the northern edge of the small wood.

"Lieutenant B. will hold the height on our right front, on both sides of the field track leading to Ebersbach, with No. 1 Section, in case of attack. His front will be towards Ebersbach, and will extend for 80 metres. The position will be reconnoitred. No. 1 Section will take up position in rear of it and will not occupy it till necessary. The point has been pushed forward in front of the division towards Ebersbach. Nos. 2 and 3 Sections will remain here and be at my disposal.

"Connection will be established with No. 1 Company on the left, and Nos. 3 and 4 Companies in rear. 1st Lieutenant C. will issue any further instructions required.

"I shall be on the hill on our right front.

b. "Under-officer M., with one private, will form an observation post at the corner of the wood straight in front of us. He will climb one of the highest trees and will watch the valley of the Glonn and the opposite heights. He will place himself so as to see the point and me if possible. The private will remain at the foot of the tree to carry messages.

c. "Sergt. N., with 5 men, will patrol towards Ebersbach, and ascertain the situation there. He will then reconnoitre the ground between Ebersbach and Asbach with a view to the brigade attacking over it. He will endeavour to find out the situation at Jedenhofen ; it is especially important to discover the position of the enemy's right flank. Reports will be sent here."

d. While 1st Lieutenant C. was detailing the patrols to No. 1 Company and to the battalion, and was explaining the situation and the country to the company, the company commander wrote out a full report of what he had seen and sent it to the battalion commander and to brigade headquarters.

The company commander then went to the hill mentioned above for observation purposes, and examined the ground with a view to an attack being carried out over it. He put down his impressions in the form of a sketch, which he completed from the reports as they came in ; he then sent the sketch back to the battalion commander.

The two signallers whom he took with him were placed so that they could be seen by the company and from hill 508 south-west of Aufhausen. They were then ordered to try and get communication with the artillery signal station on hill 508. When communication was established they were directed to send the following message :—

"11th Bde., marching from Reichersthausen, is now approaching Ziegelberg ; protective detachments hold wood south of Ziegelberg. Please send information as to the situation.

"No. 2 Coy., 13th Inf. Regt."

THE MACHINE GUN COMPANY.

The commander of the machine gun company had accompanied the commander of the 1st Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., on his ride to the advanced companies, and arrived with him, about 8.30 p.m., at the edge of the wood 1,400 metres north-west of Asbach, just as the commander of No. 1 Company was issuing his orders. The advanced guard commander recognized from a reconnaissance of the ground that No. 1 Company would be much assisted in holding its

position against an attack from the far side of the Glonn by the addition of some machine guns. He therefore addressed the commander of the machine gun company who was with him, as follows at 8.40 a.m. :—

“No. 1 Company will presumably hold the rise in front of us.

“Place two machine guns at the corner of this wood, so that they can sweep the ground in front of Asbach and between that village and the railway bridge north-east of it. The guns will be attached to No. 1 Company.

“Draw the remainder of your company up in close order behind the wood, where it will be at my disposal.

“Reconnoitre the edge of the wood and the ground to the west as far as the ridge which runs down east of Ebersbach towards the Glonn, and submit to me proposals for the employment of the machine gun company in case we have to hold this bank of the Glonn against attack.”

A. The commander of the machine gun company then rode off to the commander of No. 1 Company who was close by, informed him of the orders he had received, and added :—

“The best position for the machine gun section is at the most southerly corner of the wood with the guns close together. There they can flank the Glonn valley. The section will bring its vehicles as far forward as possible, but the guns must be brought up by hand to the edge of the wood. It seems to me that Wasenhof should be occupied in case the machine gun company has to move up to the edge of the wood, which appears desirable.”

B. When the commander of No. 1 Company had arranged for the occupation of Wasenhof, the commander of the machine gun company rode back to the northern edge of the wood, drew his company up in line behind the piled arms of Nos. 3 and 4 Companies, and ordered his men to dismount. He called up his section commander and gave him the following order verbally at 9.15 a.m. :—

“The advanced guard is covering in this wood the deployment of the brigade near Ziegelberg, the village on the right rear.*

“The brigade is in échelon in rear of the left flank of the 1st Inf. Div., to which we are attached. The 1st Inf. Div. is engaged with the enemy, who is attacking from the far bank of the Glonn, and is west of us. The valley of the Glonn begins immediately on the far side of the wood in front of us. The left of the division is in Ebersbach. Nos. 1 and 2 Companies are at the southern edge of this wood, whence the valley of the Glonn is in full view. No. 2 Company is on the right, and No. 1 on the left, close to the corner of the wood which juts out towards Asbach. Lieutenant A., with No. 1 Section, will be in the portion of the front allotted to No. 1 Company, to which he is attached. He will take up a position at the corner of the wood 1,400 metres north-west of Asbach to assist No. 1 Company. He will move to his position by the near edge of the wood, left from here, as far as the farthest point where he is still under cover from the Glonn valley. He will then unload and move the guns by hand straight through the wood towards the corner, without exposing himself. March off.

* The company commander was facing his command.

"The rest of the company will remain here. 1st Lieutenant B. will take over command, will have shoes, harness, and vehicles examined, and see that the situation is explained to the company. I am going to reconnoitre the southern edge of the wood and will return here."

C. Captain M. then hurried forward to carry out the reconnaissance as ordered. He arrived at the southern edge of the wood at a point near the centre, whence a field track led down to the Glonn valley road.

The view to the west was bounded at this point by the ridge which runs down to the valley of the Glonn, between the wood and Ebersbach. Only a few of the roofs of Ebersbach and its small pointed church spire were visible. Looking to the left, however, there was a clear view over the whole of the broad level of the Glonn valley as far as the hill east of Jedenhofen (which was crowned by the enemy's artillery), and of the lower slopes of the hills between Jedenhofen and Asbach, as far as the edge of the wood north of Vierkirchen. Nothing was to be seen of the country on the far side of the high railway embankment. This embankment allowed the enemy to approach Asbach under almost complete cover, only that edge of the latter village facing the Glonn valley being exposed to view.

From Captain M.'s position in the middle of the wood, the Glonn valley road was almost 800 metres away, and the Glonn itself was another 800 metres farther off. The range to Asbach was about 2,000 metres. If the infantry remained in position on the edge of the wood, neither its fire nor that of the machine guns would be able to search the Glonn valley effectively. The range was too great. The enemy would only come within effective range when he reached the Glonn valley road.

As it seemed probable that the enemy in attacking would make use of the covered approach to Asbach, the main attack was to be expected from that direction. It was, therefore, desirable to place the machine guns so that they could bring effective fire to bear upon the enemy's firing lines as they emerged from Asbach. It would only be possible to do this from the corner of the wood which jutted out to Asbach, whence the range to the edge of the village was from 1,300-1,400 metres. As this corner of the wood jutted out like a bastion to the south, it would then be possible to flank the valley of the Glonn on both sides.

If the brigade were to advance to the attack across the Glonn, a position in this corner of the wood would be suitable for the machine gun company to support the attack. From this position the company would be able both to support the attack on Asbach, which the enemy would probably hold in strength, and also to assist in the attack longer than if it took up a position more to the west, for, in the latter case, it would apparently have to change position to the Glonn valley road when the infantry advanced.

As the result of this reconnaissance Captain M. rode back again to No. 1 Company, and had a careful look at the ground from the above-mentioned corner of the wood. This reconnaissance confirmed him in his previous opinion.

When he had approved of the position which had meantime been

taken up by his 1st Section, had interviewed the commander of No. 1 Company, and had found his position accurately on the map. he rode back straight through the wood, which was not thick, to its northern edge, and at the same time reconnoitred a route by which he could bring up his vehicles close to the position of No. 1 Company.

As soon as he returned he reported the result of his reconnaissance to the advanced guard commander. He then assembled his subordinates and explained the situation, the ground, and the results of his reconnaissance to them.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS.

The brigade headquarters reached the position of No. 2 Coy., 13th Inf. Regt., soon after 9 a.m. The staff left their horses under cover and ascended the hill to reconnoitre. They had the same view of the country and of the situation as had the commander of No. 2 Coy. The brigade major (*adjutant*), who had been looking round with his glasses, called his general's attention to the fact that the divisional flag was on the road between Aufhausen and Edenpfaffenhofen, and that the divisional headquarters were dismounted on the hill east of the road. The brigade staff thereupon mounted and galloped off after informing the commander of No. 2 Coy., 13th Inf. Regt., that they were going to the headquarters of the 1st Inf. Div.

ACTION OF, AND ORDERS ISSUED BY, THE DIVISIONAL STAFF.

When the brigadier had reported the arrival and dispositions of the 11th Inf. Bde., he received the following information from the divisional headquarters:—

The advanced guards of the army reached the line Eisenhofen—Hirtlbach—Markt-Indersdorf—Weichs, about mid-day 22. XI., the main bodies reached the line Pfaffenhofen—Altomünster—Pipenried—Hilgertshausen.

On the evening of 22. XI., the advanced guards reported that the enemy was in strength at Ottmarshart, south of Kloster-Indersdorf, and at Pasenbach, and that their patrols south of the Glonn had been everywhere fired on. Hostile infantry had been seen entrenching at Arnbach—Kloster-Indersdorf—Zillhofen and at Jedenhofen.

According to the Army Order for the 23rd, the intention was to attack the enemy across the Glonn, and to make the decisive attack with the 3rd and 4th Army Corps on the right flank. The latter corps had been directed to attack on the line Unter-Weikertshofen—Hirtlbach. The centre (2nd Army Corps) was directed to hold the enemy on the line Albersbach—Markt-Indersdorf—Glonn. The left (1st Army Corps) was to hold the enemy on the line Glonn (exclusive)—Ebersbach, and, in the event of the enemy attacking, to hold the northern heights along the Glonn at all costs.

The 2nd Inf. Div. was engaged on the line Glonn—Weichs to a point 1,000 metres towards Ebersbach.

The 1st Inf. Div., to which the 11th Inf. Bde. was attached, had gained touch with the enemy at Jedenhofen and in front of

Ebersbach with its 2nd Inf. Bde.—the 1st Field Artillery Regt. was in action on the hill south-west of Aufhausen against one of the enemy's artillery regiments near Jedenhofen.

From an infantry and artillery point of view the situation was favourable.

The left wing of the 7th Inf. Bde. was deployed at the southern edge of Ebersbach, and was engaged with hostile infantry, which had advanced east of Jedenhofen as far as the further bank of the Glonn, which at this point makes a bend northward. The outskirts of Ebersbach had been placed in a state of defence.

The divisional commander added that it was not his intention to throw all his troops into the fight, but that he was keeping the 1st Inf. Bde. at his disposal. Two battalions of the latter brigade had just reached Aufhausen. He was also keeping the 7th F.A. Regt. in hand at Edenpfaffenhofen. The remainder of the 1st Inf. Bde. was still on the march from Hilgertshausen to Eggersreid.

At this moment (9.30 a.m.) an under-officer of the Chevaulegers galloped up with the following message, which was received and read by the general staff officer of the division:—

“2nd Chevaulegers Regt.

Lauterbach.

East of Kammerberg.

To 1st Inf. Div. at Aufhausen.

23. XI., 8 a.m.

“Strong hostile reserves have been identified at Vierkirchen and Rettenbach. These troops were marching at 7.30 a.m. towards Jedenhofen and Asbach. At 7.30 a.m. five battalions were assembled south of Vierkirchen and three battalions south of Rettenbach.

“I have been attacked by a strong body of hostile cavalry (more than one regiment) from the direction of Kollbach, and have been pushed back from Pifitz to Lauterbach. If compelled I will fall back by Weissling and Hohenkammer towards the left flank of the division.

A.,

“Colonel, Commanding 2nd

“Chevaulegers Regt.”

When he had finished reading this message, the general staff officer remarked: “We must expect to be attacked at any moment.” He signed the envelope, handed it back to the under-officer, and told him to wait for orders.

The divisional commander then issued the following orders:—

1. Verbal order at 9.40 a.m., 23. XI., to the commander of the 1st F.A. Bde., who was with him.

“The enemy is expected to attack from the direction Jedenhofen—Asbach. I intend to meet him on the line west of Ebersbach—Ebersbach—Wasenhof (inclusive), and will hold this position in any circumstances. Place one *Abteilung* of the 7th F.A. Regt. in position east of Aufhausen, and support the portion of the division (11th Inf. Bde.) in position east of Ebersbach in the defence. One *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., will remain at my disposal at Edenpfaffenhofen.”

2. To the 2nd Inf. Bde. at Ebersbach, at 9.45 a.m., by telephone to the general staff officer: “The enemy is expected to attack from

the direction Jedenhofen—Asbach. The division will meet this attack on the north bank of the Glonn, which is to be held in any circumstances.

"The 2nd Inf. Bde. holds the section Ebersbach (inclusive) to a point 1,000 metres west of Ebersbach, where it connects with the 2nd Inf. Div. The 11th Inf. Bde. is formed up at Ziegelberg and will deploy east of Ebersbach. The 1st *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., will take up a position east of Aufhausen. Chief dressing station at Aufhausen; collecting stations for slightly wounded at Edenpffenhofen."

3. Verbal order at 9.50 a.m. to the commander of the 11th Inf. Bde.:—

"You have heard that I intend to meet the attack, which is expected from the direction of Jedenhofen and Asbach, on this bank of the Glonn, and that I mean to hold this position to the last.

"The 11th Inf. Bde. will hold the section Ebersbach (exclusive) —Wasenhof (inclusive). The brigade will deploy at once and will prepare its position for defence. The brigade will be responsible for the security of the left flank until the 1st Inf. Bde., only two battalions of which have reached Aufhausen, is ready at my disposal at the wood north-east of Sollern.

"I will order the divisional cavalry regiment to cover my extreme left flank in the neighbourhood of Petershausen. The chief dressing station will be at Aufhausen; collecting station for slightly wounded at Edenpffenhofen.

"Divisional headquarters will be here.

"Get connection from a point north of Wasenhof with the divisional headquarters signalling station."

4. The following written orders were then prepared by the general staff officer:—

a. "To the 1st Inf. Bde. by way of Edenpffenhofen,* 23. XI., 10 a.m.

"The division is holding the north bank of the Glonn on the line west of Ebersbach—Ebersbach—Wasenhof (inclusive), left flank at the latter point (11th Inf. Bde.), against an attack which is expected from Jedenhofen and Asbach. This position will be held to the last.

"The 1st Inf. Bde. will move by the shortest route to the wood north-east of Sollern, and will form up in the wood on either side of the Jetzendorf—Petershausen road, facing Petershausen, where it will be at the disposal of the divisional commander. The line Petershausen—Goppertshausen—Ober-Marbach, will be watched and reconnoitred. Connection with the 11th Inf. Bde. by way of Ziegelberg. On reaching its position the brigade will take over the protection of the left flank.

"1st and 2nd Bns., 1st Inf. Regt., at Edenpffenhofen, will move at 10.10 a.m. by Lindach to Sollern, and join the brigade. The divisional cavalry regiment has been ordered to Petershausen.

"Divisional headquarters will be at Aufhausen.

* On the march from Hilgertshausen to Eglersried.

"Chief dressing station will be at Aufhausen, collecting stations for slightly wounded at Edenpfaffenhofen.

M.,

"Captain, General Staff Officer.

"1st Inf. Div."

b. "1st Inf. Div.

Aufhausen, 23. XI., 10.15 a.m.

"To the 1st Army Corps, 1 kilometre east of Erlhausen.

"The divisional cavalry regiment reports the advance of strong reserves from Vierkirchen (five battalions) and Rettenbach (three battalions) on Jedenhofen and Asbach.

"Expect attack on the line west of Ebersbach—Ebersbach—Wasenhof. Orders issued for this event. Please send ammunition columns and field hospital to Edenpfaffenhofen.

"Divisional headquarters at Aufhausen.

A.,

"Lt.-Gen., Commanding 1st Inf. Div."

An orderly officer was given both messages, and was ordered to go first to the 1st Inf. Bde., and then to Army Corps Headquarters, and deliver them.

5. The following order to the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. was then prepared, and given to the under-officer, who was waiting, to deliver:—

"23. XI., 10.15 a.m.

"To 2nd Chevaulegers Regt., by way of Petershausen.

"1st Inf. Div., which forms the left flank of the army, expects attack on the line west of Ebersbach—Ebersbach—Wasenhofen (inclusive; 11th Inf. Bde. here).

"1st Inf. Bde. has been ordered to the wood north-west of Petershausen, on the line Jetzendorf—Petershausen, to be in divisional reserve.

"2nd Chevaulegers Regt., if pressed, will fall back on Petershausen, and cover the left flank of the army. Reconnoitre enemy's right flank; observe in the direction of Unterbruck—Thurnsberg—Allershausen; get connection with 1st and 11th Inf. Bdes.

"Divisional headquarters at Aufhausen."

6. The commander of the 1st Inf. Regt., who was with the two battalions at Aufhausen, was directed to come to divisional headquarters, was told the situation, and was ordered to march by Lindach to Sollern to join his brigade. He was told to explain the situation to his brigadier.

7. The principal medical officer of the division was ordered to take the necessary steps for establishing the chief dressing station. The bearer company was ordered to Edenpfaffenhofen and placed under him. He was told that requisitioned vehicles would be halted north of Aufhausen, on the side of the road from Edenpfaffenhofen. He was to obtain the concurrence of the divisional commander in his proposals for the establishment of the chief dressing station at Aufhausen, and of the collecting station for slightly wounded at Edenpfaffenhofen.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE PRINCIPAL MEDICAL OFFICER OF THE DIVISION.

It will perhaps be interesting to consider briefly the instructions issued by the principal medical officer of the division for the medical services on the battle-field.

Immediately after the issue of the divisional orders a mounted orderly was sent with the following written order to the bearer company at Edenpfaffenhofen:—

“East of Aufhausen,
23. XI., 10.15 a.m.

“To Bearer Company, 1st Inf. Div.

“Chief dressing station will be at Aufhausen; move there at once. Medical officer in charge will come to the principal medical officer at Aufhausen church. Collecting station for slightly wounded will be at Edenpfaffenhofen.”

The principal medical officer then reconnoitred Aufhausen and issued the following order at 10.45 a.m. to the officer in command of the bearer company, who had ridden on ahead:—

“The chief dressing station will be at the southern end of Aufhausen on the Weichs road. The regimental dressing station of the 1st F.A. Regt., which is at Aufhausen, and the dressing station of the 2nd Inf. Bde., which has been pushed forward towards Ebersbach, will be attached to it. No. 1 halting place for wagons will be pushed forward towards Ebersbach. No. 2 halting place for wagons of the 11th Inf. Bde. will be at the wood south of Ziegelberg. You will be informed of the position of the dressing station of the 11th Inf. Bde. as soon as possible.

“The division has the 2nd Inf. Bde. in action at and west of Ebersbach, and will extend the left with the 11th Inf. Bde. as far as Wasenhof inclusive. The position will be held to the last. The 1st F.A. Regt. is just south of Aufhausen, part of the 7th F.A. Regt. will take up position east of Aufhausen. Twenty requisitioned vehicles are parked just north of Aufhausen and are at the disposal of the bearer company, as are also the personnel and material of the attached dressing stations. The latter must, however, be ready at any time to be employed elsewhere.

“Collecting station for slightly wounded remains where it is. Slightly wounded, and severely wounded who can be transported, will be evacuated by way of Eggersried and Jetzendorf to the stationary hospital at Schrobenhausen. Wounded who cannot be moved will remain temporarily at Aufhausen, where it is intended to establish a field hospital.

“I am going to divisional headquarters east of Edenpfaffenhofen.”

On his return the principal medical officer informed the units concerned of the position of their dressing stations, and of the establishment of the field hospital, sent up by the army corps, at Edenpfaffenhofen. A report of the medical arrangements for the 1st Inf. Div was prepared and sent to the principal medical officer of the 1st Army Corps on the first opportunity.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY, AND ACTION OF, THE HEADQUARTERS,
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

The commander of the 11th Inf. Bde. had received his orders at 9.45 a.m., and had then galloped off with his staff to Ziegelberg. While riding back he appreciated the situation, in view of the orders he had received and of his personal reconnaissance of the ground, as follows :—

“The brigade is to hold its position to the last and is to occupy the area Ebersbach (exclusive)—Wasenhof. This section is about 1,500 metres long and can, therefore, be suitably held by the brigade. As the brigade is also responsible for the protection of the left flank, the whole of it must not be employed in holding the front, but troops must also be *écheloned* on the flank, which they will have to reconnoitre and watch.

“The Glonn valley road from Ebersbach to Wasenhof forms a good line of defence. This line is sufficiently in advance of the artillery position not to interfere with the guns, runs parallel to the enemy’s probable line of attack, and has a stretch of absolutely level ground, which it will be difficult for the enemy to cross, from 700 to 800 metres in front of it. Besides this, the Glonn, which is a considerable obstacle even though infantry can cross it at most points, lies within effective rifle range of the position. The deployment preceding the occupation of the position can be carried out in the wood south of Ziegelberg, though it must be remembered that the southern edge of the wood does not correspond with the position selected. It will be necessary to be careful at this point to prevent the occupation of a wrong line of defence. For this reason the edge of the wood itself cannot form part of the defensive position.

“The ditches along the Glonn valley road afford cover which can be improved, if the enemy allows us time.

“The greatest danger to the position is Asbach. At this point the enemy can approach the position under cover nearer than elsewhere; but even here he will have 800 metres of open ground to cross. If the enemy extends further to the east he can only be met by employing the troops *écheloned* on the flank.

“Four battalions will be sufficient to hold the position in the first instance. It appears best to employ the whole of the 13th Inf. Regt. and one battalion of the 10th Inf. Regt. for this. The two remaining battalions of the 10th Inf. Regt. will remain where they are, and will protect the left flank. They can be left under the commander of the regiment to be disposed according to requirements. It will also be best to keep back the machine gun company of the 10th Inf. Regt. at first.”

On reaching Ziegelberg at 10 a.m., the brigadier called up the regimental commanders and issued the following order :—

“Ziegelberg,

“23. XI., 10.10 a.m.

“The enemy has deployed infantry along the Glonn on either side of Jedenhofen; his right flank extends to a point opposite Ebersbach. He has artillery on the hill south of Jedenhofen.

"Strong hostile reserves are on the march from Vierkirchen and Rettenbach to Jedenhofen and Asbach.

"The division will await the enemy's attack on the line west of Ebersbach—Ebersbach—Wasenhof. The 2nd Inf. Bde. is at and west of Ebersbach. The artillery of the division is on either side of Aufhausen. The 1st Inf. Bde. is on the Jetzendorf—Petershausen road. The divisional cavalry regiment has been ordered to Petershausen.

"The brigade forms the left flank. It will hold the section Ebersbach (exclusive)—Wasenhof (inclusive). It will occupy the line of the Ebersbach—Wasenhof road. The 1st Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., will be under the orders of the regimental commander, and the 13th Inf. Regt. will deploy with its right on Ebersbach and its left at the junction of the tracks 300 metres south-west of Wasenhof. The 10th Inf. Regt. will extend the left of the 13th Inf. Regt. with one battalion as far as Wasenhof (inclusive). The remainder of the regiment will remain here at my disposal. It will be responsible for the protection of the left flank and will reconnoitre in that direction. It will send a signalling detachment to brigade headquarters at Ziegelberg.

"The position will be strengthened. Wasenhof will form a supporting point.

"Brigade headquarters will be at Ziegelberg.

"The chief dressing station is at Aufhausen.

"The collecting station for slightly wounded is at Edenpfaffenhofen."

This order was taken down by the brigade major (*adjutant*) as it was given out. The signalling detachment, which arrived at Ziegelberg five minutes afterwards, endeavoured to get connection from the roof of a house with the divisional signalling station. Communication was established at 10.25 a.m.

ORDERS ISSUED IN THE 13TH INFANTRY REGIMENT.

The commander of the 13th Inf. Regt., immediately on receipt of the brigade order, issued the following order to the 2nd and 3rd Bns., 13th Inf. Regt.:—

"S.A.A. carts will be emptied. Medical personnel and material will be sent to the regimental medical officer. The regiment will advance. The 2nd Bn. will move on the right corner of the small wood in front, the 3rd Bn. on the centre of the wood. Advance to the southern edge of the wood and then halt under cover. Battalion commanders will come to me at the centre of the southern edge of the wood."

The regimental commander, as he rode by, directed the commander of the 1st Bn. of the 13th Inf. Regt. and the commander of the machine gun company to come with him. He and his adjutant reached the centre of the small wood at 10.20 a.m. The commander of the No. 1 Coy., 13th Inf. Regt., reported himself there and gave the regimental commander, who had meanwhile dismounted, the following information:—

"The village in the valley half-left is Asbach; the church tower behind it belongs to Kollbach. The group of houses straight in front

of us is the eastern portion of Ebersbach; the greater part of that village is concealed by the spur which runs down to the Glonn west of us. Above and beyond the group of houses you can see a flat-topped hill on the far bank of the river, that is the hill east of Jedenhofen.

"A short time ago there were some of our infantry in front of Ebersbach about 400 metres from the river. A few minutes ago they retired, apparently on Ebersbach, as they were being enfiladed from the hill south of Asbach, which was occupied about a quarter of an hour ago by hostile infantry. This infantry is now advancing towards the Glonn. During the last half hour movements of hostile bodies have been observed near Asbach. There is at least one battalion in Asbach but it has not crossed the edge of the village. The enemy's patrols have been active on this bank of the Glonn. Our small patrols have already had to be recalled from the edge of the wood which No. 1 Coy. holds. A strong patrol which No. 1 Coy. sent to the bridge over the Glonn at Asbach has had to retire. I no longer hold the bridge.

"A number of infantry columns have been observed on the hill south-east of Asbach; they were all moving towards the valley just south-west of hill 496 (west of Kollbach). There must be about two battalions assembled there. A party of horsemen was visible for a short time on hill 496, but it soon disappeared."

The battalion commanders had in the meantime come up. The commander of the 13th Inf. Regt. then issued the following order:—

"Small wood south of Ziegelberg.

23. XI., 10.40 a.m.

"The hills which you see in front of us and the village of Asbach in the valley half-left are occupied by the enemy. East of Asbach the enemy has a number of battalions in close order.

"The division is awaiting the enemy's attack on this bank of the Glonn. The artillery is in position on either side of Aufhausen, the 2nd Inf. Bde. is on our right at and west of Ebersbach. The section Ebersbach (exclusive) to Wasenhof (inclusive)—Wasenhof is the small group of houses on the left (below us)—is allotted to the 11th Inf. Bde. The 10th Inf. Regt. is on the left of the 13th Inf. Regt.

"The 2nd and 3rd Bns. will deploy in the wood under cover, the 2nd Bn. on the right of the track where we are standing, the 3rd Bn. on the left. Both battalions will advance simultaneously, on my signal, from the wood to the Ebersbach—Wasenhof road, which they will hold; the right of the 2nd Bn. will be directed on Ebersbach, the left of the 3rd Bn. on the sign post* below us. The track on which we are standing will be the dividing line between battalions. The position will be strengthened. Telephonic communication with the front line will be established from the edge of the wood. Battalion commanders will report their positions and the position of their telephone stations. When the firing lines of the 2nd and 3rd Bns. have left the wood Nos. 3 and 4 Companies of the 1st Bn. will close and will be at my disposal.

"Observation posts will remain in position.

"The S.A.A. carts will be left full.

* At the junction of the roads 300 metres south-west of Wasenhof.

"The machine gun company will move to the corner of the wood which juts out towards Asbach and support the 3rd Bn. in the defence. It will bring fire to bear on the ground between Asbach (inclusive) and the railway bridge north-east of that place. Empty S.A.A. carts of the 2nd and 3rd Bns. will move to Ziegelberg.

"A cyclist officer of the 3rd Bn. will be sent with them. The dressing station for the whole regiment will be in the centre of the northern edge of this wood. I remain here."

The regimental commander then directed the regimental medical officer to establish a dressing station at the place ordered, and sent the regimental adjutant to brigade headquarters to report the information obtained by the commander of No. 1 Coy., 13th Inf. Regt., and to find out at the same time the shortest way to brigade headquarters.

There was no difficulty about establishing telephonic communication with brigade headquarters, as the way there was completely under cover and the line could be laid rapidly.

The following verbal order was issued at 10.50 a.m. by the commander of the 2nd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., to the company commanders, who had been called up:—

"The enemy has occupied the southern bank of the Glonn opposite Ebersbach (partially visible to the right below us) and at Asbach, the village on the left below in the Glonn valley. Hostile artillery is in position on the hill south of Jedenhofen (the position of this place was pointed out).

"The division will await the enemy's attack on the north bank of the Glonn. The artillery is in position on either side of Aufhausen. The 2nd Inf. Bde. is at and west of Ebersbach. The 11th Inf. Bde. has been allotted the section on the left as far as Wasenhof. The 13th Inf. Regt. is on the right of the 10th Inf. Regt.

"The 13th Inf. Regt. will deploy two battalions, the 2nd Bn. on the right, the 3rd Bn. on the left of the track on which the regimental commander is standing. The 1st Bn. remains in the wood at the disposal of the regimental commander.

"Nos. 5, 6, and 7 Coys. will each occupy 150 metres of front, No. 5 Coy. on the right, No. 7 Coy. on the left. Companies will deploy their firing lines in the wood, and will advance, on my signal, to the Ebersbach—Wasenhof road, with the right on the spur on our right, and the left on the track which leads down to the valley.

"Companies will halt and establish themselves on that line as follows:—No. 5 Coy. from Ebersbach (exclusive) as far as the prominent round tree, 150 metres left of that place. No. 6 Coy. will extend the left as far as that dark heap of earth close to the road. No. 7 Coy. will extend the left as far as the junction of the field track with the road. No. 8 Coy. will remain at my disposal in the wood. The dressing station will be at the northern edge of this wood. I shall be with No. 8 Coy. The telephone detachment will establish a station at the edge of the wood and lay out a line to No. 6 Coy."

Similar orders were issued to the 3rd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt. When, shortly after 11 a.m., the commander of the 13th Inf. Regt. was informed by his battalion commanders that the battalions were deployed on the edge of the wood, he gave the signal for the advance,

which was carried out simultaneously. The battalions were, in consequence of the angle made by the edge of the wood with the position to be occupied, *écheloned* from the right.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY, AND ACTION OF, THE REGIMENTAL MEDICAL OFFICER, 13TH INFANTRY REGIMENT.

Meanwhile, the orders for establishing the dressing station were issued. The medical personnel and material were assembled by the senior medical officer of the battalion at 10.15 a.m., and moved to the north edge of the wood, halting behind the centre. They were then formed into two requisitioning parties, consisting of stretcher bearers who were not required and the horse holders of the medical officers, and into two stretcher bearer parties, each of two stretchers, for each battalion.

The ambulances and requisitioned vehicles were drawn up in line; the horses of the medical officers were with the ambulances of their battalions. One mounted medical officer kept communication with the regimental medical officer, who was at regimental headquarters. At 10.45 a.m. the regimental medical officer had been ordered to establish the dressing station for the whole regiment behind the centre of the northern edge of the wood, at the same time he received permission to employ the band of the regiment at the dressing station. He thereupon rode back and issued the following verbal order to the medical personnel:—

a. "Medical officer A. please come here!

"Requisitioning parties will be drawn up on the right; parties for duty on the battle-field on the left, five paces interval between parties."

b. To the bandmaster, who was with the 1st Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., close by:—

"In accordance with the orders of the regimental commander, the band will be under my orders for duty at the dressing station. Join the medical personnel, place the instruments on the ground and detail twelve men as assistant stretcher bearers. They should put on *brassards*."

c. To the whole of the medical personnel:—

"The regiment is engaged in front of this wood, 2nd Bn. on the right, 3rd Bn. on the left of this track, which leads down to the Glonn valley. Senior medical officer A., with two medical under-officers, two medical orderlies with medical panniers, and the stretcher bearers of the 2nd Bn., will take over duties on the battle-field south of the track leading to the Glonn valley.

"Senior medical officer B., with two medical under-officers, two medical orderlies with panniers and the stretcher bearers of the 3rd Bn., will take over the duties on the battle-field north of the track leading to the Glonn valley.

"The dressing station will be here. The receiving section will be on this track. The dressing section will be in the forester's hut on the left in the wood. The collecting station for the slightly wounded will be by that haystack. Unload field equipment, take over the articles required and move off.

"No. 1 requisitioning party, under the No. 1 medical under-officer of the receiving section, will work in the area Ziegelberg and Sollern. Tables, buckets, spoons, glasses, clean handkerchiefs and blankets are required. These will be handed over to the dressing section. When this is done, four stretcher bearers will be sent to the receiving section, and two to the dressing section.

"No. 2 requisitioning party, under No. 2 medical under-officer, will obtain straw or hay, thirty trusses are required for the receiving section and twenty for the dressing station. As many vehicles as possible will be requisitioned. The party should obtain a number of lanterns.

"Five bandsmen, with one of the requisitioned vehicles, will fetch water.

"The requisitioning parties will move off.

"No. 3 medical under-officer will superintend the issue from the wagons, which will begin with the wagons of the 2nd Bn.

"No. 4 medical under-officer, with five bandsmen, will arrange the receiving section. Three rows of hay or straw beds will be made, each row 20 metres long by 4 metres wide. Screens of straw or leaves will be erected. No. 2 requisitioning party will provide the straw or hay. When this is done the under-officer will draw one bottle of wine as a restorative and a glass from the infantry ambulances. Wine will not be issued without my orders. He will then take over the panniers and see that they are properly filled. I will superintend the receiving section myself.

"Medical officer C., with five medical under-officers, will arrange the dressing section. A latrine will be marked out. When No. 1 requisitioning party has obtained what is required, two stretcher bearers and two bandsmen will be at the disposal of the dressing section.

"Senior medical officer D. will take over the collecting station for slightly wounded. He will have No. 3 medical under-officer and two bandsmen from No. 2 requisitioning party. Slightly wounded will be sent to Edenpfaffenhofen, the collecting station of the division. Those who are fit for duty will be sent to the 1st Bn., and afterwards will be sent back to the firing line. The men will be sent off in parties of twenty, under charge of slightly wounded under-officers. Ammunition will be handed over to those who are fit for duty. No. 5 medical under-officer will hand over the ammunition of the severely wounded and dead to senior medical officer D. One charger of ammunition will be left with those who are not fit for duty. Medical officer E., with No. 6 medical under-officer and three bandsmen of No. 2 requisitioning party, will supervise the transport of the severely wounded to the chief dressing station at Aufhausen. Four of the requisitioned vehicles, on which hay or straw should be spread, are at his disposal.

"The remainder of the medical personnel and the bandsmen will remain behind the ambulances and be at my disposal. The bandmaster will see that the Geneva cross and the national flag are hoisted in the open. He will get the flags from No. 3 medical under-officer. He will leave a man at the flagstaff to direct wounded to the receiving section."

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN, AND ACTION OF, THE 10TH INFANTRY REGIMENT.

We will now examine briefly the instructions issued in the 10th Inf. Regt., the 1st Bn. of which had been ordered to extend the left of the 13th Inf. Regt. as far as Wasenhof (inclusive).

The battalion commander first ordered the S.A.A. carts to be emptied, and sent for the company commanders. The medical personnel and material were placed at the disposal of the battalion medical officer, who was told to establish a dressing station at Ziegelberg. He was informed at the same time of the position of the chief dressing station and of the divisional collecting station for slightly wounded.

The company commanders were then given the following verbal order at 10.20 a.m. :—

“Hostile reserves are advancing on Jedenhofen and Asbach, the village in the valley which can be seen to the south.

“The 11th Inf. Bde. forms the left flank of the division and holds the near bank of the Glonn from Ebersbach to Wasenhof (inclusive).

“The 13th Inf. Regt. is deploying on our right through this small wood. The 2nd and 3rd Bns., 10th Inf. Regt., remain at the disposal of the brigadier.

“The 1st Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., forms the extreme left flank of the position at Wasenhof, and will hold the ground to the west as far as the sign-post which can be seen at the junction of the roads on the right. It connects there with the 13th Inf. Regt.

“No. 1 Coy. will hold the section from the sign-post to a point, 100 metres towards Wasenhof, where that low bush is. It will advance to the Ebersbach—Wasenhof road and establish itself there. No. 2 Coy. will extend the left as far as Wasenhof, which will be prepared for an obstinate defence. Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. will form the reserve at Ziegelberg. A signalling station at Ziegelberg will communicate with the signallers of No. 2 Coy. at Wasenhof. The dressing station of the battalion will be at Ziegelberg. Empty S.A.A. carts will be sent to that place. I shall be at Ziegelberg. Telephone detachment will lay out a line to No. 1 Coy.”

NO. 1 COMPANY.

Orders of the commander of No. 1 Coy. 10th Inf. Regt. on receipt of the battalion order.

a. “Ammunition will be issued by sections, empty S.A.A. carts and led horses will be sent to Ziegelberg.”

b. “Stretcher bearers will report to the battalion medical officer.”

c. Verbal order issued to the whole company :—

“The enemy has occupied the hills on the far bank of the Glonn. The brigade holds this bank of the Glonn. The section of the position from the sign-post in the valley on the right as far as Wasenhof, that small group of houses on the left, is allotted to the 1st Bn., 10th Inf. Regt. The 13th Inf. Regt. is on our right. Our No. 2 Coy. is on the left at Wasenhof. The dressing station is at Ziegelberg. Nos. 1 and 2 Sections will extend, No. 2 Section on the left, and will move on

the clump of bushes 100 metres left of the sign-post. The sections will advance as far as the Ebersbach—Wasenhof road, and will establish themselves there. I shall be with the firing line. No. 3 Section will form the support at the large haystack on the right front. It will establish connecting files with the firing line. It will keep a look out for signals from brigade headquarters and from the battalion commander at Ziegelberg."

When these orders were issued, the company commander handed over his horse and followed the advancing firing line.

NO. 2 COMPANY.

Orders issued in the No. 2 Coy., 10th Inf. Regt.

a. "Ammunition will be issued by sections. S.A.A. carts and led horses will remain at Ziegelberg till further orders."

b. "Stretcher bearers will report to the battalion medical officer."

c. Verbal order issued to the company on receipt of the battalion order:—

"The enemy has occupied the hills on the far bank of the Glonn. The brigade holds the heights on the near bank. The 13th Inf. Regt. and our No. 1 Coy. are on our right. We form the left flank of the firing line, and have to hold Wasenhof, the group of houses in front of us, and also a front of 100 metres to the right of that place on the Wasenhof—Ebersbach road, where we connect with our No. 1 Coy. The 2nd and 3rd Bns., 10th Inf. Regt., are to remain here. The dressing station is at Ziegelberg. No. 1 Section will extend on both sides of this track and advance to the southern edge of Wasenhof, which it will prepare for an obstinate defence. No. 2 Section will extend behind No. 1 Section, and will advance with its left to Wasenhof, and will hold the line from Wasenhof as far as the left of our No. 1 Coy. It will establish itself in that position. No. 3 Section will form the support behind the house with the red roof. The signallers will establish a station at the northern edge of Wasenhof and get communication with the brigade signalling station at Ziegelberg. I shall follow No. 1 Section to Wasenhof."

The company commander then dismounted and followed No. 1 Section, which was already extended, to Wasenhof. There he personally superintended the preparation of the houses for defence.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN, AND ACTION OF, THE 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

About 10.45 a.m., as the firing lines of the 1st Bn., 10th Infantry Regt., crossed the Ziegelberg ridge and began to descend to Wasenhof, they came under a fairly heavy fire from Asbach; this fire, however, was not particularly effective, as the range was very long. A few men were wounded. No. 1 Coy., 10th Inf. Regt., had one man killed, shot through the chest. The allotted position was reached without further difficulty, the last 100 metres being covered at the double. No. 1 Coy. and one section of No. 2 Coy. occupied the ditch of the Ebersbach—Wasenhof road. No. 2 Coy. held Wasenhof. The position along the road was strengthened by deepening the ditch,

the men digging lying down and shooting in turn. The buildings of Wasenhof were placed in a state of defence.

At 11 a.m., as the firing lines of the 2nd and 3rd Bns., 13th Inf. Regt., left the southern edge of the small wood, they came under fire from Asbach and from the ground west of that village. The firing lines, however, reached their position without suffering any considerable loss. The position could only be strengthened at certain points, and that gradually, as immediately it was occupied it became necessary to keep up a steady fire.

It appeared that the enemy had strong firing lines moving from the hilly ground south of Asbach towards the Glonn, and that his infantry had occupied the bushes along the bank of the river. Their fire was chiefly directed against the left flank of the 2nd Inf. Bde., and against the 2nd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt. The troops holding Asbach were engaged in a well-sustained fire fight with the 3rd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., and the 1st Bn., 10th Inf. Regt. No. 2 Coy., 10th Inf. Regt., at Wasenhof did not come under any heavy fire after it had occupied that place.

The brigadier could only see, from his position at Ziegelberg, that part of the field in which the 10th Inf. Regt. and the left flank of the 13th Inf. Regt. (3rd Bn.) were engaged; the remaining portion was concealed by the small wood south of Ziegelberg.

The noise of battle increased every quarter of an hour, and at 11.45 a.m. there appeared to be a heavy fight opposite Ebersbach, that is to say, in front of the centre of the division.

The 1st *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., east of Aufhausen, kept up a hot fire on Asbach and on the infantry west of that place; its fire seemed to be well directed and to be effective.

The following information was available up to 11.45 a.m., partly from verbal reports and partly from signed messages sent in by the portions of the brigade engaged:—

The 2nd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., had 3 companies in the firing line and 1 company in reserve at the southern edge of the small wood. The 3rd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., had all its 4 companies engaged from the first, and had only a few sections held back as supports at the edge of the wood. No part of the battalion held in reserve by the commander of the 13th Inf. Regt. had yet been engaged.

The machine gun company had taken up a covered position in the corner of the wood jutting out towards Asbach, and was actively engaged. The rattle of its guns was specially noticeable whenever the enemy's firing line moved forward.

The enemy's firing lines opposite the 13th Inf. Regt. had, at 11.45 a.m., got to within 600 metres of the position. At this point the fire fight appeared to become stationary. It was also at a stand opposite the 10th Inf. Regt., which had only 2 companies, Nos. 1 and 2, deployed. The enemy's troops holding the northern edge of Asbach had not advanced beyond the village.

The company in Wasenhof, which was favourably placed for observation, reported by signal that the enemy's infantry on hill 496, between Asbach and Kollbach, was entrenching, that hostile cavalry were assembled at Höckhof, and that the enemy was signalling towards the west from Kollbach church.

The infantry section holding Petershausen bridge reported that

the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. had come in from Glonbercha at 11 a.m., had crossed the Glonn at Petershausen, and had taken up a position at Petershausen station. The section had also met hostile cavalry (apparently a brigade) at Höckhof. This cavalry had attempted to cross Petershausen bridge, but had been driven back by the fire of the infantry.

An officer of the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. arrived at brigade headquarters at 11.45 a.m. He had come from divisional headquarters, and reported that news had come in there that the right flank of the army was victorious, and that the divisional commander had said that he was only awaiting the arrival of the 1st Inf. Bde. to attack with his whole division. The cavalry officer said that he had left the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. at Petershausen station $\frac{3}{4}$ hour ago, and was riding back there.

The brigade major (*adjutant*) explained the situation and the dispositions of the 11th Inf. Bde. to the officer, and requested that important information should be repeated to the 11th Inf. Bde. He pointed out to him the signalling station of the brigade at Ziegelberg, which might be of use as a transmitting station to divisional headquarters.

At 11.50 a.m. the following signalling message from the division arrived:—

“23. XI., 11.47 a.m.

“Right wing of army victorious. Whole will attack.

2nd Inf. Bde. on bend in road 1,000 metres south of Asbach.

11th Inf. Bde. east and west of Asbach.

1st Inf. Bde. through Petershausen on hill 496, west of Kollbach and Kollbach.

1st Inf. Bde. begins attack.

Through 11th Inf. Bde. to 1st Inf. Bde.—Acknowledge.

1st Inf. Div.”

The brigadier sent his brigade major (*adjutant*) with this order to the 1st Inf. Bde., and directed him to explain the situation to that brigade. He then dictated the following order to the adjutants of the 10th and 13th Inf. Regts., who had been called up:—

“23. XI.

“(time not yet inserted.)

“1. The right flank of the army is victorious. The whole army will attack.

“2. The 1st Inf. Division, on the left flank, will seize the heights on the far bank of the Glonn; the 2nd Inf. Bde. on the right is advancing on Jedenhofen—bend in the road 1,000 metres south of Asbach; 1st Inf. Bde. on the left will advance through Petershausen on hill 496, west of Kollbach (inclusive)—Kollbach.

“3. The 11th Inf. Bde. in the centre will seize Asbach and the hills east of that place.

“4. The 10th Inf. Regt. will deploy with its left flank on both sides of the railway embankment, right flank (1st Bn.) on Asbach bridge. Objective north and east front of Asbach, and hill 200 metres east of that place. It will get connection with 13th Inf. Regt. and with the 1st Inf. Bde. Two companies will be at my disposal at the railway crossing south-west of Petershausen.

"5. The 13th Inf. Regt. will support the attack of the 10th Inf. Regt., the left of which it will extend at the proper moment. Its left will move due south on Asbach; its right will connect with the 2nd Inf. Bde.

"6. Empty S.A.A. carts to Ziegelberg. Brigade headquarters at that place.

X.,

Major-General, commanding Brigade."

This order was not issued at once. The advance of the 1st Inf. Bde., which was to give the time for the attack, was awaited.

At 12.15 p.m. a field officer of the field artillery galloped up to Ziegelberg hill and reported that he had been directed to support and accompany the attack of the 11th Inf. Bde. with the 2nd *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt. He stated that his *Abteilung* was following him from Edenpfaffenhofen.

The brigadier rapidly explained the situation to him, and directed him to bring fire from Ziegelberg upon Asbach and any targets east of that place. He told him that the 11th Inf. Bde. would make its main attack with its left, where the 10th Inf. Regt. would attack the north-east part of Asbach.

The following was then added to the written order:—

"The 2nd *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., will be in position at Ziegelberg and support the attack of the 11th Inf. Bde. Target Asbach."

Meanwhile, the brigade major (*adjutant*) returned and reported that he had met the 1st Inf. Bde. at the exit of the wood on the Jetzendorf—Petershausen road, 1,200 metres north-west of Petershausen. He said that the brigade would pass through Petershausen in about half an hour. The brigade major then made himself acquainted with the instructions issued by his commander during his absence.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN, AND ACTION OF, THE 1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.

We will now turn to the 1st Inf. Bde. (Body Guard Inf. Regt.—1st Inf. Regt.). The orderly officer sent from divisional headquarters, at 10 a.m. had met the brigadier at the head of the 4 battalions of his brigade in Stachussried, just as the latter was about to ride forward in order to get touch with the divisional commander at Aufhausen. In consequence of the order:—"to form up the brigade in the wood 1 kilometre north-east of Sollern, on both sides of the Jetzendorf—Petershausen road, and be at the disposal of the divisional commander," he had directed his march at once on Thann. At 12 noon, when the brigade major (*adjutant*) of the 11th Inf. Bde. reached the 1st Inf. Bde., the whole of the latter brigade was assembled at the place ordered, the 2 battalions of the 1st Inf. Regt. having marched in from Aufhausen by way of Kreithof.

The Body Guard Inf. Regt. was north, and the 1st Inf. Regt. south, of the Jetzendorf—Petershausen road. The brigade was drawn up as follows:—Each regiment had 2 battalions, at 100 metres interval, with the head at the edge of the wood, and 1 battalion

écheloned to the flank, at 200 metres interval and distance. The machine gun companies of both regiments were in column of route, that of the 1st Inf. Regt. leading, on the Jetzendorf—Petershausen road, about 1,500 metres from the south-east edge of the wood. The battalions were drawn up in column of squads. The brigadier was on the road between the regiments, the regimental commanders being with him, and was engaged in issuing orders for observation and protection.

S.A.A. carts, telephone detachments, and led horses were with their battalions. The field kitchens were behind the machine gun companies under a supply officer, and had been told to halt on the road inside the wood until further orders.

The brigade major (*adjutant*) of the 11th Inf. Bde. arrived shortly after midday with the divisional order given above. A few minutes afterwards an orderly officer sent direct from divisional headquarters brought a second copy.

The brigadier thereupon issued the following verbal order to his regimental commanders, who were with him, at 12.30 p.m.:—

"The enemy is holding the far bank of the Glonn; his right is at present at Asbach. He is entrenching between Asbach and Kollbach. A strong force of hostile cavalry is south of Petershausen. The 1st Inf. Div. is holding the near bank of the Glonn from Petershausen to Wasenhof. The 11th Inf. Bde., which is nearest to us, has its left at Wasenhof. The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. is at Petershausen station. One section of the 11th Inf. Bde. is holding Petershausen bridge.

"The right flank of the army is victorious; the whole army will attack.

"The 2nd Inf. Bde. is moving on Jedenhofen and east of that place, the 11th Inf. Bde. on Asbach.

"The 1st Inf. Bde. will seize hill 496, west of Kollbach, and Kollbach.

"The brigade will deploy on either side of the road to Petershausen. The 1st Inf. Regt. will be on the right; the Body Guard Inf. Regt. will have one battalion on the left connecting with the 1st Inf. Regt. The brigade will move through Petershausen and attack the line indicated. The 1st Inf. Regt. will have its left on the line Petershausen—Kollbach road—hill 496, and will take up 800 metres of front. The battalion of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. will move on Kollbach church tower, frontage 300 metres.

"The remainder of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. will take up a covered position at Petershausen station, and be at my disposal.

"The medical personnel and material will be at the disposal of the regimental medical officer of the 1st Inf. Regt., who will control the medical services of the brigade. Dressing station at Petershausen; chief dressing station at Aufhausen; collecting station for slightly wounded at Edenpfaffenhofen.

"Empty S.A.A. carts to Sollern under a cyclist officer of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. Field kitchens remain in the wood north-west of Petershausen. Brigade orders will be issued as to bringing them up.

"Brigade headquarters will be at Petershausen station. Regiments will arrange signalling communication with that place."

1ST INFANTRY REGIMENT.

The commander of the 1st Inf. Regt. issued the following orders, at 12.45 p.m., to his battalion commanders and the regimental medical officer, who had been sent for at once:—

"1. The medical personnel and material will be at the disposal of the regimental medical officer, who will superintend the medical services of the brigade. The brigade will deploy for attack against hill 496, west of Kollbach, and Kollbach. Dressing station at Petershausen; chief dressing station at Aufhausen; collecting station for slightly wounded at Edenpfaffenhofen.

"2. The 1st Bn. will advance on Petershausen with its left on the road; the 2nd Bn. will be on the right of the 1st Bn., at 400 metres interval. Petershausen is the large village in front of us; the regiment will move through it as far as the southern edge, but will not advance beyond it.

"Patrols will be sent ahead to hill 496, west of Kollbach.

"The 3rd Bn. will follow behind the centre, at 500 metres distance, as far as the north edge of Petershausen.

"The machine gun company will be in rear on the road. The Body Guard Inf. Regt. is moving east of the road.

"Battalion commanders and the commander of the machine gun company will come to me, as soon as possible, to the mill at the southern edge of Petershausen."

3. Verbal order issued to the battalion commanders and the commander of the machine gun company at the mill at 1 p.m.

"The right flank of the army is victorious, the whole army will attack. The 11th Inf. Bde., immediately on our right, is advancing on Asbach, the village which can be seen on the right flank in front of the railway embankment.

"The flat hill straight in front of us is the hill 496, west of Kollbach. The church tower visible to its left belongs to Kollbach.

"This hill, which is entrenched, is the objective of the regiment.

"The 2nd Bn. will deploy on the edge of the village on the right, the 1st Bn. on the left. Battalions will, on my signal, advance simultaneously to the attack. Frontage of each battalion 400 metres.

"The left flank of the 1st Bn. will move on the Petershausen—Kollbach road, it will connect with the Body Guard Inf. Regt. which is advancing on the far side of the road. The 3rd Bn. and the machine gun company will remain at the northern edge of Petershausen at my disposal. The battalion will observe towards Ziegelberg and Asbach, and keep in touch with the front line. The telephone detachment of the 3rd Bn. will be sent to me at the mill.

"Regimental headquarters will be at the mill."

BODY GUARD INFANTRY REGIMENT.

Meanwhile, the following orders had been issued verbally in the Body Guard Inf. Regt. at 12.45 p.m., shortly after receipt of the brigade order, to the commander of the 1st Bn.:—

"The right flank of the army is victorious, the army will attack.

"The 1st Inf. Bde. forms the left flank of the 1st Inf. Div., and will attack through Petershausen and Kollbach on hill 496, west of Kollbach. The 1st Inf. Regt. will deploy south of this road, the 1st Bn., Body Guard Inf. Regt., north of the road. This battalion will connect with the 1st Inf. Regt.

"The battalion will advance through Petershausen, with its right on the Petershausen—Kollbach road and its centre on Kollbach church, and will attack. Frontage 300 metres.

"The remainder of the regiment is in brigade reserve at Petershausen station.

"A detachment of the 11th Inf. Bde. is at Petershausen bridge. The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. is at Petershausen station. Empty S.A.A. carts to Sollern. Medical personnel and material will be sent to the regimental medical officer, 1st Inf. Regt. Dressing station for the whole brigade is at Petershausen."

The commander of the 1st Bn., Body Guard Inf. Regt., then gave the following instructions to his adjutant:—

"Have the ammunition issued from the S.A.A. carts. Then send the carts to Sollern. Send the medical personnel and material to the medical officer of the 1st Inf. Regt., which is on our right.

"Then have the battalion drawn up north of this road, and direct it on the further edge of Petershausen.

"No. 1 Coy. will be on the road level with the 1st Inf. Regt. with which it will connect; No. 2 Coy. on the left at 200 metres interval both companies in front line.

"Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. will be in second line, écheloned to the left at 200 metres distance and interval.

"The telephone detachment will follow No. 3 Coy. Patrols will be sent through Petershausen to Kollbach.

"Company commanders will come with me to Petershausen."

The battalion commander reached the outskirts of Petershausen, at the point where the road to Kollbach leaves the village, shortly before 1 p.m. with his company commanders. The party first examined the ground. There was a fairly extended view along the Glonn valley to the north-east. It was possible to recognize Goppertshausen on the north bank and Glonbercha on the south bank. The outlook to the south was less extensive. It is true that the valley itself, as far as the point where the hills on the south bank begin, was open to view, but the upper part of the hills themselves was not visible. The prolongation of the Petershausen road eastwards could be followed along a flat valley, behind which the church tower of Kollbach was visible. A small group of houses (Höckhof) could be seen west of the road, at the point where the valley mentioned above bends down towards the Glonn. Above Höckhof a flat-topped hill, hill 496, could be seen.

At first nothing was to be seen of the enemy, but an observation post of the section of the 11th Inf. Bde., part of which had been pushed forward to the bridge, while the remainder was in a covered position on the edge of the village, reported that strong bodies of hostile cavalry had been a short time before at Höckhof; that the enemy had been busily entrenching for the last hour on the hills west of Kollbach; and that during the same period a number of infantry patrols had been moving towards Petershausen.

The section commander reported that he was only waiting for the 1st Inf. Bde. to advance from Petershausen, to rejoin his brigade.

The battalion commander then turned to his company commanders and issued the following orders at 1.10 p.m. :—

“The right flank of the army is victorious. The whole army will attack. The 1st Inf. Div. forms the left flank. The 1st Inf. Regt. is advancing on our right against the flat-topped hill with the small bush in front of it. The 2nd and 3rd Bns., Body Guard Inf. Regt., are in brigade reserve at Petershausen station. The 1st Bn., Body Guard Inf. Regt., will seize Kollbach, the church tower of which is visible in prolongation of the line of this road. The church tower is the objective of the centre of the battalion in the advance. No. 1 Coy. will move with its right on the road, No. 2 Coy. will be on the left, both companies in first line, the frontage of each company being 100 metres. Strong patrols will be sent in advance.

“Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. with a telephone detachment will follow under my orders in échelon from the left, and will advance through the plantation in front of us.

“No. 3 Coy. will send an officer's patrol towards Weissling, and will have a strong flank patrol. The dressing station is at Petershausen.”

The commander of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. issued the following order at the same time to his 2nd and 3rd Bns. which were approaching Petershausen station :—

“The 2nd Bn. will halt with its head opposite the station building. The 3rd Bn. will form up on the left at 100 metres interval. Columns will be closed up to 200 metres. The machine gun company will halt under cover between the railway crossing west of the station and the railway buildings. Battalion and company commanders will then come to the station. The 2nd Bn. will also send a signalling party there.”

The situation was then explained to the battalion and company commanders. The 2nd Bn. was directed to watch and reconnoitre the line Höckhof—Glonbercha, the 3rd Bn. to do the same on the line Glonbercha—Mitter-Marbach. The regimental adjutant placed a signalling station on the roof of the station building to get connection with the signallers of the 11th Inf. Bde. at Ziegelberg. He watched with his glasses the ground on which the brigade was deploying for the attack.

ORDERS ISSUED IN THE 10TH INFANTRY REGIMENT.

We will now return to the 11th Inf. Bde. The brigadier had seen the 1st Inf. Bde. moving down towards Petershausen between 12.45 and 1 p.m. He then issued the written order given above to his regiments so that they should receive it at 1 p.m. The orders issued in consequence by the 10th Inf. Regt., which had one battalion at Wasenhof, and the remainder of the regiment assembled east of Ziegelberg, were as follows :—

Verbal order issued at 1.10 p.m. to the commanders of 2nd and 3rd Bns., 10th Inf. Regt.

“The right flank of the army is victorious. The whole army will attack, the 1st Inf. Div. forming the left flank.

"The enemy has occupied Asbach in strength, and has reserves east of Asbach.

"The 13th Inf. Regt. will advance on our right with its left on Asbach. The 1st Inf. Bde. will advance through Petershausen, the large village in the valley on the left, against the flat-topped hill behind which the church tower of Kollbach is visible.

"The 10th Inf. Regt. will seize Asbach, and the small hill, 200 metres east of Asbach, on the far side of the railway. The 2nd Bn. will deploy with its right 150 metres east of Wasenhof, where the 1st Bn. is, and with its left on the railway. It will advance to the attack on Asbach. Subsequently, the direction of the right flank will be on Asbach church.

"The 1st Bn. will join in this attack at the proper moment.

"The 3rd Bn., less Nos. 11 and 12 Coys., will cross the railway at the crossing west of Petershausen, and deploy for attack with its right on the railway embankment. It will advance on the small hill 200 metres east of Asbach in échelon from the right. It will keep touch with the 1st Inf. Bde.

"The machine gun company will gain the railway embankment behind the 3rd Bn., it will advance along the railway embankment to the attack. Nos. 11 and 12 Coys. will move to the railway crossing to be in brigade reserve.

"Empty S.A.A. carts to Ziegelberg.

"I will accompany the 2nd Bn. in its attack along the railway embankment, and be 300 metres behind the front line. The 2nd and 3rd Bns. will arrange connecting files with me. One signalling party from the 2nd Bn. will be sent to regimental headquarters. The dressing station is at Ziegelberg."

A message which ran as follows was sent by orderly to the 1st Bn. 10th Inf. Regt. :—

"23.XI., 1.15 p.m.

- "1. The right flank of the army is victorious, the army will attack.
- "2. The 2nd and 3rd Bns., 10th Inf. Regt., are advancing on Asbach on both sides of the embankment. The right of the 2nd Bn. will be 150 metres east of Wasenhof. Thence it will move on Asbach church.
- "3. The 1st Bn. will join in this attack at the proper moment. The objective of its right will be Asbach bridge. The 13th Inf. Regt. is advancing west of Asbach.
- "4. Regimental headquarters are on the embankment behind the 2nd Bn. Get communication with them from Wasenhof by signal."

The commander of the 2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., issued the following verbal order to his company commanders* at 1.15 p.m. :—

- "1. Empty the S.A.A. carts and send them to Ziegelberg ; led horses to the same place."

* The battalion was drawn up in the valley about 300 metres north-east of Ziegelberg, facing south-east. The four companies were drawn up in line of columns of squads, at 20 paces interval, in the following order from the west : Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 Coys.

"2. Medical personnel and material will be sent to the regimental medical officer.

"3. (Assuming that the company commanders have made themselves familiar with the country.)

"The right flank of the army is victorious, the whole army will attack, with the 1st Division on the left flank. Asbach is held in strength and the enemy has reserves east of that place. The 1st Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., is advancing on Asbach on our right. Our 3rd Bn. is moving on our left on the far side of the railway against hill 200, east of Asbach. The 1st Inf. Bde. is attacking still further to the east.

"The battalion will advance for 500 metres towards the railway, and will deploy to the right. Objective Asbach.

"Nos. 6, 7, and 8 Coys. will be in first line. No. 6 Coy. will connect with the 3rd Bn. and move with its left on the railway. The battalion will attack Asbach from the railway on the left to the church on the right, frontage of each company 150 metres.

"No. 5 Coy. will form the battalion reserve, at the gravel pit near the railway embankment, and will keep communication with No. 6 Coy. by means of connecting files.

"The machine gun company will follow No. 6 Coy. and support the attack. The signallers of No. 6 Coy. will be sent to regimental headquarters.

"I will order the deployment of the companies and afterwards be with No. 5 Coy.

"No. 6 Coy. will remain close to No. 5 Coy. while the change of direction to the left is being carried out. Nos. 7 and 8 Coys. will advance at 150 metres distance between companies.

"The telephone detachment will join No. 5 Coy. It will then follow under escort of the machine gun company, which is moving along the embankment. The dressing station for the 10th Inf. Bde. is at Ziegelberg.

"Move off by companies."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION UP TO 2 P.M.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN, AND ACTION OF, THE 1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.

The fire fight had remained stationary opposite the 13th Inf. Regt. The 3rd Bn. of that regiment was very heavily engaged, for the enemy opposite to it had established himself within 500 metres, in good cover amongst the bushes and along the bank of the Glonn. The losses in the 3rd Bn. were considerable, for the enemy was shooting well and the battalion had not much cover. It had only been possible to deepen the ditch along the road slightly, as the battalion had become heavily engaged at once.

The 1st Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., which extended the left of the 13th Inf. Bde. as far as Wasenhof, had for a time opened fire on Asbach, but owing to the length of the range this fire was soon stopped. When the order to attack arrived at 1.20 p.m., the right flank had been left in position, but the left flank and centre advanced further into the valley, changing direction on Asbach. At 1.30 p.m. 3 companies

were deployed in the front line, and were firing on the part of Asbach designated as the objective of the attack. The firing lines of the 2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., were at that time on the left of the 1st Bn., in the area between Wasenhof and the railway, and had opened fire on the part of Asbach east of the church, which was not strongly held.

The enemy had deployed a fresh firing line, which was, however, not very strong. It was lying partly in trenches and partly in the open on the far side of the railway. This firing line became engaged with the skirmishers of the 1st Inf. Regt. advancing from Petershausen, and with the right of the 3rd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., which was on the railway embankment. At this period the position of the attackers ran generally along the lane leading from Asbach to Höckhof. There was a gap of 150 metres between the 3rd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., and the 1st Inf. Regt.

A very heavy fire fight soon developed here. There was no news at the headquarters of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. of the 1st Bn. of the regiment, which was engaged on the far side of the Petershausen—Kollbach road.

The 7th F.A. Regt., in position east of Aufhausen, directed a heavy fire upon Asbach. The artillery *Abteilung* at Ziegelberg was enfilading the enemy's firing lines on the far side of the railway embankment. At 1.45 p.m. fire broke out at several points in Asbach.

The regimental commander was informed by the 3rd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., that the battalion was beginning to run short of ammunition. The commander of the 13th Inf. Regt. therefore sent the following order to the commander of his 1st Bn. at 1.50 p.m. :—

“Issue the ammunition in your S.A.A. carts to one of your companies, and send that company forward so that it is distributed over the whole front of the 3rd Bn., in order to supply that battalion with ammunition. Empty S.A.A. carts of all battalions to Ziegelberg.”

At 2 p.m. it was seen that the attack of the 10th Inf. Regt., and also that of the 1st Inf. Regt. on the far side of the embankment was gaining ground. The commander of the 13th Inf. Regt. therefore sent the following message by signal to the front line of his regiment :—

“Left flank of 3rd Bn. will attack west of Kollbach, right flank of 2nd Bn. will connect with 2nd Inf. Bde.”

The following information as to the position beyond the railway line had been obtained at the headquarters of the 11th Inf. Bde. at Ziegelberg and at the headquarters of the 1st Inf. Bde. at Petershausen station :—

Shortly before the firing lines of the 1st Inf. Bde. had emerged from Petershausen, hostile firing lines had been seen advancing over hill 496. These firing lines descended part of the slope towards the Glonn, and took up a position just north of the Asbach—Kollbach lane. The 1st Inf. Regt. came very soon under the fire of this firing line, which was, however, not very strong. Its firing line lay down level with the Asbach—Höckhof lane, and advanced then by rushes towards the enemy's position. By 1.45 p.m. the left had got beyond Höckhof.

The fire fight here soon became heavy. The 1st Bn., Body Guard Inf. Regt., had been seen to disappear among the hills on the far bank of the Glonn, but no message had been received from it. The battalion, therefore, appeared to have met no serious obstacle in its advance on Kollbach. The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. had crossed Petershausen bridge behind the 1st Bn., Body Guard Inf. Regt., and had advanced in the direction of Glonbercha and Kammerberg.

Shortly before 1.45 p.m., the commander of the 1st Inf. Bde. sent the following order to the commander of the Body Guard Inf. Regt.:—

"I place at your disposal the 2 battalions and the machine gun company which are here. Advance across the Glonn valley and occupy Kollbach. Observe and protect the left flank.

"Brigade headquarters will be at Petershausen at the exit of the road to Kollbach."

The commander of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. then issued the following verbal order at 1.50 p.m.:—

"The regiment will advance and extend the left of the 1st Bn. which is attacking on Kollbach church. The advance will be directed on the centre of Kollbach. Kollbach is to be captured.

"The 2nd Bn. will advance across the Glonn valley, and will move on Kollbach, with its right in the wood which can be seen on the other side of the valley. It will get connection with the 1st Bn. Strong patrols will be sent on at once through the plantation. Frontage 400 metres.

"The 3rd Bn. will follow in échelon on the left, at 300 metres interval and distance, and be at my disposal. Regimental headquarters will accompany this battalion. It will observe towards Weissling and Waltenhofen.

"The machine gun company will cross the Glonn at Petershausen, follow the 2nd Bn. and support the attack.

"The 2nd Chevaulegers is either in front of us, or on our left flank."

The Body Guard Inf. Regt. was approaching the hills on the far bank of the Glonn about 2 p.m. when the adjutant of the 1st Bn. was seen running back, and asking for the regimental commander.

Scattered infantry fire was heard from the direction of Kollbach, but a loud roar of battle came from the direction of Höckhof.

The adjutant of the 1st Bn. reported as follows:—

"Kollbach is ours. Two companies hold the southern edge, and two companies are engaged on the western edge with the right flank of the enemy on hill 496. They are in close touch with the 1st Inf. Regt. The enemy appears to be deploying a weak reserve from Piflitz towards Kollbach.

"The capture of Kollbach took place almost without a struggle. We came under some fire in advancing out of the small plantation at Kollbach, but then captured the village at the first rush. We took about 100 of the enemy's dragoons prisoners."

The regimental commander then gave the following verbal order to the 2nd Bn., Body Guard Inf. Regt.:—

"Kollbach is taken; the 1st Bn. at the south-west corner of the village is engaged with the enemy's right. Join in this attack. The machine gun company is placed under your orders.

"The 3rd Bn. will be at my disposal in the eastern part of Kollbach."

Events developed in this part of the battlefield as follows :—

The participation of the 2nd Bn., Body Guard Inf. Regt., in the attack on hill 496 compelled the enemy's flank, which was already turned sharply back at this point, to give way. By 2.30 p.m. the enemy had begun to retire, and a few minutes afterwards it was seen from the western edge of Kollbach that the whole of the enemy's line on hill 496 was withdrawing in a southerly direction. As this retirement came under the enfilade fire of some companies of the 1st and 2nd Bns., Body Guard Inf. Regt., and also of the machine gun company it soon grew confused and turned into a flight, the more so as it came under the fire of the *Abteilung* of the 7th F.A. Regt., which was in action at Ziegelberg.

The 1st Inf. Regt. followed the enemy closely and pursued his firing lines, part of which was retiring on to the Rettenberg road and part on the woods north of Vierkirchen, with fire from hill 496. The portions of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. at the southern edge of Kollbach also directed its fire upon them. The fire of the two machine gun companies which were in the centre of the infantry line was particularly effective.

A weak attack coming from the direction of Piflitz, apparently delivered by dismounted cavalry, was easily driven off. The 2nd Chevaulegers surprised and charged this portion of the enemy and completed his annihilation.

When the commander of the 1st Inf. Bde. reached Kollbach shortly before 2.45 p.m., he found $2\frac{1}{2}$ battalions and the machine gun company deployed along the Asbach—Kollbach road; 2 companies were following by way of Höckhof.

Parts of the 1st and 2nd Bns. of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. near Kollbach church, and part of the machine gun company, were pursuing the enemy with fire from the southern edge of the village.

The 3rd Bn. was in the eastern part of the village at the disposal of the regimental commander.

Thin hostile firing lines were seen, from the position of the 1st Inf. Regt., climbing the opposite slopes, some slowly, others quickly.

Two companies, who were retiring east of the Rettenbach road, had just disappeared behind the hill south of Kollbach. The 2nd Chevaulegers appeared to be engaged with hostile cavalry in the direction of Piflitz.

At 2.45 p.m. the 2nd *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., appeared from the direction of Petershausen on hill 496, unlimbered in the middle of the firing lines of the 1st Inf. Regt., being greeted with cheers by the infantry, and opened fire on the enemy who were retiring on the woods north of Vierkirchen.

In these circumstances the brigadier gave the following verbal order, at 2.50 p.m., to his regimental commanders who were with him :—

"The brigade will pursue the enemy, who is retiring on both sides of the Kollbach—Rettenbach road; the 1st Inf. Regt. will be west, and the Body Guard Inf. Regt. east of the road. Next objective the southern edge of the woods in front. The Body Guard Inf. Regt., will leave 6 companies at Kollbach at my disposal. The

artillery will support and accompany the advance of the brigade. The 2nd Chevaulegers are on the left front near Piflitz. Brigade headquarters will be on the Kollbach—Rettenbach road.”

The orderly officer of the brigade then brought the following verbal order to the 2nd *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt.:—

“The commander of the 1st Inf. Bde. commands in this portion of the battle-field until the divisional commander arrives.

“The 1st Inf. Bde. is pursuing the retreating enemy on both sides of the Kollbach—Rettenbach road.

“The 2nd *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., will support and accompany the advance of the brigade.

“Brigade headquarters will be on the Kollbach—Rettenbach road.”

The brigade major (*adjutant*) had, meanwhile, prepared the following message, which was sent by the orderly officer to divisional headquarters:—

To the 1st Inf. Div. at Aufhausen. Kollbach.

“23. XI. 2.45 p.m.

“Kollbach and hill 496, west of Kollbach, have been captured.

“The 1st Inf. Bde. and the 2nd *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., are pursuing the retreating enemy on both sides of the Kollbach—Rettenbach road. The enemy’s right is on that road.

“The 2nd Chevaulegers have made a successful charge near Piflitz, and are covering the left flank of the brigade.

“Brigade headquarters will be on the Kollbach—Rettenbach road.

“Will endeavour to get signalling connection with Aufhausen from Kollbach church.

X.,

“Major-General, commanding Brigade.”

An orderly was sent with the following written message to the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt.:—

“Kollbach, 23. XI., 2.50 p.m.

“I have taken over command on the flank until the arrival of the divisional commander. The 1st Inf. Bde. is pursuing the retreating enemy on both sides of the Kollbach—Rettenbach road.

“Cover my left flank and accompany the advance.

“It is especially important to reconnoitre through Kammerberg towards Rettenbach—Weidenhof—Biberbach.

“Keep communication with brigade headquarters on the Kollbach—Rettenbach road.

X.,

“Major-General, commanding Brigade.”

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY, AND ACTION OF, THE DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.

We will now turn to the divisional headquarters and examine its action from the moment when the divisional commander gave the order for the attack. This order was sent to the 2nd Inf. Bde. by telephone, and to the 11th and 1st Inf. Bdes. by flag, a second copy was also sent to the latter by an orderly officer.

The divisional commander then moved to the hill north of

Ebersbach, in order to get a better view of the battle-field. An officer of the staff and the divisional flag were left at the old position to point out the way to the divisional commander.

At noon an officer from the army corps headquarters arrived and reported that one infantry and one artillery ammunition column would be at Eggersried at 2 p.m., at the disposal of the 1st Inf. Div., and 2 field hospitals at 1 p.m. at Edenpfaffenhofen.

The divisional medical officer proposed to establish one field hospital at Aufhausen, where the chief dressing station was already overcrowded, in order that he might be able to free the personnel and material as early as possible. He also proposed to keep the second field hospital for the present at Edenpfaffenhofen as a reserve. The divisional commander agreed and directed the divisional medical officer to issue the necessary instructions.

As regards the empty S.A.A. carts of the brigades engaged, reports had been received that those of the 2nd Bde. were at Edenpfaffenhofen, of the 11th Bde. at Ziegelberg, and of the 1st Bde. at Sollern.

The 2nd Inf. Bde., which had been in action throughout the forenoon, had reported by telephone that it was beginning to run short of ammunition.

The general staff officer prepared the following written orders on message forms between 12.30 and 1 p.m.

1. To 1st Inf. Am. Col. and 1st Arty. Am. Col. at Eggersried.

“Aufhausen 23. XI., 12.45 p.m.

“Both Am. Cols. are under the 1st Inf. Div. (at Aufhausen). The Inf. Am. Col. will leave four sections at Eggersried to fill up the S.A.A. carts of the 2nd Inf. Bde. which have been ordered to that place. The remainder will move by Thann to Sollern and Ziegelberg, where they will issue their ammunition to the S.A.A. carts of the 11th and 1st Inf. Bdes. Issue of ammunition to be expedited.

“The Arty. Am. Col. will move to Edenpfaffenhofen and be at the disposal of the 1st F.A. Bde.

“(1st Inf. Div.)”

2. To the commander, 1st F.A. Bde.

“Aufhausen 23. XI. 12.45 p.m.

“1st Arty. Am. Col. will reach Edenpfaffenhofen at 2 p.m. and will be under the 1st F.A. Bde. for ammunition supply.”

3, 4, 5. Corresponding messages were sent to the 2nd, 11th and 1st Inf. Bdes.

From his position the divisional commander had gathered the following information as to the development of the situation :—

The 2nd Inf. Bde. had gained ground to the front from Ebersbach, and was engaged in a heavy fire fight with the enemy's firing lines, which had taken cover in the bushes, etc., along the Glonn. The distance between the opposing lines was between 400 and 500 metres. The left flank of the brigade, which was drawn slightly back, was in touch with the 2nd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt. Here the distance between the lines was somewhat greater and the fire was less intense. But about 1 p.m. the noise of battle increased here too to a noticeable extent. About 1.30 p.m. the firing lines of the 13th Inf. Regt. began to work forward, and gained ground slowly but steadily. The

advance of the 10th Inf. Regt. between the railway and Wasenhof had been observed some time previously.

Hostile firing lines were seen deployed beyond Asbach. These were opposing the attack of the 1st Inf. Bde. Part of the 1st F.A. Regt. was in position south of Aufhausen, engaged with hostile artillery at Jedenhofen. The greater part of the regiment, however, was supporting the attack of the 2nd Inf. Bde., and was distributing its shrapnel over the whole of the front opposed to that brigade.

The 1st *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., was firing from the heights east of Aufhausen at Asbach, which, by 1.45 p.m., had been set on fire at various points. By 2 p.m. the firing lines of the 13th and 10th Inf. Regts. had encircled Asbach on all sides, and were barely 200 metres from the edge of that place. Some of the attackers appeared to have penetrated the village at certain points. The 1st *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., had changed its target and was directing its fire on the enemy's firing lines outside the village.

By 2.30 p.m., the enemy opposed to the 2nd Inf. Bde. and the right of the 13th Inf. Regt. had been pushed back to Jedenhofen, and the heights between that place and Asbach, the attackers following down to and over the Glonn. Part of the 13th Inf. Regt. had pushed into the southern portion of Asbach, and a fierce fight was raging in the village. At that moment the 1st Divisional Adjutant who was watching with his glasses the country about Asbach, said :— "The enemy is retiring from hill 496."

Long firing lines were seen descending the slope of hill 496, moving south. They came at once under fire of the 2nd *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt. Shortly afterwards a signalling party was seen at work on the church tower of Kollbach, which was clearly visible. The message was read with the help of glasses and ran as follows :—

"Kollbach captured, the enemy is retiring south. 1st Inf. Bde."

Soon after the enemy's firing lines had begun to retire, the attacking firing lines appeared on hill 496, and were seen to be pursuing the enemy with fire. About 2.45 p.m. artillery was seen to come into action in the middle of these firing lines and to open fire in a southerly direction. It was assumed that the 2nd *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., which had originally been in position at Ziegelberg, had taken up a new position on the south bank of the Glonn.

In Asbach, too, things grew quieter. Single men were seen retiring eastward. The fire in the village slackened. Companies were seen assembling at the edge of the village, and these were recognized to be part of the attacking force.

About 3 p.m., the divisional commander sent an adjutant to the artillery commander of the division with the following order :—

"The enemy's right is giving way. Asbach, hill 496, and Kollbach, have been captured. The 2nd *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., is already on hill 496. The division will continue its attack on the far bank of the Glonn.

"The whole of the artillery will change position as soon as possible to the heights on the far bank and will support the further attack of the division.

"Divisional headquarters. are going to hill 496, west of Kollbach."

An officer was then left near Aufhausen, the motor cars were ordered to Kollbach by way of Petershausen, and divisional head-

quarters then galloped off to Asbach, whither the telephone detachment was also ordered.

Just before reaching Asbach, the commanders of the 11th Inf. Bde. and of the 10th Inf. Regt. were met on their way to that place. The brigadier reported as follows :—

“Asbach has been taken. The greater part of the 10th Inf. Regt. and about 6 companies of the 13th Inf. Regt. are in the place. I have ordered the latter companies to assemble outside the village.

“The garrison of Asbach, about 2 battalions strong, has been captured. There are about 1,000 unwounded prisoners of the enemy's 40th Inf. Regt. There are a large number of wounded in Asbach. It is urgently necessary to establish a dressing station at that place. The brigade does not, however, possess the necessary personnel and material for this.”

Thereupon the divisional commander issued the following orders :—

A. Verbally to the senior medical officer of the division who was riding with him :—

“See to the wounded in Asbach. The personnel and material of the chief dressing station must, by this time, have been relieved by No. 1 Field Hospital. No. 2 Field Hospital will only be employed if it is absolutely necessary. Report the steps you take to me at Kollbach.”

B. Verbal order to the commander of the 11th Inf. Bde. :—

“The division will continue to push the enemy in a southerly direction with the 1st Inf. Bde., which has captured Kollbach and hill 496, west of that place. The 2nd Inf. Bde. will also continue its attack. The 11th Inf. Bde., except that part which is in the firing line, will assemble at Asbach and form the divisional reserve. All prisoners will be sent to Asbach. Report the strength and position of the brigade as soon as possible to Kollbach, whither divisional headquarters are now riding.”

The divisional commander arrived at Kollbach, at the exit of the Rettenbach road, at 3.30 p.m. There the commander of the 1st Inf. Bde. reported to him what had happened up to 3.15 p.m., and also the steps he had taken. The divisional commander expressed his concurrence in the latter.

The following view was obtainable from hill 496 :—

Below, to the right, the Glonn valley from Petershausen as far as the neighbourhood of Weichs was in view. The whole of Asbach, which was in flames, could be overlooked, but a spur, which runs parallel with hill 496 and projects south of Asbach like a tongue into the Glonn valley, hid the ground round Jedenhofen. This spur, which is somewhat lower than hill 496, was in full view, but the valley which runs south of it, in which begin the woods crowning hill 481, north of Vierkirchen, could not be seen. The northern edge of these woods was not in view. Behind hill 496, which is entirely covered with woods and not sharply defined, is a bare hill, point 506, south-west of Rettenbach, and east and west of it are church towers, that on the right belonging to Vierkirchen, that on the left to Rettenbach. About 500 metres of the road running south from Kollbach to Rettenbach were in view, the road then disappeared behind the ridge mentioned above. East of the road lies hilly country

visible as far as Piflitz, a hamlet consisting of a few houses on an isolated hill. Beyond Piflitz a church tower believed to be that of Kammerberg was to be seen. There was nothing more of the enemy to be seen. In front, on the ridge running parallel with hill 496, the firing lines of the 1st Inf. Bde. could be discerned firing southwards at an enemy who appeared to be holding the northern edges of the above mentioned woods. On the right of the 1st Inf. Regt. the firing lines of the 3rd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., extended as far as the railway. Beyond the railway embankment in the Glonn valley parts of the 2nd Inf. Bde. could be seen near the foot of the hills on the near bank. It therefore appeared that the trenches east of Jedenhofen, which the enemy had recently occupied, were not yet captured.

At 3.45 p.m. the 1st *Abteilung*, 7th F.A. Regt., came into action on hill 496 alongside the 2nd *Abteilung*, and turned its fire on the woods. Fire was controlled by telephone from the ridge on which were the firing lines of the 1st Inf. Regt. The 1st F.A. Regt. was still firing at Jedenhofen from its old position. A few troopers of the 2nd Chevaulegers were seen near Piflitz looking out to the west, but nothing was visible of the main body of the regiment. The 2nd Inf. Bde. reported that it had not yet been able to take the enemy's trenches east of Jedenhofen, but that it hoped to storm them shortly. The 16th Inf. Regt. had entered Jedenhofen and was engaged in a fierce fight in that place. Farther to the west, the 2nd Inf. Div. seemed to be making good progress.

The commander of the 11th Inf. Bde. reported that he had 4 battalions, each of about 600 men, available at the railway embankment north-east of Asbach. He added that the 1st Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., was engaged alongside the 2nd Inf. Bde.; that one battalion 10th Inf. Regt. was in action alongside the 1st Inf. Bde. with its right on the railway; that one company was guarding about 1,000 prisoners who had been placed in Asbach church; and that parts of the medical company and field hospital had come up.

At 4 p.m. the front lines of the 1st Inf. Regt. and of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. reported that the enemy in the woods was beginning to give way. The adjutant, who was watching the 2nd Inf. Bde., also observed that it was moving forward.

The divisional commander then issued the following order at 4.30 p.m., the commanders of the 1st Inf. Bde. and of the 7th F.A. Regt. being present; six copies were also made by two officers provided with copying materials:—

“Kollbach, 23. XI, 4.30 p.m.

“Divisional order, No. 3, for 23. XI.

“1. The enemy's right has been driven back from the line Asbach—Kollbach, and is retiring through the woods south of that line.

“2. The division is pursuing.

“3. The 2nd Inf. Bde. to which the battalion of the 13th Inf. Regt. alongside it is attached, will seize Jedenhofen and the neighbouring heights; it will then advance to the line Esterhofen station (exclusive)—Vierkirchen (inclusive). Its right will keep touch with the 2nd Inf. Div., its left will move on both sides of the Asbach—Vierkirchen road.

"4. The 1st Inf. Bde., with those detachments of the 11th Bde. between it and the railway line, will drive the enemy from the woods south of Kollbach, and capture Rettenbach. It will advance on both sides of the Kollbach—Rettenbach road, on the same front as before. It will observe and protect the left flank of the division, reconnoitring through Piflitz towards Giebing and the country south of Rettenbach.

"5. The 11th Inf. Bde. will form the divisional reserve, and move by the shortest route to Piflitz.

"6. The artillery will support the advance of the division. 1st F.A. Regt. will be with the 2nd Inf. Bde., 7th F.A. Regt. with the 1st Inf. Bde. Two batteries 7th F.A. Regt. will proceed at once by Piflitz to join the second Chevaulegers Regt.

"7. The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt., with 2 batteries 7th F.A. Regt. will attack through Kammerberg. It will reconnoitre on the line Kammerberg—Gross-Nöhbach, towards the line Rettenbach—Amperpettenbach. It will seize the bridge at Unter-Bruck.

"8. Divisional headquarters will be at Kollbach, and later will follow the 1st Inf. Bde. on the road to Rettenbach.

In writing to

2nd Chevaulegers.
2nd and 11th Inf. Bdes.
F.A. Bde.

A.,

"Lieut.-Gen., commanding
Division."

At the same time the following message was sent by cyclist by way of Petershausen, to the 2nd line transport of the division at Hilgertshausen :—

"1st Inf. Div.

Kollbach, 23. XI., 4.30 p.m.

"Supply wagons will move, at the head of the transport, which will march by Jetzendorf to Petershausen. Report arrival at Petershausen to divisional headquarters on the Kollbach—Rettenbach road.

1st Inf. Div."

(The 2nd line transport received this order at 5.30 p.m. and moved at once to Petershausen, the head of the column reaching that place about 7.30 p.m.)

The general staff officer then prepared the following report to Headquarters 1st Army Corps :—

To Headquarters, 1st Army Corps, 1 kilometre east of Erlshausen.

"Kollbach, 23. XI., 4.45 p.m.

"Enemy's right has been driven back from the line Asbach—Kollbach, through the woods south of that line.

"Division is pursuing to the line Esterhofen station—Vierkirchen—Rettenbach and thence according to circumstances. Left on both sides of the Kollbach—Rettenbach road. Divisional headquarters are at Kollbach, they will be subsequently along the road mentioned above.

A.,

Lieut.-General."

This report was sent to Army Corps Headquarters by motor car. The orderly officer in charge of it was told to order the pioneer company, which was still at Aufhausen, to move through Asbach to Kollbach and there wait for orders.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN, AND ACTION OF, THE 1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.

In consequence of the above divisional order the commander of the 1st Inf. Bde. issued the following order:—

“The brigade will pursue the enemy and will seize Vierkirchen, Rettenbach and Giebing.

“The 1st Inf. Regt., to which the detachments of the 11th Inf. Bde. as far as the railway are attached, will direct its right on the centre of the road between Vierkirchen and Rettenbach, and its left along the Kollbach—Rettenbach road.

“The Body Guard Inf. Regt. will extend the left. Frontage 400 metres. Its right will move on Rettenbach church tower; it will send officers' patrols on Giebing and Kammerberg and get touch with the 2nd Chevaulegers. The brigade reserve, with which brigade headquarters will move, will follow along the Kollbach—Rettenbach road. The left flank of the 2nd Inf. Bde. is advancing on both sides of the Asbach—Vierkirchen road; the 2nd Chevaulegers are attacking through Kammerberg. The field kitchens will be moved to Kollbach under brigade orders. A supply or a cyclist officer from each regiment will be sent at once to brigade headquarters.”

Issued verbally by the brigade major (*adjutant*) to the 1st Inf. Regt. and the Body Guard Inf. Regt.

1ST INFANTRY REGIMENT.

Orders in the 1st Inf. Regt. issued verbally through the regimental adjutant, who galloped to the battalion commanders:—

“The brigade will pursue the retreating enemy through the woods in front and seize Vierkirchen, Rettenbach and Giebing.

“The Body Guard Inf. Regt. will advance left of the Kollbach—Rettenbach road. The 1st Inf. Regt., to which the companies of the 11th Inf. Bde. alongside it, as far as the railway, are attached, will advance on the right of that road.

“The frontage will be as before. The 1st Bn. will have its left on the above-mentioned road and will connect with the Body Guard Inf. Regt. The regimental reserve,* with which regimental headquarters will be, will follow behind the 1st Bn.”

The regimental adjutant then galloped to the battalion commander of the 10th Inf. Regt., who was in command of the troops on the right of the 1st Inf. Regt., and gave him the following verbal order:—

“According to divisional orders your battalion is attached to the 1st Inf. Regt., which is pursuing the enemy with its left on the Kollbach—Rettenbach road, and intends to seize the Vierkirchen—Rettenbach road.

* Two companies.

"Your battalion will be on the right and will connect with the 1st Inf. Regt. It will move on the centre of the road between Vierkirchen and Rettenbach, keeping touch with the 2nd Inf. Bde., the left of which is moving on both sides of the Asbach—Vierkirchen road. The regimental reserve, with which regimental headquarters are, is following behind the left flank of the regiment. The brigadier is on the Kollbach—Rettenbach road."

BODY GUARD INFANTRY REGIMENT.

The commander of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. issued the following verbal order to his two battalion commanders:—

"The brigade will pursue the enemy through the woods in front and seize the Vierkirchen—Rettenbach—Giebing road.

"The 1st Inf. Regt. is advancing on our right. The 2nd Chevau-legers, reinforced by artillery, are on our left. Field artillery will accompany our advance.

"The 1st Bn., with the machine gun company, will move with its right on the Kollbach—Rettenbach road. Frontage 400 metres. It will seize Rettenbach, which is on that road on the far side of the woods. The 2nd Bn.* will follow as regimental reserve. Regimental headquarters will be with it. It will be écheloned to the left at 300 metres distance, and advance through the gap in the woods which can be seen in front of us. It will send a strong officer's patrol of cyclists, and a party of signallers with lanterns by Piflitz on Giebing.

"Half the 2nd Bn. and the 3rd Bn. form the brigade reserve at Kollbach."

A supply officer belonging to the regiment was then directed to report himself at once to brigade headquarters at Kollbach, to bring up the field kitchens, and to inform the regiment, as soon as possible, of the arrival of the field kitchens at Kollbach.

1ST BN., BODY GUARD INF. REGT.

The following verbal order was issued by the commander of the 1st Bn., Body Guard Inf. Regt., to his battalion:—

"The enemy will be energetically pursued. Rettenbach, which lies beyond the woods at the end of this road, is to be captured.

"The 1st Inf. Regt. is advancing on our right, the 2nd Chevau-legers Regt., reinforced by artillery, is on our left. Field artillery will accompany our advance. Nos. 1 and 2 Coys. will be in the front line. No. 1 Coy. will be on the right with its right on the road, and will connect with No. 2 Coy. which will be on the left. Frontage of each company 150 metres. The first line will move at 100 metres distance from the second line and pursue the enemy through the woods in front. The front line will advance. Objective Rettenbach.

"The machine gun company will move at 50 metres distance behind the centre of the first line, and be ready to come into action at once.

"Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. will follow in the second line; No. 3 Coy. on the road, at 100 metres distance, No. 4 Coy. écheloned to the left, at 100

* Two companies.

metres interval and distance. These companies will reinforce the first line whenever necessary, I shall be with No. 3 Coy."

No. 1 COY., BODY GUARD INF. REGT.

1. Verbal order to No. 1 Section which was extended.

"The enemy will be pursued through the woods in front to Rettenbach, which lies on the far side of the woods at the end of this road. Rettenbach must be taken. The 1st Inf. Regt. is advancing on our right. No. 2 Coy., Body Guard Inf. Regt., on our left. The section will extend to 150 metres with its right on the road. It will gain 50 metres distance to the front, and push through the wood. Patrols will be sent to the far edge of the wood. The company is following."

2. To the remainder of the company, which was partly extended and partly in close order:—

"No. 1 Coy. on the move, close! Double!"

3. Verbal order issued on the move to Nos. 2 and 3 Sections:—

"When we reach the far edge of the wood we shall see the village of Rettenbach at the end of the road on our right. That village is our objective. Our right is to be on the road and our frontage is 150 metres.

"No. 2 Coy. is moving in touch with us on our left. No. 3 Coy., with which the battalion commander is, is moving directly behind us. The 2nd Bn. is following beyond the wood on the left flank. Our right is in touch with the 1st Inf. Regt. Field artillery is accompanying our advance."

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY, AND ACTION OF, THE DIVISIONAL HEAD-QUARTERS.

The divisional headquarters remained at Kollbach after issuing the order of 4.30 p.m.

At 5.50 p.m., as it was beginning to get dark, an officer from army corps headquarters arrived in Kollbach in a motor car with the following order:—

"1 kilometre east of Erlhausen, 23. XI., 4.30 p.m., to the 1st Inf. Div. at Kollbach by way of Petershausen.

"The enemy is retiring along the whole front. The right flank of the army is victorious, and is pushing forward to the Ober-Roth—Dachau road; Kloster-Indersdorf, Zillhofen, and Jedenhofen have been captured. The army will pursue the enemy to-day as far as the Amper.

"The left of the 2nd Inf. Div. will move by Vierkirchen—Milbertshofen—Hörgenbach on Fuchsberg.

"The 1st Inf. Div. will move on Fahrenzhausen and seize the crossings over the Amper there. Press on relentlessly.

"Prepare quarters for the division on the Kammerberg—Fahrenzhausen road (Giebing and Viehbach inclusive). The division will not halt until the Amper is reached.

"Corps headquarters will probably be at Rettenbach. Report position of divisional headquarters to that place.

"Headquarters 1st Army Corps."

At this moment artillery fire was heard from the south-east, and rifle fire from the direction of Rettenbach and Vierkirchen. The 7th F.A. Regt., on hill 496, was limbering up to change position forwards.

The divisional commander had barely read the army corps order when an adjutant of the Body Guard Inf. Regt. galloped up and reported:—"The enemy is in full retreat. Rettenbach is ours. The 2nd Inf. Bde., mixed up with troops of the 2nd Inf. Div., has entered Vierkirchen."

Shortly afterwards an officer of the 2nd Chevaulegers reported:—

"The regiment has seized the west side of Giebing, and, with the assistance of the artillery, has surprised a hostile column marching from Rettenbach on Giebing. This column has fled southwards in confusion. About 100 prisoners have been shut up in Giebing. Detachments of the enemy are retiring in disorder through Milbertshofen and Biberbach, pursued by detachments of the 2nd Inf. Div. A number of wagons have been upset on the Giebing—Biberbach road. The country between Kammerberg and Viehbach is full of stragglers; these are being collected at Giebing. The regiment is pursuing the enemy towards Fahrenzhausen, on which place strong bodies of hostile troops are retiring."

The divisional commander then gave the following verbal orders at 5.35 p.m.:—

1. To the 2nd divisional adjutant.

"Ride to the 7th F.A. Regt.* and tell it to halt. Tell the commander to come to me at Piflitz.

"Then go to the 1st, and afterwards to the 2nd Inf. Bde., and tell the 1st Inf. Bde. to assemble at Giebing, and the 2nd Inf. Bde. at Rettenbach. The 1st F.A. Regt. will join the 1st Inf. Bde.; the parts of the 11th Inf. Bde. with the 1st and 2nd Inf. Bdes. will move to Kammerberg.

"Brigades will send representatives for orders to Piflitz as soon as possible. Take 2 orderlies from the escort with you."

2. To the officer of the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt.:—

"Take a message form and write as follows:—The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. and 2 batteries, 7th F.A. Regt., will pursue the enemy at once towards Unter-Bruck and seize the bridge at that place.

"The 11th Inf. Bde., to which the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. is attached, is following at once.

"Reconnoitre on Biberbach, Hörgenbach, Oberndorf and Gross Nöbach.

"Send 1 patrol on Thurnsberg and 1 troop to divisional headquarters.

"Divisional headquarters are moving to Piflitz, and thence by Kammerberg on Bachenhausen."

As soon as the 2nd divisional adjutant and the cavalry officer had ridden off, the staff galloped to Piflitz. The motor cars were ordered to the latter place. The 11th Inf. Bde., which had been ordered to move to Piflitz, was met just west of that place at 6 p.m.

The divisional commander greeted the men and shouted to them

* It was trotting southwards along the Kollbach—Rettenbach road.

that the enemy was defeated and must be pursued. He then turned to the brigadier, who was riding at the head of the brigade. The latter reported as follows:—

"I have 4 battalions available. One company has been left at Asbach in charge of prisoners. The 2nd line transport of the brigade, which was originally left at Steinkirchen, has been ordered to Petershausen, but can hardly arrive there before 7.30 p.m."

The divisional commander then gave the following verbal order to the commander of the 11th Inf. Bde. at 6.15 p.m.

"The enemy has been defeated and is retiring everywhere. The army will pursue him to-day as far as the Amper.

"The 2nd Inf. Div. is moving south of us, with its left on Vierkirchen and Milbertshofen, towards Fuchsberg. The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. with some artillery is in front, and has been ordered to seize Unter-Bruck bridge.

"The 11th Inf. Bde., with the 7th F.A. Regt., will follow the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt., which is under its orders, by Kammerberg and Bachenhausen to the Amper. Press the enemy relentlessly at all points. The bridge at Unter-Bruck must be in our possession to-day. Touch with the enemy must not be lost. The 1st Inf. Bde. will be assembled in the neighbourhood of Viehbach, the 2nd Inf. Bde. in the neighbourhood of Giebing and Kammerberg.

"Divisional headquarters will be at Piflitz and will move later to Bachenhausen."

When he had left the brigadier, Piflitz having meanwhile been reached, the divisional commander said to his general staff officer:—

"Prepare the orders for the 1st and 2nd Inf. Bdes., and explain the situation to the commander of the 7th F.A. Regt., and also to those portions of the 12th Inf. Bde. which are coming in."

DIVISIONAL TELEPHONE DETACHMENT.

At this moment the commander of the divisional telephone detachment reported himself, and stated:—

"The lines on the far bank of the Glonn have been reeled up, and the detachment is ready at Asbach church. The section which was working from Aufhausen towards Ebersbach and Weichs has lost a considerable amount of material. One telegraphist has been killed."

The general staff officer took the commander of the detachment aside and gave him the following order:—

"The enemy is retiring everywhere. We are pursuing him to-day as far as the Amper, and will then go into quarters. The 11th Bde. is pursuing as far as Fahrenzhausen. The 1st Inf. Bde. is going into quarters in the area Viehbach—Bachenhausen; the 2nd Inf. Bde. in the area Giebing—Kammerberg. The artillery will be distributed among the brigades. Divisional headquarters, which the telephone detachment will accompany, are moving to Bachenhausen.

"The telephone detachment will advance by Kollbach and Kammerberg to Bachenhausen, and will connect Kammerberg, Bachenhausen, and Fahrenzhausen on its march.

"Stations will be established at Kammerberg (2nd Inf. Bde.), Bachenhausen (Div. hdqrs.), and at Fahrenzhausen (11th Inf. Bde.).

"Quarters will be prepared for the detachment ; 2nd line transport has been ordered up.

"There is a great deal of traffic on the Kollbach—Kammerberg road. Move as quickly as possible. The officer charged with the preservation of order has been instructed to give you precedence."

The pioneer lieutenant rode back at once to his detachment and found it at Asbach, drawn up at the side of the road close to the exit on the Kollbach road. The square near the church had not been occupied by the detachment, owing to the number of prisoners collected and to the fact that a dressing station had recently been established there.

Lieutenant F. then moved his detachment from Kollbach with the section which had been already used at the head. He then called his section commanders to the head of the column and explained the situation to them. He issued the following order at 7.30 p.m. while he was still 2 kilometres from Kammerberg :—

"The division is going into quarters in the area Fahrenzhausen—Viehbach—Kammerberg. No. 2 Section will connect Kammerberg, Bachenhausen and Fahrenzhausen. Stations will be established at Kammerberg (for 2nd Inf. Bde.), and at Fahrenzhausen (for 11th Inf. Bde.). The remainder will be billeted at Fahrenzhausen. Nos. 3 and 1 Sections will be quartered at Bachenhausen, where No. 1 section will establish a station for divisional headquarters. The commander of No. 1 Section will proceed at once to Bachenhausen to fix the position for his station and to arrange for quarters."

When the detachment entered Kammerberg No. 2 Section remained behind and began to lay its line. The commander with the other two sections continued the march to Bachenhausen.

DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.

We will now return to divisional headquarters. After the commander of the telephone detachment had ridden off, the staff had dismounted. A large fire was then lighted outside Piflitz, the divisional flag was placed alongside it, and the escort posted near by. The general staff officer informed the commander of the 7th F.A. Regt. that he was attached to the 11th Bde., which was then marching through Piflitz. He then entered the nearest house in Piflitz with the orderly officers. There he dictated the following order, several copies of which were taken by the officers :—

"Piflitz, 23. XI., 6.30 p.m.

"Divisional Order, No. 4, for 23. XI.

- "1. The enemy has been defeated and is retiring everywhere.
- "2. The army will pursue to-day as far as the Amper.
2nd Inf. Div. is moving, with its left through Vierkirchen and Milbertshofen, on Fuchsberg, north of Oberndorf.
- "3. The 1st Inf. Div. will pursue the enemy through Kammerberg on Bachenhausen.
- "4. The 11th Inf. Bde., with the 2nd Chevaulegers and 7th F.A. Regt., will move on Unter-Bruck and seize the bridge at that place.

- "5. The 1st Inf. Bde. will advance to the area Viehbach—Bachenhausen, 2nd Inf. Bde. to the area Giebing—Kammerberg, and will go into temporary quarters in those areas. Brigades will cook and prepare everything for the night, but will hold themselves in readiness to move.

1st Inf. Bde. will prepare quarters in Bachenhausen for divisional headquarters, the telephone detachment and the headquarters of the F.A. Bde.

Ammunition wagons which have not yet come up, and the 2nd line transport will be forwarded under divisional orders.

- "6. Divisional headquarters will be at Piflitz till 7 p.m., and will move to Bachenhausen. Representatives for orders will be at the latter place at 7.30 p.m.

In writing to representatives of:—

1st and 2nd Inf. Bdes.

1st F.A. Bde.

1st F.A. Regt.

A.,

"Lt.-General, commanding Division."

This order was handed over to the representatives of units, who arrived about 6.30 p.m.

At 6.45 p.m. a lieutenant of the 2nd Chevaulegers reported himself with a troop of cavalry.

An orderly officer of the divisional staff was then given 6 troopers, and the following instructions were issued to him by the general staff officer:—

"You will find the S.A.A. carts of the 11th Inf. Bde. at Asbach. Send these { by way of Kollbach to Kammerberg. Send the 1st Pioneer Coy., which is at Kollbach, to Bachenhausen. Then ride to Petershausen, and there meet the S.A.A. carts of the 1st Inf. Bde., which are coming from Thann, and the 2nd line transport of the division and of the 11th Inf. Bde., which is coming from Jetzendorf. Direct all these columns, with the transport of the 11th Inf. Bde., if possible, by Kollbach to Kammerberg. At the latter place Captain A., the 1st adjutant of the division, will take over control.

"See that strict order is kept on the road. Keep the right side of the road free. The telephone detachment of the division, which has been ordered to Bachenhausen, must have precedence."

While the orderly officer was making notes of the most important points of his instructions, the general staff officer prepared the following authorization for him:—

"Lieutenant M. has been directed to take over control of the transport columns of the division. His instructions will be followed even by officers senior to him.

M.,

• Captain, General Staff Officer,

"1st Inf. Div."

The 1st divisional adjutant was then requested by the general

staff officer to be at Kammerberg at 7 p.m., and to arrange for the movement of the transport thence in the following order :—

S.A.A. carts of the 11th Inf. Bde.,	
2nd line transport of the 11th Inf. Bde.,	
“ “ “ “	2nd Chevaulegers Regt.,
“ “ “ “	7th F.A. Regt.,

to Fahrenzhausen.

2nd line transport of divisional headquarters, including that of headquarters of F.A. Bde.

2nd line transport of the 1st Inf. Bde.,	
“ “ “ “	Divisional bridging train,

S.A.A. carts of 1st Inf. Bde.,
to Bachenhausen.

The 2nd line transport of the 2nd Inf. Bde. and of the 1st F.A. Bde. was to be handed over to the respective units at Kammerberg.

He was told that no transport was to pass through Kammerberg before 7.30 p.m., as the 11th Inf. Bde. was not expected to reach Fahrenzhausen until that hour.

The telephone detachment of the division, which had been ordered to Bachenhausen, was, however, to be assisted in its march.

A cyclist was sent with a message to army corps headquarters, giving a resumé of the orders issued and naming the headquarters of the division (Bachenhausen).

The divisional staff was then ordered to move to Bachenhausen. The divisional commander and his general staff officer entered a motor car shortly before 7 p.m. and followed the 11th Inf. Bde., the commander of which was met at the head of his main body, about 7.15 p.m., in front of Bachenhausen.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN, AND ACTION OF, THE 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

We must now consider the instructions which the commander of the 11th Inf. Bde. issued on receipt of the divisional order of 6.15 p.m. First of all the order was given to the column :—

“Pass the word along for regimental commanders to come to the head of the column.”

When the regimental commanders had arrived, the brigadier gave them the following verbal order as he rode along, at 6.20 p.m. :—

“The enemy has been defeated and is retiring everywhere.

“The army will pursue him to-day as far as the Amper. The 2nd Inf. Div. is moving, with its left on Vierkirchen, Milbertshofen and Hörnenbach, on Fuchsberg.

“The 1st Inf. Bde. and the 2nd Inf. Bde. are moving respectively on Giebing and Viehbach.

“The 11th Inf. Bde., with the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. and the 7th F.A. Regt., is moving by Kammerberg and Fahrenzhausen, and will seize the bridge over the Amper at Unter-Bruck. The enemy will be relentlessly attacked everywhere. The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. with some artillery is already in front of us. The leading company (1st Bn., 10th Inf. Regt.) will form the advanced guard. The point only will be pushed out. A distance of 300 to 400 metres to be

maintained. Connection by cyclists with the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. Reconnoitre on both sides of the road.

"The 2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., will move by the shortest way to Lauterbach (2 kilometres north-east of Kammerberg), and will advance thence along the main Fahrenzhausen road to Jarzt. It will connect thence with the brigade.

"The 3rd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., will move by Gramling and Wiehbach to the southern part of Fahrenzhausen.

"The 7th F.A. Regt. will follow behind the brigade. Five cyclists of the 10th Inf. Regt. will be sent to No. 1 Coy., 10th Inf. Regt., and five more to No. 2 Coy.

"Five cyclists of the 13th Inf. Regt. will be sent to brigade headquarters, which will move at the head of the main body.

"One mounted officer, 13th Inf. Regt., will remain in Kammerberg, and will tell the 3rd Bn., 13th Inf. Regt., and the 3rd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., which have been ordered to that place, that they are to follow the brigade without delay."

The supply officers of both regiments, who reported themselves shortly afterwards, were directed to ride back to Sollern as quickly as possible, and to bring the field kitchens of the brigade, by way of Petershausen and Kammerberg, to Fahrenzhausen. The kitchen fires were to be lighted at once and food prepared. The field kitchens were to march together, those of the 10th Inf. Regt. in front. The supply officers were told to establish communication with Fahrenzhausen as soon as the columns were near that place, and that they would then receive further orders.

The road between Kammerberg and Bachenhausen was clear of the enemy. But after leaving Bachenhausen many signs of a retreat in disorder were observed. The enemy's most northerly line of retirement appeared to be by Milbertshausen and Viehbach on Fahrenzhausen; ammunition pouches, rifles, and overturned wagons littered the road.

At 7.15 p.m., as the head of the main body was passing through Bachenhausen, heavy rifle fire, which, however, only lasted a short time, was heard from the direction of Viehbach. The 3rd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., soon after reported that a party of stragglers had made a short stand in Viehbach, that about 100 prisoners had been taken, and that these had been handed over to the 1st Inf. Bde.

At this moment the divisional commander with his general staff officer arrived, and announced that he would accompany the 11th Inf. Bde.

At 7.30 p.m., shortly before the advanced guard of the 11th Inf. Bde. reached Fahrenzhausen, an officer of the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. arrived and reported to the brigadier as follows:—

"The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. has surprised a number of stragglers between Giebing and Bachenhausen. Shortly before reaching Fahrenzhausen it overtook and charged the end of a long column of infantry and artillery. The enemy fled in all directions, the majority in the direction of the bridge at Unter-Bruck, abandoning their wagons and guns. The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. pressed forward to the bridge, which the enemy blew up just as the first troopers reached it in the midst of the fugitives. A number of men were killed and wounded on both sides by the explosion, and the

commander of the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. was killed. The wounded have been placed in Unter-Bruck, close to which place the regiment is in position dismounted. The prisoners, who are very numerous, and whose numbers are continually being increased by the capture of men who have been cut off, have been placed in Fahrenzhäusen under a guard."

In consequence of this report, the divisional commander issued the following order to the commander of the 11th Inf. Bde., at 7.45 p.m. :—

"The 11th Inf. Bde., with the attached units, will go into quarters in the area Fahrenzhäusen—Unter-Bruck—Jarzt. Outposts will be established on the Amper from the junction of the backwater, 500 metres south of Unter-Bruck, with the main stream to Weng (inclusive).

"The crossings at Weng and Thurnsberg must be seized to-night. Touch will be kept with the enemy. Strong cavalry patrols will be sent to Grüneck (near Neufahrn on the Isar), Ascherling and Freising. The enemy's lines of retreat must be discovered.

"Preparations will be made for repairing the bridge at Unter-Bruck.

"The Pioneer Coy. and Divisional Bridging Train will reach Unter-Bruck during the night.

"Supplies will be issued from field kitchens and supply wagons. 2nd line transport and S.A.A. carts will be sent on.

"Divisional headquarters will be at Bachenhausen. Signal communication will be established with that place, and representatives for orders will be sent there at once. Telephone communication will be established with the brigade."

The divisional commander and his general staff officer then returned to Bachenhausen, where the remainder of the divisional staff was established already. Two lanterns had been fixed on a large house directly on the road, the divisional flag had been erected, and an office established in a room on the ground floor.

The senior medical officer of the division, who had returned in the meanwhile, reported that No. 1 Field Hospital was in Aufhausen, No. 2 Field Hospital in Petershausen, with 1 section at Asbach, and that the personnel and material of the bearer company were employed at Asbach.

A dressing station was still at Kollbach. He stated that the wounded were still coming in in large numbers, particularly to Asbach, and that, in his opinion, the dressing stations would not complete their work before midnight. The hospital at Petershausen had been taken over for the wounded at that place. He added that it appeared desirable to establish under the control of the Lines of Communication, at the latter place, a stationary hospital, which could supply a quantity of material, and that he had for that reason ordered all wounded in and east of Asbach to be evacuated to the field hospital at Petershausen. He stated that he had reported the disposition of the medical services on the battlefield to the principal medical officer of the Corps.

The divisional commander expressed himself as satisfied with these arrangements, and directed the divisional medical officer to arrange for the relief of the medical personnel and material of units as early as possible.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS, ETC.

1ST ARMY CORPS.

At 8 p.m. an officer from army corps headquarters arrived at Bachenhäusen, and brought the following written order:—

“Army Corps Headquarters, Rettenbach.

“1st Army Corps. 23. XI., 7.30 p.m.

“Extract from the special instructions of the 1st Army Corps for the 1st Inf. Div. at Bachenhäusen.

“1. *Ammunition Supply*.—No. 2 Inf. Am. Col. and Nos. 3 and 4 Art. Am. Cols. moving by Petershausen, will reach Kammerberg at midnight, and be at the disposal of the 1st Inf. Div. Issue of ammunition is to be completed by 3 a.m.

“2. *Supply*.—An issuing depôt of the 1st Army Corps will be at Vierkirchen at midnight. Supply wagons of the 1st Inf. Div. will move by Giebing and Rettenbach. Rations for 24. XI. will be carried on the man, supply wagons will load up with 2 days' rations. Requisitioning area allotted to the 1st Inf. Div.:—the country between the Amper and the Glonn, north of the Petershausen—Fahrenzhäusen road. Requisitioning will be begun as soon as possible. The supplies obtained will be collected at Fahrenzhäusen, and handed over to the Field Intendant of the 1st Army Corps. The supply depôt staff will reach the latter place to-morrow morning.

“3. *Medical*.—Field hospitals will remain at work in their present positions till further orders. Positions to be reported to army corps headquarters.

The medical personnel and material of units will be relieved as soon as possible.

Empty supply columns march, at 8 a.m. to-morrow, from Vierkirchen by Rettenbach, Kollbach, Petershausen, Jetzendorf and Gerolsbach, to the line of communications, and are available for the transport of wounded.

“4. *Prisoners and trophies* will be handed over to-morrow, the 24th, at Ebersbach to Lt.-Col. A. of the 2nd Inf. Div. The latter will arrange for the evacuation of the battlefield. One battalion from each division will report to him at 4 a.m., 24. XI.

“5. *Captured horses* will be handed over to the horse depôt, 1st Army Corps, at Weichs to-morrow.

“6. *Line of Communication, 1st Army Corps*.—Petershausen—Jetzendorf—Gerolsbach—Aresing—Schrobenhausen. Nearest station on the line of communication, Schrobenhausen, and, on the morning of 25. XI., Petershausen.

“7. *Postal*.—Field Post Office, 1st Army Corps, Rettenbach. Nearest permanent post office, Schrobenhausen.

“Headquarters 1st Army Corps.”

The following note was added to the message:—“Units will probably march early to-morrow, 24. XI. to pursue the enemy. Touch must be maintained with the enemy. Reconnoitre towards the Isar. Patrols towards Neufahrn, Aschering, and Freising are of special importance.

"Corps orders will probably arrive late. Arrange to rouse units quietly. The Corps Telegraph Detachment will connect Rettenbach and Bachenhausen.

"Army Corps Headquarters."

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION.

The divisional commander sent 2 cyclists at once to Giebing to the 2nd Inf. Bde., and an orderly to the 1st Inf. Bde. at Viehbach, with the following written order:—

"Bachenhausen, 23. XI., 8.15 p.m.

"To 1st Inf. Bde. at Viehbach, and 2nd Inf. Bde. at Giebing.

"The 11th Inf. Bde. has reached the Amper and driven the enemy over the river. It is quartered for the night in the area Fahrenzhäusen—Unter-Bruck—Jarzt.

"Divisional headquarters and the headquarters of the F.A. Bde. are quartered for the night at Bachenhausen.

"The 1st Inf. Bde. and the 2nd Inf. Bde. (with the 1st F.A. Regt.) will pass the night in the areas allotted. Arrangements will be made to rouse troops quietly.

"1st Inf. Div."

The general staff officer then prepared the special instructions for 23–24. XI. The order was reduplicated by the two adjutants of the division, and ran as follows:—

"Divisional Headquarters, Bachenhausen,
23. XI., 8.45 p.m.

"Special instructions of the 1st Inf. Div., 23–24. XI.

"1. *Ammunition Supply*.—S.A.A. carts have been ordered into the billeting areas. They will be emptied at once, and sent back to Kammerberg to refill. (2nd Inf. Am. Col., and 3rd and 4th Art. Am. Cols. are at that place.) Vehicles of the 11th Inf. Bde., 2nd Chevaulegers Regt., and 7th F.A. Regt. will march to and fro by Lauterbach. If wagons arrive at the same time they will refill in the following order:—

11th Inf. Bde., 2nd Chevaulegers Regt., 7th F.A. Regt., 1st Inf. Bde., 2nd Inf. Bde.

A field officer of the 1st F.A. Regt. will arrange for the issue of ammunition and regulate the traffic.

"2. *Supply*.—Supplies will be issued from field kitchens and supply wagons. The latter will refill from the depôt of the 1st Army Corps at Vierkirchen. The wagons will march together by brigades closed up. Heads of columns will move through Rettenbach as follows:—

2nd Inf. Bde. and 1st F.A. Regt. at 11.30 p.m.

1st Inf. Bde. with divisional headquarters and headquarters of the F.A. Bde. not before 12 midnight.

11th Inf. Bde. with 2nd Chevaulegers Regt., 7th F.A. Regt. and No. 1 Pioneer Coy. not before 12.30 a.m.

Rations for to-morrow, the 24th, will be issued at once from the supply wagons, and will be carried on the man.

Beginning at 4 a.m. to-morrow, a company of the 11th Inf. Bde.

will requisition in the area east of the Hohenkammer—Fahrenzhausen road, a company of the 2nd Inf. Bde. will requisition in the area between that road and the Petershausen—Fahrenzhausen road. All supplies obtained are to be handed over to the divisional intendant at Fahrenzhausen.

“3. *Medical*.—The field hospitals at Edenpfaffenhofen and Petershausen will remain at work. Dressing stations will be evacuated on them.

The medical personnel and material of the latter will rejoin their units as soon as possible, at the latest, by 4 a.m.

Wounded at Unter-Bruck will be sent back to Petershausen to-morrow on requisitioned transport; slightly wounded will be sent back on captured transport.

Empty supply columns are leaving Vierkirchen at 8 a.m. to-morrow and will move by Rettenbach, Kammerberg and Petershausen, to the line of communications, they are available for the transport of the wounded.

“4. *Prisoners and trophies*.—One battalion 2nd Inf. Bde. (at Kammerberg) will remain behind to clear the battlefield. It will report at 4 a.m. to-morrow to Lt.-Col. A. at Ebersbach.

“5. The 1st and 11th Inf. Bdes. will hand over prisoners and trophies as early as possible to-morrow to this battalion, which will escort them to Ebersbach and hand them over to Lt.-Col. A.

Guns captured in the area of the 11th Inf. Bde. will be horsed by the 7th F.A. Regt. and sent to Ebersbach.

“6. Captured horses will be handed over to No. 1 Horse dépôt, 1st Army Corps, at Weichs by 12 noon to-morrow.

“7. *Line of communications*.—The line of communications of the 1st Army Corps runs through Petershausen—Jetzendorf—Gerolsbach—Aresing—Schrobenhausen. Nearest station on the line of communications, Schrobenhausen, and, after the morning of the 25th, Petershausen.

“8. The strictest march discipline will be observed in all transport, right sides of roads to be kept free. Transport which is not marching will be clear of the roads.

“9. *Postal*.—The post office of the 1st Inf. Div. is at Bachenhausen. All letters addressed to killed, wounded and missing will be returned at once to the field post office. Postmen will call at Fahrenzhausen, Giebing, and Kammerberg for letters at 2 a.m.

“10. Telephone stations Kammerberg, Bachenhausen, Fahrenzhausen.

“1st Infantry Division.”

“*Note*.—Units will probably march early to-morrow, 24th. Arrangements will be made for rousing troops quietly. Representatives for orders will be sent to divisional headquarters.”

As soon as this order was issued to the representatives of units, with instructions to deliver it at once, the divisional intendant was directed to go to Fahrenzhausen during the night and prepare for the establishment of a dépôt there, and to take over all supplies collected by the 11th Inf. Bde.

A police patrol was ordered to go to the Fahrenzhausen—Bachenhausen—Kammerberg road, and to keep order on it. The senior medical officer of the division was then requested to expedite the evacuation of wounded from the chief dressing station at Asbach to

the field hospitals at Aufhausen and Petershausen, and to report when the personnel and material of the bearer company would be available for further employment. He was told that it was necessary that part of the company should be at Kammerberg by 4 a.m. on the 24th.

The pioneer company reached Bachenhausen about 9 p.m., and was followed by the field kitchens, the S.A.A. carts, and the 2nd line transport of the 11th Inf. Bde., in that order. Next came the divisional bridging train, which was followed by the 2nd line transport of divisional headquarters, of the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt., of the 7th F.A. Regt., and of the 1st Inf. Bde.

The pioneer company and the divisional bridging train were ordered to march to Unter-Bruck to repair the bridge over the Amper, which had been destroyed at that place. The transport of divisional headquarters and of the headquarters of the 1st F.A. Bde. and of the 1st Inf. Bde. was halted. The field post office of the 1st Inf. Div., which arrived with the 2nd line transport, was directed to start work at Bachenhausen and to send postmen to collect letters at Fahrenzhausen, Giebing, and Kammerberg. At the same time the postal official in charge was informed that the post office of the 1st Army Corps was established at Rettenbach, and that the nearest post office on the line of communications was at Schrobenhausen.

Soon afterwards the 1st divisional adjutant came in and reported that the 2nd Inf. Bde. had received its transport. The clerks of the divisional headquarters were then established in the office room, the red lantern inscribed 1st Inf. Div. was fixed to the house and lighted. Instructions were issued, besides, that lights were to be kept burning in the office, and that two men of the escort were always to be on duty there. They were directed to rouse the general staff officer whenever orders or reports came in.

At 9.30 p.m. a serjeant of the corps telephone detachment reported himself to divisional headquarters. Telegraphic connection was established with army corps headquarters, and the telegraph station was placed in the house next to the divisional office.

Telephonic communication was also working with 11th and 1st Inf. Bdes.

11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

After the divisional commander had left the 11th Inf. Bde., the brigadier issued the following verbal order at 7.45 p.m. to his regimental commanders, who had been sent for:—

“The enemy has been driven behind the Amper, and has blown up the bridge at Unter-Bruck.

“The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. is at Unter-Bruck, and has a number of prisoners.

“The brigade, with the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. and the 7th F.A. Regt., will go into quarters in the area Unter-Bruck—Fahrenzhausen—Jarzt.

“The 2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., and the Machine Gun Coy., 10th Inf. Regt., will form the outposts, they will move to Unter-Bruck and watch the line of the Amper from the junction of the backwater, 500 metres south of Unter-Bruck bridge

(inclusive), with the main stream, to Weng (inclusive), and will reconnoitre towards Hölenzhausen, Hetzenhausen, and Gesseltshausen. The outposts will connect with 2nd Inf. Div. at Oberndorf, and patrol along the Amper to Thurnsberg.

"The pioneer company of the division and the divisional bridging train are moving to-night to Unter-Bruck to repair the bridge. Suitable material will be requisitioned.

"The 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. will send 1 troop to the 2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., and will occupy the bridge at Thurnsberg with 1 squadron.

"Officer's patrols will be sent to-night to Grüneck near Neufahrn, on the Isar, to Aschering, to Freising, and also towards Schleissheim and Garching.

"The enemy's times of retreat must be discovered, and touch maintained with him in any circumstances.

"Billets and bivouacs are allotted as follows :—

"10th Inf. Regt. } at Fahrenzhausen, under the orders of the com-
 "7th F.A. Regt. } mander of the 10th Inf. Regt.

"13th Inf. Regt. } at Jartz, under the orders of the com-
 "2nd Chevaulegers Regt. } mander of the 13th Inf. Regt.

"Supplies will be issued from field kitchens and supply wagons. 2nd line transport has been ordered up to units.

"Brigade headquarters will be at Fahrenzhausen. Representatives for orders will be sent to that place as soon as possible, and also a signalling party of the 10th Inf. Regt. with lanterns."

"The brigade office was then established at Fahrenzhausen, and was marked outside by a number of lanterns.

The brigade received the instructions of the division for 23-24. XI. at 9.15 p.m. While the brigade major (*adjutant*) was reading these through, the commander of the 2nd line transport of the 11th Inf. Bde. arrived, the supply officers in charge of the field kitchens being with him. He reported as follows :—

"The 2nd line transport, with supply wagons at the head, will reach Fahrenzhausen in 15 minutes. The S.A.A. carts of the 11th Inf. Bde. are immediately in rear of it. The 2nd line transport of the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt., of the 7th F.A. Regt., and the divisional bridging train come next. The pioneer company and the field kitchens are in front of the 2nd line transport of the 11th Inf. Bde."

The commander of the pioneer company reported himself shortly afterwards.

The brigade major requested the commander of the 2nd line transport and the supply officers to post themselves at the entrance to Fahrenzhausen, and to direct the transport to its units. They were told that the 13th Inf. Regt. and the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. were quartered at Jarzt; the 10th Inf. Regt., and the 7th F.A. Regt. at Fahrenzhausen; and the 2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt. at Unter-Bruck.

The commander of the pioneer company was then informed that the brigade was bivouacking at Fahrenzhausen and Jarzt, and that the 2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., at Unter-Bruck, had been instructed to give him every assistance. The company was told to leave behind a representative for orders.

The brigade major then prepared the following notification on a message form, addressed to :—

10th Inf. Regt.
7th F.A. Regt.
13th Inf. Regt.
2nd Chevaulegers Regt.
2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt.
Pioneer Coy.

9.30 p.m.

“Ammunition pouches will be filled as soon as the S.A.A. carts arrive. Rations for to-morrow, the 24th, will be drawn from the supply wagons. They will be prepared and carried on the man.

“Field kitchens and 2nd line transport which have just reached Fahrenzhausen have been ordered to unite. Orders follow.”

The brigade major then prepared the special instructions for the brigade, which he dictated to representatives who had arrived in the meantime.

“Brigade Headquarters, Fahrenzhausen, 23. XI., 10 p.m.

“Special instruction for 23–24. XI.

“1. *Ammunition Supply*.—Infantry S.A.A. carts and artillery ammunition wagons will be assembled at 11 p.m. on the main Fahrenzhausen—Hohenkammer road. Those which arrive first will be drawn up level with the brick-field (Zgl), 1 kilometre west of Jarzt, and will move under a mounted officer of the 13th Inf. Regt. by Lauterbach to Kammerberg to refill. They will return by the same road.

“2. *Supply*.—Supply wagons will be ready to move off at 11.30 p.m. as follows :—

“Brigade Headquarters, 10th Inf. Regt., 7th F.A. Regt., in that order, on the Fahrenzhausen—Bachenhausen road. Rear at the cross-roads 200 metres north of Fahrenzhausen.

“13th Inf. Regt., 2nd Chevaulegers Regt., on the Jarzt—Fahrenzhausen road; 2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., and Pioneer Coy., on the Unter-Bruck—Fahrenzhausen road; heads of both columns at the above-mentioned cross-roads. They will move, under the senior supply officer, by Kammerberg and Giebing to Vierkirchen, where they will fill up from the depôt of the 1st Army Corps with 2 days' supplies.

“3. The strictest discipline will be maintained in the transport, which will move on the right side of the road. Transport will halt clear of villages.

“4. *Medical*.—Dressing stations will be evacuated on No. 1 Field Hospital at Aufhausen, and No. 2 Field Hospital at Petershausen. Severely wounded from Fahrenzhausen, Unter-Bruck and Jarzt will be sent to-morrow on requisitioned transport to Petershausen. Part of the medical personnel and material of units will be available at 4 a.m.

“5. *Prisoners*.—All prisoners, trophies, and horses taken by the 11th Inf. Bde. are to be handed over at Fahrenzhausen to a company of the 10th Inf. Regt., which will escort them to Kammerberg and hand them over to the 2nd Inf. Bde. The 7th F.A. Regt. will at the same time arrange for the transport of captured guns to Ebersbach.

"6. *Requisition.*—1 company, 13th Inf. Regt., which has been ordered to requisition to-morrow, will receive special instructions.

"7. *Line of Communication.*—The line of communication, 1st Army Corps, is Petershausen—Jetzendorf—Gerolsbach—Aresing—Schrobenhausen. Nearest station on the L. of C., Schrobenhausen, and, on the morning of 25. XI., Petershausen.

"8. *Postal.*—Field post office of the 1st Inf. Div. is at Bachenhhausen. Letters addressed to wounded, killed, and missing, will be returned at once to the field post office. Letters will be despatched from brigade headquarters at Fahrenzhausen at 2 a.m. to-morrow.

"11th Inf. Bde."

13TH INFANTRY REGIMENT. REQUISITIONING.

The instructions sent in the course of the night to the 13th Inf. Regt. for the company detailed for requisitioning ran as follows:—

"The company will requisition in the area between the Fahrenzhausen—Hohenkammer road, the Amper and the Glonn, beginning at 4 a.m. to-morrow, the 24th. Articles specially required are:—slaughter cattle, flour, vegetables, and potatoes. Vehicles will be requisitioned for transport purposes; receipts will be given. Any resistance on the part of the inhabitants will be severely repressed.

"All articles requisitioned will be delivered to the divisional intendant at Fahrenzhausen. The company will rejoin immediately on completion of the duty."

2ND BN., 10TH INFANTRY REGIMENT. PROTECTION.

Finally it may be of interest to see how the 2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., carried out the protective duties allotted to it.

The first order issued was:—

"The battalion, followed by the machine gun company, will move on Unter-Bruck." The battalion and company commanders then trotted on ahead.

The following verbal order to the company commanders was issued between 8 p.m. and 8.15 p.m., during the ride and in Unter-Bruck:—

"The enemy has retired behind the Amper, and has left a number of prisoners in the hands of the 2nd Chevaulegers Regt., which is in front at Unter-Bruck. The bridge at Unter-Bruck has been blown up.

"The 10th Inf. Regt. and the 7th F.A. Regt. are quartered at Fahrenzhausen, where brigade headquarters are also.

"The 13th Inf. Regt. and the Chevaulegers Regt. are quartered at Jarzt.

"The 1st Inf. Bde. has pursued the enemy as far as Viehbach and Bachenhhausen. The 2nd Inf. Bde. is at Geibing and Kammerberg.

"The 2nd Bn., 10th Inf. Regt., has to find the outposts from the mouth of the backwater, 500 metres south of the Unter-Bruck bridge as far as Weng (inclusive).

"No. 6 Coy. will bivouac at the south-east exit of Unter-Bruck, No. 7 Coy. at the north-east exit, No. 8 Coy. will be in Unter-Bruck, south of the main road.

"The commander of No. 7 Coy. will arrange for requisitioning in Unter-Bruck.

"No. 6 Coy. will occupy the bridge with a piquet, and will find the outposts from the mouth of the backwater as far as the plantation on both sides of the Amper (north of the bridge), inclusive. It will construct foot-bridges. It will reconnoitre towards Lohhof, Höhrenhausen and Hetzenhausen. It will connect with the 2nd Inf. Div. up stream.

"No. 5 Coy. will move by Jarzt to the small wood in the bend of the Amper, east of that place. It will occupy Weng and the crossing there, and extend the left of No. 1 Coy. as far as Weng, inclusive.

"The machine gun company will send 1 section to No. 5 Coy. and 1 section to No. 6 Coy., the remaining section will be at my disposal with No. 8 Coy.

"The machine gun company will reconnoitre towards Gross-Eisenbach and Gesseltshausen. It will connect with the 13th Inf. Regt. at Jarzt and with Thurnsberg, which 1 squadron, 2nd Chevaulegers Regt. has been ordered to occupy to-night.

"In case of attack the Amper, and more especially the bridge, will be held.

"No. 7 Coy. will send a half section to Fahrenzenhausen and another half section to Jarzt, to requisition wagons, teams, planks, ropes, etc., for the repair of the bridge. All material will be brought to Unter-Bruck.

"Six troopers of the troop of Chevaulegers, which will be quartered with No. 7 Coy., will be attached to No. 5 Coy., and 6 more to No. 6 Coy.

"Rations will be issued from the field kitchens. No. 4 (*sic*) Coy.* will draw its supplies in Unter-Bruck, where all the vehicles of the battalion will be parked with No. 3 (*sic*) Coy.†

"Battalion headquarters will be with No. 3 (*sic*) Coy.†

"The field kitchens will be at once refilled from the supply wagons, and a second ration will be prepared for to-morrow. Sick and wounded will be sent to Unter-Bruck, where medical under-officer M. of No. 6 Coy. and 2 stretcher-bearers will prepare a room for the reception of wounded."

As such special instructions as would be issued in the regiments would be only extracts and repetitions of those issued by the brigade, I do not think it necessary to give them.

This brings me to the end of my little study. Its object has been not so much to present specially difficult situations designed to practise those who worked them out in forming decisions, as to illustrate the principles on which such orders as would be issued in a modern battle on a large scale should be based.

It may be more amusing to occupy oneself with the action of small independent detachments, but I hold that the study and detailed working out of the requirements and details of a great struggle between two large armies is of more use. In this, less

* Should be No. 8 Coy. G.S.

† Should be No. 7 Coy. G.S.

scope is left for the initiative of the individual, and the difficult task of obeying, and of working in co-operation with another man's ideas, takes the place of the delights of independent command; subordination of self takes the place of tactical liberty of action. A battle on a large scale makes a more severe demand upon a leader of an independent mind, it requires him to work in accordance with the ideas of a superior, and to subordinate his own ideas and wishes. But here, as in every other case, victory over self is the noblest victory.

My First Edition closes with these words. I wish to leave them at the end of my Second Edition for I have no reason to change them.

I am still, as formerly, of the opinion that it is a matter of life and death for the armies of the great continental nations to study war on a large scale. We must get to know, and must consider, the limitations within which the decisive struggle of these days is fought out. We must also know the demands which modern leadership makes upon the discipline and subordination of all commanders, if they are not to see the power of control slip from their grasp. The Imperial Manœuvres prove conclusively every year that we have not got the idea of co-operation on the battlefield within the sense of the instructions emanating from higher authority, that we often place the attainment of cheap personal glory higher than playing our proper part in the whole scheme. The large number of small tactical exercises which we practise have a bad effect in this respect.

Let us therefore work together, and study war on a large scale, at least in theory, so that when the real trial comes we may not be taken by surprise, and may not have to go through the bitter experience of unlearning, under the stress of compulsion, much of what we have learnt and taught in peace.

VON KIESLING.

PART II.

THE DEFENCE.

PREFACE.

THE cordial reception which the military world gave to my first attempt to illustrate the technique of battle orders in a series of practical exercises has induced me to produce this second small book. In the first part I was only able to deal with certain phases of the modern battle, *i.e.*, the attack, the envelopment, and the pursuit immediately following the battle. The present work deals with the defence in a similar manner. In accordance with many requests I have included a number of explanations in the text, in order to show, on the one hand, how the various tactical decisions have been arrived at, and on the other, to justify those decisions.

In doing this, attention has been paid to the new "Field Service Regulations" and medical orders in the field as well as special instructions (formerly called orders of the day) have been included. My intention is to give a complete picture of the methods of preparing such orders as affect a unit during the course of one day.

I must not neglect, however, to mention here that my orders are not sealed patterns, but rather examples of how orders may be issued to meet specific situations. Some one else would probably employ different expressions to arrive at the same result.

My only intention is to lay the foundation for a thorough system of self-instruction, which has for its object training in the preparation of orders. The only royal road is constant practice, and it is this which I wish to assist.

I have laid special emphasis on the fact that the will and attention of the commander must be clearly expressed in every order. The habit of clear and exact expression, and the knowledge of what it is necessary for subordinates to know, in order that they may be able to carry out the intention of their superior, are just as necessary as is the assumption of responsibility for orders which have once been issued. Orders, the meaning of which is not clear, and instructions for eventualities are usually the outcome of a want of clear thinking. They are often also the result of a desire to avoid responsibility, in that they leave the choice of means to the subordinate. Readiness to accept responsibility is just as important in military life in peace time as it is in war; it is essential to success that it should be clearly expressed in all orders in definite language, which cannot be misinterpreted, and this is a goal which peace training must strive to reach.

I must express my thanks to those gentlemen who helped in working out the examples of orders here presented for the great assistance which they have given me.

HANS VON KIESLING.

*München,
September, 1908.*

GENERAL IDEA.

A Red army coming from the north is advancing on München through Aichach and Schrobenhausen. A Blue army is advancing through München against it.

The Danube forms the frontier between Red and Blue. Ingolstadt is a Red frontier fortress.

SPECIAL IDEA.

The Blue army crossed the Amper north and west of Dachau on the 22. XI., and at 9 a.m. on that day was advancing between the Amper and the Glonn with the object of defending the heights on the south bank of the latter river.

The 5th Army Corps on the right wing was advancing by Röhrmoos on Pasenbach and Kloster-Indersdorf.

The 1st Reserve Infantry Brigade (1st Res. Inf. Regt., 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., each of three battalions and one machine gun company, 1st Sq., 1st Res. Cav. Regt., one section of the 1st Field Telephone Detachment), which had originally been detached towards Freising to observe Ingolstadt, had reached Kammerberg with the head of its advanced guard at 10 a.m. on 22. XI.

Advanced Guard.

1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt.,
machine gun coy., 1st Res. Inf.
Regt., 1st squadron, 1st Res.
Cav. Regt.

It was moving as in the
margin, from Freising by
Thurnsberg on Vierkirchen,
where it was to form the
right wing of the army.

Main body in order of march.

At 1,000 metres distance—

Two connecting files, 1st
Sq., 1st Res. Cav. Regt., one
section 1st Tel. Det., 1st Res.
Inf. Regt. (less 1st Bn. and
m. gn. coy.), 2nd Res. Inf.
Regt., 2nd line transport (at
5 kilometres distance).

At that hour the brigade commander, who was at the head of the main body, received the following order from the 5th Army Corps:—

"5th Army Corps.

Gross Inzemoos,
22. XI., 9.15 a.m.

"To 1st Res. Inf. Bde.

(By Riedenzhofenen—Vierkirchen—Kammerberg).

"The army will hold the south bank of the Glonn against the enemy, who is reported to be advancing by Klenau, Schiltberg and Aichach. The section Jedenhofen—Kloster-Indersdorf is allotted to the 5th Army Corps. The 9th Inf. Div. will occupy the line Zillhofen (inclusive)—Kloster-Indersdorf (inclusive). The 10th Inf. Div., which will not reach Röhrmoos till 2 p.m., is advancing by Riedenzhofen and Vierkirchen on Rettenbach and Giebing to form the right wing of the Army Corps. The 1st Res. Inf. Bde., which is attached to the 5th Army Corps, will hold the section Jedenhofen (inclusive)—Albertshofen (inclusive). It will advance and occupy this section to-day (22nd), and will be responsible for the right of the Army Corps, until the arrival of the 16th Inf. Div.

"Army Corps headquarters will be at Esterhofen from 12 noon.

(By motor.)

Z.

General."

At the same time the following report arrived from the commander of the 1st Sq., 1st Res. Cav. Regt. :—

"Advanced guard squadron.

East of Jedenhofen,
22. XI., 9 a.m.

"Am east of Jedenhofen, in touch with enemy's cavalry in strength on the hills at Aufhausen. Have occupied the crossings at Petershausen, Asbach, and Jedenhofen with mounted troopers.

"The water in the Glonn is low ; it is fordable by infantry except at one or two deep places ; mounted troops can only cross at the bridges. The infantry of the 9th Inf. Div., which has just arrived, is entrenching at Zillhofen. Orders will reach me at the hill east of Jedenhofen."

This report was marked as read by the commander of the advanced guard. (1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt.)

Required :—(1) The orders and action of the brigade staff in view of the above order and of the situation. (The only officers of the brigade staff, besides the brigade commander, are the brigade major and one orderly officer.)

(2) The orders and action of subordinate commanders.

ORDERS AND ACTION OF THE BRIGADE STAFF AT 10 A.M.

(a) The brigade commander first sent the following order to the column by cyclists :—

"Regimental commanders to come to the brigade commander at the head of the main body."

(b) On the arrival of the regimental commanders he issued the following order at 10.25 a.m. :—

“Col. A. (comdg. 2nd Res. Inf. Regt.) will take over command of the brigade and will advance to Vierkirchen. The advanced guard will be ordered to advance to Jedenhofen to cover the brigade at that place. The main body will halt at Vierkirchen and dinners will be issued from the field kitchens. The brigade will be ready to march at short notice, as the position Jedenhofen—Albertshofen must be prepared for defence to-day. The brigade will hold that position against the enemy, who is expected from the far side of the Glonn from the north-west, and will connect with the 9th Inf. Div. which is on its left.

“Kollbach and Petershausen are to be observed. A look-out must be kept towards Röhrmoos, through which the 10th Inf. Div. will be marching at 2 p.m. from Riedenzhofen and Vierkirchen towards Rettenbach and Giebing. The march of that division must not be interfered with.

“Tool and technical wagons will join the regiments. Entrenching tools will be requisitioned from the places marched through and brought on. I am going forward to the position.”

The staff then rode forward and reached the commander of the advanced guard at 10.45 a.m. That officer had just reached Rettenbach and was riding between the vanguard and the main guard. The following verbal order was issued to him :—

(c) “The brigade will hold the line Jedenhofen—Albertshofen in co-operation with the 5th Army Corps, to which it is attached, against attack from the north-west, and will prepare that position for defence to-day.

“The 9th Inf. Div. holds the line from Zillhofen to Kloster-Indersdorf ; the 10th Inf. Div. is expected at Röhrmoos at 2 p.m., and will move thence to Rettenbach and Giebing to guard the right flank. You will send the machine gun company back to join its regiment at Vierkirchen, and will move to Jedenhofen to cover the brigade, which will halt at Vierkirchen. Later you will have to cover the brigade while it is entrenching this afternoon. Reconnoitre at once towards Petershausen, Aufhausen and Weichs, and get connection with the 9th Inf. Div., parts of which are already entrenching at Zillhofen. I am going forward to Jedenhofen.”

(d) The orderly officer of the brigade was given four orderlies, and was told to ride to the 9th Inf. Div. to act as reporting officer ; he was told to report the dispositions of and orders received by the brigade, and to send information as soon as possible as to the intentions and dispositions of the 9th Inf. Div. as well as anything that was known about the enemy.

ORDERS AND ACTION OF THE SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS BASED
UPON THE ORDERS OF THE BRIGADE COMMANDER.

THE MAIN BODY.

Colonel A., who was placed in temporary command of the brigade, issued the following verbal order at 10.30 a.m., immediately after the brigade staff had ridden off, to the two regimental commanders who were with him :—

(a) "The brigade will halt at Vierkirchen, and dinners will be issued from the field kitchens. 1st Res. Inf. Regt. will send one section, with the addition of two cyclists and a detachment of signallers, under an officer, to Kollbach, to cover the brigade. This officer occupy the bridge at Petershausen, will watch the far bank of the Glonn, and endeavour to establish signal communication with Vierkirchen. 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will arrange for requisitioning entrenching tools and material for obstacles and over-head cover from Kammerberg, Giebing, Rettenbach and Vierkirchen, and also will requisition the necessary transport. A mounted officer from each regiment will be sent to me at once to receive further information as to the situation, and to reconnoitre positions for bivouac."

(b) The adjutant next prepared a message to the second line transport which was forwarded by cyclist after being approved by the officer in command of the brigade. It ran as follows :—

"1st Res. Inf. Brigade.

Giebing,

22. XI., 10.35 a.m.

"To second line transport, *via* Kammerberg and Lauterbach.

"The brigade will halt at Vierkirchen where dinners will be issued. Tool and technical wagons will proceed at a trot to join the brigade; the remainder of the 2nd line transport will follow to Vierkirchen, where bivouacs will be allotted. One officer will be sent forward to Vierkirchen."

A.,
Colonel.

In temporary command of the brigade.

(c) At 10.45 a.m., as the head of the main body was approaching Kammerberg, Captains M. and N. of the 1st and 2nd Res. Inf. Regts. respectively reported themselves.

They received the following verbal instructions :—

"The brigade will halt at Vierkirchen and dinners will be issued from the field kitchens. The 1st Res. Inf. Regt. will be west of Vierkirchen, and the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. east of that place and at Rammelsbach. No troops are to be south of the Esterhofen—Vierkirchen—Rettenbach road. The advanced guard has been pushed forward to the neighbourhood of Jedenhofen to cover the brigade. You will reconnoitre halting places for the battalions of your regiments, and will arrange for the allotment of areas for water, wood, and straw at Passenbach, Esterhofen, Rammelsbach, and

Vierkirchen. The troops should, if possible, be placed under cover. Start at once."

At 11 a.m., as the head of the main body was approaching the eastern exit of Rettenbach, the officer in command of the brigade rode forward to Vierkirchen, where he received reports as to the halting places which had been reconnoitred. He then dictated to his adjutant the following order, which was taken down on a message form :—

"1st Res. Inf. Bde.

"Vierkirchen.

22. XI., 11.15 a.m.

"Brigade order No. 1 for 22. XI.

"1. The brigade will halt at Vierkirchen, and dinners will be issued from the field kitchens.

"2. The ground west of Vierkirchen as far as the railway is allotted to the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. The ground between the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. and Vierkirchen, and the ground east of Vierkirchen half way to Rettenbach, are allotted to the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt.

Captains N. and M. will point out the exact position of halting places. No troops are to be south of the Esterhofen—Vierkirchen—Rettenbach road.

"3. The following areas are allotted for water, if required, for requisitioning wood and straw, and for shelter :—

To the 1st Res. Inf. Regt., Esterhofen, Passenbach and Vierkirchen west of the church.

To the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., Rammelsbach and Vierkirchen east of the church.

"4. 1st line transport will be parked with units. The 2nd line transport has been ordered up and will halt immediately in rear of the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. Tool and technical wagons will join their regiments.

"5. No transport is to be in Vierkirchen. Roads are to be kept clear. Captain N. is responsible for the maintenance of order in Vierkirchen.

The march of the 10th Inf. Div., which is moving about 3 p.m. from Röhrmoos through Vierkirchen on Rettenbach, must not be interfered with.

"6. The advanced guard has been pushed forward to the neighbourhood of Jedenhofen to cover the brigade. One section, 1st Res. Inf. Regt., is at Kollbach.

"7. A signalling detachment, 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will endeavour to get connection with Kollbach from the church tower of Vierkirchen (transmitting station at Rettenbach if necessary).

"8. I shall be at Rammelsbach ; representatives of regiments will come there for orders."

A.,

Colonel.

A message form with this order was then given to each of the two captains, who had been ordered to reconnoitre the halting places. They were instructed to hand them to their regimental commanders, and to report to the latter as to the halting places reconnoitred ; they were also directed to guide the battalions to their halting places.

ORDERS ISSUED IN THE 1ST RES. INF. REGT.

Captain M. met the officer in the command of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. (2 battalions) at the head of the 2nd Battalion, which was just approaching Vierkirchen. He handed over the brigade order and reported as follows :—"I have reconnoitred two halting places. The first for the 2nd battalion is immediately east of the railway, at the point where the track from Vierkirchen crosses it 800 metres north of Esterhofen station.

"The 3rd Battalion had best turn west of Vierkirchen and bivouac by companies on either side of the lane leading to Rammelsbach. It should not be north of the big bend in this lane between Vierkirchen and Rammelsbach.

"Esterhofen and Passenbach are available for the 2nd Battalion for requisitioning wood and straw, and for water and shelter. Vierkirchen, west of the church, is available for the 3rd Battalion. The ground is dry; the big ridge running west from Rammelsbach, affords cover from the north."

The battalion commanders, who had previously been ordered to come to the regimental commander, then received the following verbal order at 11.35 a.m. :—

"The brigade, which will prepare a defensive position on the south bank of the Glonn this afternoon, the 22nd, will halt at Vierkirchen, and dinners will be issued from the field kitchens. The ground about Rammelsbach and east of Vierkirchen is allotted to the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., and that west of Vierkirchen, as far as the railway, to the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. The advanced guard is covering the brigade in the neighbourhood of Jedenhofen.

"The 2nd Battalion will halt east of the railway, at the point where the track from Vierkirchen crosses it 800 metres north of Esterhofen.

"The 3rd Battalion will halt immediately west of Vierkirchen, on either side of the lane leading to Rammelsbach. Both battalions will be covered from the north.

"The 2nd Battalion will watch the left flank and towards Jedenhofen.

"The following areas are allotted for water, for requisitioning wood and straw, and for shelter :—

"To the 2nd Battalion, Passenbach and Esterhofen.

"To the 3rd Battalion, Vierkirchen west of the church.

"2nd line transport will be parked with units. All roads in Vierkirchen, where Captain M. is responsible for order, will be kept free from vehicles. The march of the 10th Inf. Div., which is moving about 3 p.m. from Röhrmoos through Vierkirchen on Rettenbach, must not be interfered with.

"The 2nd line transport will halt with the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. Regimental headquarters will be at the church at Vierkirchen. Representatives of battalions will be there by 12 noon for orders.

"The battalions will march through Vierkirchen together, and afterwards will move independently to their halting places."

The battalions reached the allotted areas about 11.30 a.m. The

2nd Battalion halted in column. It posted two observation posts on the hills west of the railway, one of which could see towards Jedenhofen, while the other could watch the Passenbach—Albertshofen road. A strong patrol was sent towards the wood east of Albertshofen, and a piquet was posted on the ridge north of the bivouac ground. The battalion headquarters were established at the railway station adjoining. Meanwhile, the men had taken off their packs, parties had been sent off for water, horses were taken to water, and the 1st line transport was drawn up behind the companies. The field kitchens were halted on a flank, and dinners were cooked and ready for issue at 12.30 p.m., fires having been lighted during the march.

The 3rd Battalion had distributed its companies singly over the available ground; they halted in various formations. An observation post was placed on the ridge which ran just to the north. The 2nd line transport was parked together behind the battalion, the field kitchens only being brought up to the companies when dinners were ready.

ORDERS ISSUED IN THE 2ND RES. INF. REGT.

Captain N. of the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., who met his regimental commander as he was riding through Rettenbach, gave him the brigade order and reported :—“The 1st Battalion had best halt in and round Rammelsbach, as the companies can find room. The 2nd Battalion should halt immediately north of Vierkirchen with its left level with the church. The 3rd Battalion should halt on the east side of Vierkirchen north of the road to Rettenbach.

“Rammelsbach is available for the 1st Battalion for water, for requisitioning wood and straw, and for shelter. The north part of Vierkirchen east of the church is available for the 2nd Battalion, and the southern part east of the church for the 3rd Battalion. I will make a further reconnaissance of the quarters available and indicate their distribution clearly. The ground is dry meadow-land, springs are numerous and well supplied with water.”

The regimental commander then issued the following verbal order to his battalion commander, who had come up :—

“The brigade will halt at Vierkirchen and dinners will be issued from the field kitchens.

“The advanced guard is covering the brigade in the neighbourhood of Jedenhofen, one section 1st Res. Inf. Regt. is at Kollbach. The 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will halt at Rammelsbach and Vierkirchen. Detailed arrangements will be made by Captain N., who will guide the battalions.

“The 3rd Battalion will watch the front towards Piflitz, Kollbach, and Asbach, and will also reconnoitre the wood north of Vierkirchen.

“Transport will join its units, roads are to be clear. The brigadier has directed Captain M., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., to preserve order in Vierkirchen; the 10th Inf. Div. is marching about 3 p.m. from Röhrmoos through Vierkirchen on Rettenbach; its march must not be interfered with. A signalling party of the 2nd Battalion will endeavour to get connection with Kollbach from the church

tower of Vierkirchen (transmitting station at Rettenbach if necessary).

"Regimental headquarters will be at Rammelsbach. Representatives of battalions will come there at noon for orders."

Captain N. then galloped forward with the battalion commanders north of the road and gave the necessary directions as to the allotment of the various localities for requisitioning wood and straw, and for water. He then pointed out the bivouacs, and proceeded to Vierkirchen in order to reconnoitre and allot quarters for the various units. In doing this, he did not take the buildings south of the Esterhofen—Rettenbach road into account, owing to the march of the 10th Inf. Div.

When the commander of the 3rd Battalion, which was marching last, had surveyed the ground, he sent his adjutant to the portion of Vierkirchen which had been allotted to his battalion, with orders to make arrangements for drawing water for the men and watering horses.

He then halted on his bivouac ground and raised his hand high above his head, whereupon the battalion, which had come up meanwhile, turned off to the right from the road and marched on him. He then gave these orders:—"9th and 10th Companies halt. The 11th and 12th Companies will halt level with the 9th and 10th Companies at 150 metres interval. Pile arms. Take off packs. Lie down. Company commanders."

The company commanders issued orders for water parties, and told the men to get out their mess tins. The battalion commander then issued them the following verbal instructions:—"The brigade is halted near Vierkirchen, the large village on our left front. The 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. is disposed as follows:—1st Battalion and regimental headquarters at Rammelsbach, that small group of houses with red roofs half left, the 2nd Battalion is halted between Rammelsbach and Vierkirchen; we remain here. The 1st Res. Inf. Regt. is halted on the far side of Vierkirchen. The advanced guard is covering the brigade in the neighbourhood of Jedenhofen, one section 1st Res. Inf. Regt. is on hill 496 west of Kollbach. The 9th Company will establish an observation post on the hill straight in front of us; this post will watch the big wood, and send patrols towards Piflitz, Kollbach and Asbach. I want to know to what extent the wood is passable especially for vehicles.

"Dinners will be issued from the field kitchens, which will be drawn up on the outer flanks of companies. Water for men and horses in the southern part of Vierkirchen, east of the road which runs south of the church. Detailed instructions will be issued by the adjutant who has been sent on.

"The 1st line transport will clear the roads, and will be drawn up in rear of the battalion in the following order:—Headquarters, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th Coys. The Esterhofen-Rettenbach road must not be used after 2 p.m., as the 10th Inf. Div. will be marching along it from Röhrmoos. The 2nd line transport will be parked on our right towards Rettenbach. I will be with the 11th Company."

Similar orders were issued in the other battalions. By 12.30 p.m. all the battalions were resting on their allotted halting places. By 1 p.m. dinners were ready for issue.

We will now return to the officer in temporary command of the brigade. The officer in command of the brigade had, after he had issued the brigade order at 11.15 a.m., ridden with his adjutant to Rammelsbach and surveyed the country there. The wood north of Vierkirchen shut out the view to the north-east, hill 485 and its spurs hid the valley of the Glonn, but the heights on the north bank of the Glonn, particularly those about Aufhausen and Weichs, were visible over the top of that hill. Jedenhofen was not in view, but on the other hand the hill south-east of Albertshofen was clearly visible. The dismounted troopers of the 1st Sq., 1st Res. Cav. Regt., were seen some 800 metres in front on the road leading to Asbach.

The officer in command of the brigade directed his adjutant to get from the squadron any information as to the situation, and then to report to the brigade commander, whom he would find between Jedenhofen and Albertshofen, that the brigade had arrived at Vierkirchen and that representatives for orders were at Rammelsbach.

He then watched the battalions arrive at their halting places and at 1 p.m. he was informed that signalling connection had been established between the church towers of Vierkirchen and Kollbach by way of Rettenbach. A cyclist officer was sent to meet the 10th Inf. Div. to tell them that the 1st Res. Inf. Div. was at Vierkirchen.

ORDERS ISSUED IN THE ADVANCED GUARD, AND ITS ACTION AFTER 11 A.M.

While these events were taking place in the main body, the advanced guard had marched on in order to cover the brigade in the neighbourhood of Jedenhofen, while the brigade was halted in accordance with orders. At 11.15 a.m., as the point was approaching the railway crossing on the road between Vierkirchen and hill 485, the commander of the 1st Sq., 1st Res. Cav. Regt., came up and reported:—"When the squadron reached the neighbourhood of Jedenhofen about 9 a.m., it found the country round Kollbach, Petershausen and Aufhausen clear. It immediately occupied the crossings at Petershausen, Asbach and Jedenhofen with dismounted troopers. At the same time a further reconnaissance was initiated, and patrols were sent into the valley of the Ilm towards Jetzendorf and Hilgertshausen. Only one of these, which was sent in the direction of Ilmmünster, has reported; it states that Petershausen and Paindorf are clear. Observation posts have been extended along the near bank of the Glonn. A standing patrol has been placed on hill 496 west of Kollbach, an observation post, which is able to see into the Aufhausen valley, is on hill 485, a third is on a high tree at the edge of the wood south-east of Albertshofen. Soon after 9 a.m. horsemen were observed on the far bank of the Glonn on hill 508, south-west of Aufhausen, and at 9.15 a.m. a column of cavalry, about two squadrons, came out of the Aufhausen valley against the post at the bridge of Jedenhofen, but it retired at once behind Ebersbach when the post opened fire. Since then, the enemy's cavalry have made a number of attempts to cross the Glonn, but they have so far all failed owing to the alertness of my posts at the bridges. A few of the enemy, who have been killed in these attempts, belong to the 2nd Chevaulegers Regiment, and I think I

have also observed some lancers. A squadron is at present behind hill 485, dismounted and ready to oppose by its fire any attempts of the enemy to cross.

"The Glonn is low and is fordable by infantry at many points; at the same time, there are a number of pools and reaches of considerable depth in the river. Mounted troops must use the regular crossings owing to the marshy nature of the banks. There is a practicable ford, which I have had marked, just below the mill at Jedenhofen. Attempts to get telegraphic connection with Pfaffenhofen and Reichertshausen from Esterhofen station have failed. On the other hand, the railway officials at Esterhofen report that Reichertshausen answered at 7 a.m. and stated that there was nothing to be seen of the enemy."

The commander of the point then asked the squadron commander to wait a few moments while he rapidly reconnoitred the country from hill 485. He at once recognized that it would be possible to cover the brigade, while it was halted, from a position on the near bank, but that it would not be possible to cover the preparation of the defensive position Jedenhofen-Albertshofen from the same position. It was also clear to him that in order to hold Jedenhofen it would be necessary to occupy the heights east of that place, and that if the infantry position was to command the valley of the Glonn it must be pushed well forward towards the river. The whole slope would, however, be visible from the Aufhausen hills, and could thence be swept with effective artillery fire. It would even be possible for small parties of infantry pushed down to the Glonn to interfere considerably with the work of defence. Although there were no parties of the enemy at present in dangerous proximity, they were to be expected, and might certainly arrive during the long period required for the preparation of the position for defence. The less the enemy could make himself felt and the less he was able to see of the position, the better it would be for the defence. Thorough security could, therefore, only be obtained by occupying a position on the far bank of the Glonn. On these grounds the advanced guard commander determined not to remain at Jedenhofen, but to occupy the heights on either side of Aufhausen at once and to cover the 1st Res. Inf. Brigade from that position. He then informed the brigade commander, who was reconnoitring a short distance off on the hill east of Jedenhofen, of his intention, and received his approval of the plan. The squadron commander was directed to follow, as soon as the vanguard company had reached the hill immediately east of Aufhausen, as far as Ebersbach, where he would be given further instructions.

The advanced guard commander then galloped off to the vanguard, and reached it just as it was approaching Jedenhofen on its way round the south side of the hill, which has been mentioned above, east of Jedenhofen.

He signalled to the vanguard commander to join him, and issued the following order verbally from the small knoll immediately east of Jedenhofen:—

11.15 a.m.

"The brigade will entrench a position on this bank of the Glonn,
(B 760)

on either side of Jedenhofen, that small place on the left below us, and will hold that position. It will connect at Albertshofen with the 9th Inf. Div., which is already entrenching. The advanced guard squadron is dismounted behind this hill; dismounted troopers are holding the bridges at Petershausen, Asbach and Jedenhofen.

"Hostile cavalry are on the far bank about Aufhausen. The Glonn is passable by infantry. I intend to occupy the heights of Aufhausen in order to carry out my duty of protecting the brigade while it is entrenching. Aufhausen is that small place visible behind Ebersbach, which lies in front of us in the valley of the Glonn.

"You will cross with the vanguard at the mill in front of us, and will secure the hill 200 metres east of Aufhausen. The hill is that flat-topped rise straight over the small dome of Ebersbach church. You will patrol constantly towards Ziegelberg, paying particular attention to the wood in front of it, through Lindach on Sollern and Thann, and by Edenpfaffenhofen on Eggersried."

"The company is responsible for the section Wasenhof (inclusive) —Aufhausen (inclusive). I am sending the 2nd Company to hill 508, south-west of Aufhausen, and the remainder of the battalion towards Ebersbach. Reports to Ebersbach."

The order had been previously sent back by cyclist to the column:—"Company commanders to come to the advanced guard commander on the hill just east of Jedenhofen."

The company commanders arrived at 11.30 a.m., just as the head of the vanguard was approaching the mill of Jedenhofen. They received the following verbal order:—

11.30 a.m.

"The village through which you have just ridden is Jedenhofen. On the far side of the valley of the Glonn, in front of us, is Ebersbach, on its left above the foot of the flat-topped hill you can see Aufhausen, which you will recognize by the small dome of the church. Aufhausen is occupied by hostile cavalry. The enemy's army is reported to be marching to-day, the 22nd, on Klenau, Schillberg and Aichach. Those places lie about 20 kilometres ($12\frac{1}{2}$ miles) north-west of the Glonn. Our army is to hold the southern bank of the Glonn.

"The brigade, which is attached to the 5th Army Corps, will deploy on the line Jedenhofen—Albertshofen, where its left will connect with the 9th Inf. Div., which is already entrenching, and will dig itself in to-day. The hill on which we are standing will probably form the extreme right flank. The advanced guard squadron is behind this hill, and has dismounted detachments at the bridges of Petershausen, Asbach and Jedenhofen. The Glonn is passable by infantry, but it is necessary to reconnoitre it. The advanced guard is charged with the protection of the brigade while entrenching, and will occupy the hills on either side of Aufhausen. The vanguard, which has been allotted the section Wasenhof (you can see it by that waste ground left of Asbach) to Aufhausen, has been ordered to that flat-topped hill, which you can see straight over Ebersbach church.

"No. 2 Company will cross the Glonn at the mill; it will occupy hill 508, south-west of Aufhausen, and hold the line Aufhausen (inclusive) —Erlhausen. It will get touch with the 9th Inf. Div. at the latter place. It will send a small detachment to the hill with the poplars above Weichs. Strong patrols will be sent to Fränking and Edenholzhausen. It will search the wood between those two places. The remainder of the battalion will follow under my orders to Ebersbach. All reports to the latter place."

Let us now return to the vanguard. After the company commander had received his order he reached the point of the advanced guard at 11.30 a.m., as it was halting for a moment at the northern exit of Jedenhofen. He then called out to Lieutenant A., who commanded the point, "March on the mill half right and then on Ebersbach." As he rode alongside him he gave him the following instructions:—"The advanced guard will seize the hills on either side of Aufhausen in order to cover the brigade, which will entrench a position above this place, Jedenhofen. Aufhausen is the place with the church which has a small dome, to the left of the small village with a similar church immediately in front of us, which is Ebersbach. Hostile cavalry are in Aufhausen. The heads of columns of the enemy's army are reported to be marching on Klenau, Schiltberg and Aichach, about 20 kilometres (12½ miles) north-west of the Glonn. The point will advance through Ebersbach, whither it will move at once, on the flat-topped hill straight over Ebersbach church. The company is following. If the hill is occupied it will be taken. No. 2 Company is moving on our left towards hill 508, south-west of Aufhausen; the remainder of the battalion is following to Ebersbach."

He then waited at the mill for the company, and gave the section commanders and senior under-officers the following information as to the situation:—"The brigade will entrench a position behind us at Jedenhofen, the small place we have just passed through, and will hold it in touch with the 9th Inf. Div., parts of which are already entrenching on our left at Zillhofen. The stream in front of us is the Glonn, which is passable nearly everywhere by infantry. Straight in front of us on the opposite bank lies Ebersbach. That small church tower to its left belongs to Aufhausen. On the extreme right, in the valley, lies Asbach, that large place over there. A strong force of hostile cavalry is reported to be in Aufhausen. The heads of columns of the enemy's army are marching on Klenau, Schiltberg and Aichach, 20 kilometres north of the Glonn.

"The advanced guard will occupy the hills rising in front of us. Our company is ordered to secure the flat-topped hill which we can see above Ebersbach church. No. 2 Company is moving on our left on the ridge south-west of Aufhausen, Nos. 3 and 4 Companies are following to Ebersbach.

"Under-officer A. will, when the company has crossed the Glonn, go with six men to the far edge of the wood, 1,500 metres north of Ebersbach, and reconnoitre towards Ziegelberg and Lindach."

When the company commander concluded, the company moved off over the bridge crossing the second arm of the Glonn just north of the mill. As it was crossing the bridge it was received with heavy rifle fire from the direction of Ebersbach. It suffered considerable

loss, and it appeared for a moment as if the men would be panic stricken.

The company commander immediately drew his sword, and springing to the front, ordered:—"Leading section extend. Double. Advance on Ebersbach to the attack. No. 2 Section will extend to the right, No. 3 to the left."

The leading section extended, and, at the double, reinforced the point which was lying down about 200 metres in front. Thence it directed its fire against the eastern edge of Ebersbach, which was occupied by the enemy.

As the enemy's fire though heavy was not particularly effective, the section advanced by rushes. In doing this it suffered some slight loss. When it got to within 400 metres the enemy's fire ceased.

When the village was entered, a trooper of the enemy's 2nd Chevaulegers Regiment was found lying severely wounded; he was not in a condition to answer questions. He belonged to the 1st Squadron. The inhabitants stated that there had been at least two squadrons in Ebersbach, and that they had gone off in the direction of Aufhausen.

The company commander, who had remounted, then ordered the No. 1 Section to move on the hill east of Aufhausen. It was first of all to lie down in position there and keep a sharp look out towards Lindach and Edenpfaffenhofen. A strong patrol was to be sent to Aufhausen.

He then waited for the remaining two sections, which were approaching the southern edge of Ebersbach, one extended and the other in close order.

He signalled to these two sections to close immediately north of Ebersbach, and at 12.30 p.m., when he had seen that the No. 1 Section had occupied the hill east of Aufhausen unopposed, he issued the following instructions:—"The company will watch the line Wasenhof—Aufhausen, both inclusive. No. 2 Section will move on the small wood 1,500 metres north-east of Ebersbach (we can see the southern edge of that wood on our right), and will watch the line from Wasenhof to the west edge of the wood. It will reconnoitre towards Petershausen, the Petershausen—Jetzendorf road and the tracks leading to Sollern and Lindach. In case of attack, No. 2 Section will hold the north edge of the wood. No. 1 Section will watch the line from the left of No. 2 Section to Aufhausen, and will hold the hill on which it now is.

"The remainder of the company will remain here for the present. I am going to ride round the company's position beginning from the left. No. 2 Section will march off."

He then ordered the commander of No. 3 Section to pile arms, and to instruct his men as to the situation, the rôle of the company and the country. One under-officer and three men were sent back to reconnoitre the Glonn from Asbach to the north-west of Jedenhofen and to mark deep places.

The stretcher bearers and medical under-officer of the company were directed to take the wounded to the mill at Jedenhofen, and to inform the medical officer of the battalion.

Meanwhile Nos. 3 and 4 Companies had approached the southern

edge of Ebersbach; the No. 2 Company was seen to be ascending the southern slopes of hill 508.

The advanced guard commander met the commander of No. 1 Company at 12.40 p.m., and learned from him what had happened and the steps taken. After he had expressed his concurrence with the latter, and had promised to make arrangements for the wounded of No. 1 Company, the commander of No. 1 Company rode off to his section, which was still lying down in extended order on the hill just east of Aufhausen.

At 1 p.m., Lieutenant A., the section commander, made him the following report:—"I have occupied this hill without fighting. I have just seen the enemy, estimated at two squadrons, disappear into Edenpfaffenhofen. I have sent patrols as follows:—

"Through Lindach on Thann;

"Straight through the wood in front of us on Thann;

"Through Edenpfaffenhofen on Eggersried.

"An under-officer and ten men are in Aufhausen."

The hill on which the company commander was standing was a small under-feature of the ridge running down from Edenpfaffenhofen on the east side of the valley. It afforded but little view, for the ground in front was rising. The highest point of the hill lay some 800 metres to the north-west. Beyond it nothing could be seen; the field of fire for infantry was not very good and extended barely for 500 metres in front of the section. Due north, towards Lindach, rose a small knoll, which commanded the position of the section at about 1,000 metres and limited the view. Only at an occasional point was it possible to get a glimpse of the edges of the woods which extend east of Lindach and north of Edenpfaffenhofen. Looking eastwards there was also a ridge in front, which sloped down to the valley of the Glonn, and intervened between the position of the section and the wood which has been mentioned so often, 1,500 metres north of Ebersbach. The western part of this wood was visible. The knoll 1,000 metres north of Aufhausen, which has been mentioned above, shut out the view of the country towards Ziegelberg.

The position of No. 1 Section did not therefore seem particularly favourable; if it were pushed further forward toward Edenpfaffenhofen, it would, however, be too close to the wood north of that place, and the extent of front would be too great.

At 1.10 p.m. the company commander gave the following verbal order:—"Lieutenant A., you will watch the ground on the west edge of that wood there on the right, as far as Aufhausen inclusive, with No. 1 Section, and will occupy also the knoll which you see in the direction of Lindach.

"No. 2 Section will extend your right from the wood. In case of attack you will hold this position; No. 3 Section, which is at present at Ebersbach, will be sent to the west edge of the wood on your right. I agree with your arrangements for reconnaissance. It is especially important to observe the roads leading on Thann and Eggersried from the north and north-west. Hostile patrols must be prevented from observing the valley of the Glonn.

"You must keep connection with No. 2 Company, which by this time must have reached that hill over there on the left (hill 508

south-west of Aufhausen). Its section begins at Aufhausen. The remainder of the battalion is straight behind you at Ebersbach. Reports to No. 3 Section. I am going now to No. 2 Section."

The company commander then galloped off to the knoll between Aufhausen and Lindach to have a look at the country. From this point the country east and west of Lindach was in view. Looking west, the southern edges of the woods which extend about that place were visible, and Thann was easily recognizable through a gap in the wood. Looking east, the eye ran along the line of hills which extends towards Ziegelberg, and was then caught by the red roofs of the small village of Ziegelberg, which was almost concealed in the trees. The meadows lying in the deep valley which lay to the south, between this line of hills and the wood, were in full view; looking beyond them, one could see, far down the valley of the Glonn, Petershausen, and beyond it the hills of Glonnbercha could be identified.

Over the line of hills between Ziegelberg and Lindach stretched the long ridge which runs from Sollern to Petershausen, and above this ridge the line of big woods shut out the view to the north. The valleys between these ridges were not in view.

The company commander recognized that the position of No. 2 Section was even less favourable than that of No. 1. The ground rose on the far side of the meadows mentioned above, which were scarcely 800 metres wide, from the northern edge of the wood which he had been directed to hold. The slope of the ground towards Ziegelberg was concave, and the field of view and fire was very limited.

He had, therefore, to decide either to give up the defence of the wood altogether, or to extend the line of defence to the Ziegelberg ridge (hill 491), whence a view of from 2 to 3 kilometres was obtainable, and the field of fire for 2,000 metres appeared very good. By including this line the position to be held by the company would be considerably extended. But this appeared to be the only means of preventing the enemy, even for a time, from penetrating into the wood from the southern edge of which the valley of the Glonn and the positions of the 1st Res. Inf. Brigade could be observed at leisure.

In case of necessity, No. 3 Section must be posted at the western edge of the wood to fill the gap between No. 2 and No. 1 Sections, which would be increased by pushing forward No. 2 Section.

Captain B. then found the commander of No. 2 Section at the centre of the northern edge of the wood occupied in issuing instructions to his section. He asked him to postpone issuing his orders and said:—"The edge of this wood is not a suitable position. Your position must be further forward; it will begin at Wasenhof and extend through Ziegelberg and hill 491, towards that meadow land half way between Lindach and this wood. The limit of No. 1 Section is on that small knoll which you see to the left of the corner of the wood. There will be a strong observation post there. I am going to place No. 3 Section in front of the western edge of this wood. There is no change in the orders for reconnaissance."

1st Lieutenant P. then marched off towards Ziegelberg. The

company commander accompanied him and added the following instructions:—"In case of attack, you must hold Ziegelberg and hill 491 west of that place. If compelled you must fall back east of the wood on Asbach where I intend to collect the company."

At 1.30 p.m. the section arrived behind the ridge between Ziegelberg and hill 491. The section commander ordered the section to halt, and took the under-officers to the front until they could see over the hill. When he had explained the situation, he issued the following verbal order:—"Our brigade, which is attached to the 5th Army Corps, will dig itself in this afternoon about Jedenhofen, and will hold its position against every attack. The 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., is directed to cover the brigade while entrenching, and will hold the ground on either side of Aufhausen. No. 1 Company occupies the line Wasenhof—Aufhausen. No. 1 Section is on our left, its nearest observation post is on the hill which you see past the corner of the wood. You can recognize the hill by the chalk pit. No. 3 Section holds the west edge of the wood behind us. We form the extreme right wing and have to hold from Wasenhof, which is by that bare ground below us in the valley of the Glonn, which I have already pointed out to you, through Ziegelberg, the village close by, and hill 491, on the left of the village, as far as that meadow-land below there. The section will remain behind Ziegelberg, and in case of attack will hold Ziegelberg and the hill on its left. The village in the valley on the right, with that big red building (the railway station) is Petershausen, the place half left in that flat valley is Sollern. Still further to the left you see, at the end of that ridge, the chapel of Lindach.

"The following will be the observation posts:—

"Under-officer A. and six men will be on the right wing in Wasenhof: they will observe the valley of the Glonn and Petershausen. Under-officer B. and four men in Ziegelberg: they will observe from Petershausen to Sollern.

"Corporal C. and three men will form a standing patrol in the neighbourhood of Lindach, to watch the ground west of Sollern and the roads coming from Thann.

"The following will be the patrols:—

- (1) Private D. with two men by Petershausen station, along the Jetzendorf road as far as its junction with the road from Kreithof. This patrol will come back by Kreithof.
- (2) Private E. with two men by Sollern—Kreithof—the Petershausen road—Jetzendorf, and so back.
- (3) Private F. with two men by Lindach to Thann and back.

"Hostile patrols are to be stopped as far as possible; they must be prevented from getting down to the valley of the Glonn. Reports here. Observation posts and patrols will march off. Serjeant M. will take charge of the section, tell it off, pile arms at Ziegelberg, get water, and inform the men as to the situation. I am going through Ziegelberg to No. 2 observation post, and then to hill 491."

The captain asked 1st Lieutenant P. to establish a signalling station to connect with No. 3 and No. 1 sections at the south-west corner of Ziegelberg. The following abbreviations were to be used:—

F. to mean "Enemy advancing."
 A. " " "Enemy about attack."
 S. " " "Section to take up its position."
 R. " " "Section will retire."

When 1st Lieutenant P. had made a note of these abbreviations, the company commander rode back to No. 1 Section and explained to Lieutenant A. the change in the dispositions of Nos. 2 and 3 Sections. He also ordered the section to establish a signalling station, explained the abbreviations given above, and then returned to Ebersbach.

At Ebersbach, dinners were issued to No. 3 section from the field kitchens, which were then sent to No. 1 section at Aufhausen and afterwards to No. 2 section at Ziegelberg.

When dinners were finished, No. 3 section, together with the 1st line transport of the company, marched off to take up its position at the west edge of the wood north of Ebersbach.

We will now go to No. 2 Company, 1st Bn., 1st Res Inf. Regt., the head of which had reached the bridge at Jedenhofen mill at 11.45 a.m.

When the firing occasioned by the collision between No. 1, Company and the enemy holding Ebersbach was heard, the company had begun to double, but as soon as it was recognized that the affair was trifling quick time was resumed. The company had deployed its sections and had formed a thin line of skirmishers, 600 metres in front, directed on hill 508, south-west of Aufhausen. An officer and ten men had previously been sent on towards this hill. The officer was directed to lie down there and to wait for the company. He was told that the company was to attack if the hill was occupied.

When the company was on the march towards the valley and was crossing the Ebersbach-Weichs road, half-way between hill 508 and Ebersbach, some horsemen were seen at the eastern exit of Weichs. They were recognized through glasses to be infantry officers of the Blue army. A cyclist sent thither reported that the No. 2 Company, 33rd Inf. Regt. was occupying Weichs, and was charged with the duty of covering the 9th Inf. Div., which was entrenching at Zillhofen. The easternmost post of the company was on the knoll, 300 metres north of Weichs.

The officer sent forward to hill 508 reported that he had reached that place without difficulty, and that nothing was to be seen of the enemy.

Thereupon Captain B. issued the following verbal order at 12.30 p.m. to his company, which was drawn up close behind hill 508:—"The brigade, which is attached to the 5th Army Corps, is to occupy a defensive position behind us at Jedenhofen, the place on the far side of the Glonn which we have just marched through, and will dig itself in there to-day. The advanced guard on the north bank of the Glonn is to cover the brigade, while entrenching, against the enemy, detachments of whose army have been reported to be on the march this morning, the 22nd, on Klenau, Schiltberg, and Aichach. Hostile cavalry which were holding Ebersbach have been driven out by No. 1 Company.

"No. 1 Company is on our right, with its left at Aufhausen, the

church tower of which you can see over the hill. The remainder of the battalion is in Ebersbach, half right behind us.

"No. 2 Company, 33rd Inf. Regt. is on our left in Weichs, that large village with the factory chimney. The nearest observation post of that company is on the hill with the two poplars, north of Weichs. The section allotted to No. 2 Company extends from Aufhausen to the hill with the poplars.

"The company will remain in this valley, and in case of attack, will hold the hill in front. Lieutenant A. will remain on hill 508 and watch the ground in front.

"Under-officer B. will act as patrol No. 1 and move through Edenpfaffenhofen to Eggersried. Under-officer C. and four men will form patrol No. 2 and will move through the wood half left to Fränking. Hostile patrols are to be stopped as far as possible; they must not be allowed to get into the Glonn valley. 1st Lieutenant K. will take over command of the company, tell it off and instruct the men as to the situation and the surrounding country.

"Water can then be fetched from Ebersbach, and dinners be issued from the field kitchen. No. 1 Section is to be ready for instant action. I am going to Lieutenant A. on the hill in front."

Captain G. met Lieutenant A. on hill 508 at 1 p.m. A good view was obtainable from the hill. An observer stationed there not only had the whole country east of Aufhausen, as far as Ziegelberg, in full view, but also the whole of the country as far as the ridge, which runs east of Erlhausen, was visible to the west. The high ground north and north-east of the Glonn, and the woods about Gundachersdorf were clearly distinguishable over the latter ridge.

The big wood east of Edenholtzhausen, however, limited the field of view, but the country between Fränking and Edenpfaffenhofen was visible through gaps in the trees.

Lieutenant A. had placed two look-out men who divided the ground to be watched between them. He called the attention of his company commander to the fact that there was a line of men in extended order on the hill east of Aufhausen, and that they appeared to be the left of No. 1 Company. He also pointed out that there was a post of that company at the first house of Aufhausen, on the Edenpfaffenhofen road. The company commander ordered Lieutenant A. to remain on hill 508 as observation post of No. 2 Company, which had taken up a position in the valley behind, half right. At the same time he gave him the necessary information as to the enemy and the situation. When he had ridden back to his company, the company commander met the advanced guard commander, to whom he reported the position of his company and that of No. 2 Company, 33rd Inf. Regt.

We will now return to Nos. 3 and 4 Companies, which had reached Ebersbach about 1 p.m. There Major M., the battalion commander, issued them the following order:—"No. 1 Company has occupied the wood on our right, the hill in front of us, and Aufhausen; No. 2 Company holds the big spur which runs north-west from our left.

"Nos. 3 and 4 Companies will remain at my disposal at the northern exit of Ebersbach. No. 3 Company will be on the right

and No. 4 on the left of the Aufhausen road. The companies will find shelter, and dinners will be issued from the field kitchens.

"All the field kitchens of the battalion will afterwards be assembled at the southern exit of Ebersbach, and will move by Jedenhofen to Vierkirchen, where they will come under the charge of the supply officer of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. No. 3 Company will establish posts on the roads to Petershausen and Aufhausen to connect with No. 1 Company, and a piquet of one under-officer and ten men at the bridge at Petershausen. No. 4 Company will keep connection with No. 2 Company and with the 1st Bn., 33rd Inf. Regt., which is at Weichs. It will send piquets to the bridges at Asbach and Jedenhofen mill. It will establish signalling communication with the south bank of the Glonn.

"The medical officer will arrange for the care of the wounded of No. 1 Company, who will be brought back to Jedenhofen mill, and will subsequently be sent back to Vierkirchen. The ambulance wagon is at Jedenhofen mill, where the wounded of other companies will be sent. Transport will be requisitioned and held in readiness at Ebersbach.

"I am going to No. 1 Company and afterwards to No. 2. Captain N. will take over command here, and will see that the men are instructed as to the situation and their duties."

Just as the advanced guard commander was about to ride off, the commander of the 1st Sq., 1st Res. Cav. Regt., reported himself and asked for orders. He was directed to draw in his dismounted troopers as they were relieved at the bridges by Nos. 3 and 4 Companies, and to resume the reconnaissance both down the valley of the Ilm and on the line Jetzendorf—Hilgertshausen towards Petershausen. He was also directed to secure the right flank and to watch the Klenau—Hilgertshausen road especially. He was told that the battalion, in the event of a serious attack, would fall back on Asbach, and that the squadron would conform to the retirement through Höckhof.

The advanced guard commander then rode off to inspect the positions of Nos. 1 and 2 Companies, while Captain N. gave the squadron commander more detailed information as to the position of the brigade, and then wrote out a report to the brigade commander.

At 2 p.m. the brigade was seen to begin work above Jedenhofen, and about 3.30 p.m. signalling communication was established with a post of 3rd Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., at the point where the Vierkirchen—Asbach road crosses the railway.

The medical officer had meanwhile dressed the wounds of the few men who were severely wounded, and had them driven to Vierkirchen. He himself remained at the dressing station at Jedenhofen mill.

Three two-horse farm wagons were drawn up at the church at Ebersbach under a medical under-officer, with some of the stretcher bearers of Nos. 3 and 4 Companies.

ORDERS ISSUED BY, AND ACTION OF, THE BRIGADE STAFF AFTER 11 A.M.

The brigade commander, accompanied by his brigade-major and some orderlies, reached the hill east of Jedenhofen at 11 a.m. The commander of the 1st Sq., 1st Res. Cav. Regt., reported himself there. He told the brigadier what he had done and gave him the information gleaned about the enemy and the surrounding country. (See pages 80 and 81 for a similar report made to the advanced guard commander.)

The brigade staff then dismounted and ascended the hill to reconnoitre. The horses were left behind the hill under cover.

The view obtained was as follows:—The whole of the valley of the Glonn between Asbach and Weichs, between which places its width varies from 800 to 1,500 metres, was in full view; the Glonn itself, a sluggish winding stream, was difficult to identify, but a continuous line of trees and bushes marked its course more or less clearly. The line of bushes was less dense between Asbach and Ebersbach than between the latter place and Weichs, which lies further upstream. The valley appeared to be level, though in some places the lower spurs of the hills approached the river closer than in others.

The ground was in most places dry meadow and plough land, though, here and there, reeds and rushes indicated marshy ground. Thick clumps of reeds were visible at intervals along the course of the river, and were an indication of boggy banks.

The view from the hill looking north-east down the valley of the Glonn was unusually extensive; it was possible to see for a distance of 10 kilometres. The first thing which caught the eye in this direction was the railway line, which ran first of all through a number of cuttings, and then crossed the valley to Petershausen on a high embankment. The bridge by which the railway crossed the Kollbach-Asbach road was clearly visible. Beyond that bridge a round hill with gentle slopes rose eastwards; this was hill 496 west of Kollbach. The village of Kollbach was hidden in the valley behind the hill, but two church towers were visible over the crest. One of these, the most westerly, was a slender spire, the other was a tower with white walls and a zinc roof. The latter was visible from the north-west corner of the wood north of Vierkirchen. This wood consisted of high firs mixed with deciduous trees. Portions of the valley of the Glonn north-east of Petershausen, and the hills of Mitterkammer, were visible over the western end of hill 496, the view being limited by the woods north-east and north of Mitterkammer. Goppertshausen, a small village with bright red roofs, was in full view, and so was Ober-Marbach, which lay half-way up the slope and could be identified by its prominent white church tower.

The most prominent object in the foreground was the pleasant little village of Asbach, which was dominated by the dome of its church and was surrounded by trees. Beyond Asbach the church tower of Petershausen, and, some distance to the left, the red buildings of the station, which was on the slopes on the north bank of the

Glonn, could be seen. From the point of observation, Asbach and Petershausen appeared to run into each other. The valley between, which is about 2,000 metres wide, was concealed by the buildings of Asbach.

To the left of Asbach the small group of houses at Wasenhof, and a little further to the left the single house between Wasenhof and Ziegelberg could be discerned. Ziegelberg lay still farther to the left and was almost hidden in the trees. Looking over the avenue of trees, through which runs the road along the Glonn valley, the wooded land south of Ziegelberg was to be seen. Ziegelberg did not appear to stand by itself, as it does on the map, but seemed to join on to the woods lying behind it.

Past the right corner of Ebersbach, which lay in full view, the ground rose gently, and behind and above this rise, Lindach was visible in a gap in the woods.

The valley running from Ebersbach to Aufhausen could be identified, and also the small village of Aufhausen, the houses of which were similar to those of Ebersbach. The broad spur, the highest point of which is formed by hill 508, and which runs north-west from Ebersbach, shut out the view into this valley and into the country round Edenpfaffenhofen. The dark woods east of Edenholzhhausen bounded the horizon in that direction. The portion of the village of Weichs which runs from east to west was in full view, but the part which juts out towards Erlhausen could not be seen. The ridge beyond Weichs, above which place the hill of Gundackersdorf and the woods east of Langenpettenbach were easily distinguishable, was marked by two high poplars, which formed the most conspicuous landmark in the neighbourhood. The view up the Glonn is much more limited than that down the valley. The hills west of Albertshofen, the red roofs of which could be seen, and the stretch of woods running up the hill east of Albertshofen, formed the limits of vision in that direction.

North of Albertshofen, the outskirts of Glonn could be distinguished, and it was possible to identify the hills north of that place.

The small village of Jedenhofen, which lay deep in a grassy valley, could not be seen till one moved to the western slopes of hill 485. The place had little value as a tactical locality, for it was shut in and commanded on all sides.

The position to be occupied by the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. appeared, from an infantry point of view, generally strong when looked at from the road between Jedenhofen and Albertshofen. The left was connected with the 9th Inf. Div.; in front the field of fire extended to the limits of effective rifle range, and the enemy, in passing through this danger zone, had to cross the Glonn. The only unfavourable point was the right flank at Jedenhofen. It was, therefore, necessary to consider whether the hill 300 metres east of that place should be included in the line of defence. If this were done the right flank would be very strong. By bending back the right flank round this hill as far as the railway, a turning movement from Asbach would be made comparatively ineffective. If the enemy were to attempt to outflank the position from hill 496 and Kollbach, it would be necessary for him to make a wide détour and to employ a

very considerable force. Besides this, such a turning movement must soon be discovered.

The undulating nature of the country behind the position was particularly valuable. It not only made it possible to post supports and reserves close to the position under complete cover, but also made communications behind easy. The ground was plough land, easy to dig.

After this general reconnaissance, the staff mounted and rode through Jedenhofen down the position. From the narrow spur on which Albertshofen lay, and which ran down into the valley of the Glonn from the wood so often mentioned above, it was possible to see the ground about and west of Weichs. The small wood, however, shut out the view due east; on the other hand, the first houses of Jedenhofen with the buildings of the adjoining mill could be recognized. Ebersbach lay further to the left. Between these places the part of the Glonn valley as far as the isolated group of houses of Wasenhof, which were recognized by their bright red roofs, lay in view. Aufhausen was entirely concealed by spur 508 and so was the ground towards Ebersbach. The south-western slope of hill 508, which runs down into a grassy valley, and the extensive village of Weichs, were clearly seen. Above Weichs rose a pointed hill crowned by two large and characteristic poplars, which were visible from all points in the surrounding country. The wood extending north-east of Erlhausen limited the view in this direction. Looking over the roofs of Weichs one could see far into the Erlhausen valley, the houses of Erlhausen being still visible. Between this valley and the village of Glonn, which could still be identified though it was partially concealed by a November mist, hill 493 rose from the valley of the Glonn. The lower part of this hill fell in a concave slope into the valley, and above its highest point appeared the woods south of Gundackersdorf.

The brigade major thought he could identify beyond Erlhausen the church tower of Gundackersdorf, but it was not possible to confirm this. The valley of the Glonn was of the same character here as lower down, it was flat plough and meadow land, about 1200 metres wide, with a few marshy places; clumps of bushes and reeds offered some temporary cover from view to advancing infantry. On the far side of the narrow valley through which the tiny Pasenbach runs down to the Glonn, the ground rose from Zillhofen, a conspicuous group of houses, in a slope covered with scattered bushes. The highest point of this slope lay to the west of Breitenwiesen, of which only an occasional roof was visible. Infantry were at work along the lane leading from the Pasenbach valley through Zillhofen westwards. A large group was noticed on the slope north of Breitenwiesen, and it was quickly identified as consisting of dismounted staff officers.

The commander of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. directed his brigade major to bring the regimental commanders to the hill south of Jedenhofen, saying that he would be there at latest at 12.30 p.m., and then galloped off to the hill north of Breitenwiesen. There he found out that the staff was that of the 17th Infantry Brigade, and he received the following information as to the situation:—

“The 17th Inf. Bde., which forms the right wing of the

9th Inf. Div., reached the Glonn at 9.30 a.m. and has one battalion of the 33rd Inf. Regt. pushed forward to the north bank in the neighbourhood of Weichs. The brigade began to entrench at 10.45 a.m. on the line Pasenbach valley—road junction at Engelbrechtsmühle. You can see the buildings of the latter place in the valley to the left of Zillhofen. The right of the 2nd Bn., 33rd Inf. Regt., which is on the right, is at the bend in the road 300 metres south-west of Albertshofen. On the left the brigade connects with the 18th Inf. Bde., which extends as far as Kloster-Indersdorf. The divisional commander intends, owing to the great extent of the position, to occupy it with all the infantry except two battalions; these are to be kept in reserve west of Dazberg. An *Abteilung* of the 17th Field Artillery Regt. was in position on the hill on which the staff stood. The 18th Field Artillery Regt. was east of Kloster-Indersdorf at the disposal of the divisional commander.

"Nothing definite was known about the enemy. There was a rumour that the divisional cavalry regiment had been repulsed by hostile cavalry near Erlhausen about 9 a.m. The covering detachments reported constant collisions with patrols of the enemy's lancers in front."

The commander of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde., who knew that the whole of the ground in front of the 17th Inf. Bde. could be flanked by fire from Albertshofen, suggested to the commander of the 17th Inf. Bde. that it might be advisable to entrench some guns there. This was put in hand at once.

The 17th Inf. Bde. undertook, on its side, to flank with its artillery fire the ground in front of the left wing of the 1st Res. Inf. Brigade, and asked permission to place a section of machine guns in position at Albertshofen, in order to make the front of the 33rd Inf. Regt. still stronger. This proposal was agreed to. At the same time it was arranged that the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., and the 33rd Inf. Regt., which would be alongside each other, should support each other mutually as far as possible. After making these arrangements Major-General P., who commanded the 1st Res. Inf. Bde., rode off by the Albertshofen—Passenbach road in order to reach the hill south of Jedenhofen. In doing this, he crossed a long column of artillery which had halted. The officer in charge of this artillery, a lieutenant-colonel, informed him that it was attached to the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. and that the commander of the regiment and the battery commanders had gone on to the hill south of Jedenhofen. The *Abteilung* was the 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th F.A. Regt.

General P. reached the said hill at 12.25 p.m. The commanders of 1st and 2nd Res. Inf. Regts. and of the 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th F.A. Regt., the latter accompanied by his battery commanders, reported themselves there. The general asked the officers to excuse him while he retired for a short time in order to think over the action he would take.

The following were his ideas of the position which he had to defend:—The extent of the position between Jedenhofen and Albertshofen was about 1400 metres. Since army corps orders directed that Jedenhofen should be held, it was necessary to include the hill immediately east of that place which completely commanded Jeden-

hofen, and formed the only suitable point upon which to rest the right flank. By including this hill the extent of the position was increased to from 1800 to 2000 metres. This did not seem too great a front to be held by an infantry brigade even in somewhat difficult circumstances.

Four battalions were available to hold the front line, taking the battalion which was covering the front and an additional battalion to form the brigade reserve into consideration.

It seemed best to employ the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. complete in the front line and to find the reserve from the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. which had already been split up, as the battalion covering the front belonged to it. The section Jedenhofen—Albertshofen, therefore, fell naturally to the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., the hill east of Jedenhofen would then be occupied by one battalion 1st Res. Inf. Regt., the remaining two battalions of that regiment, including the battalion covering the front, being in second line.

Since the co-operation of the 10th Inf. Div. could not for the present be reckoned upon, it was necessary for the brigade to provide for the security of the right flank. The reserves had therefore to be écheloned behind that flank, their exact position depending upon the facilities for their employment. Now, whether the brigade was to act on the defensive against a hostile advance on the right wing, or whether it was itself to assume the offensive on that side, the reserve would probably have to be employed in the country between Jedenhofen and Asbach. It was also necessary to take into consideration the possibility of the enemy attempting a turning movement by hill 496.

The best position for the available reserves appeared, therefore, to be the wood north of Vierkirchen, and particularly the western part of that wood. This position was the more suitable because it was possible to withdraw the covering battalion into it without difficulty.

It was of great importance to ensure the co-operation of the infantry and the artillery. The section of the infantry position, Jedenhofen—Albertshofen, allotted to the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., could be pushed forward towards the Glonn, and might follow the general line of the lane connecting Jedenhofen and Albertshofen. From this position infantry fire could be employed up to the extreme limits of rifle range, and the obstacle which the enemy had to cross, the river Glonn, would be well within effective rifle range. The ground, which was plough land, seemed to be easy to dig.

The best position for the field artillery, therefore, seemed to be the spur running down from the wood east of Albertshofen where there would be plenty of room for the artillery *Abteilung*. From that position there was a good view of the Glonn Valley between Petershausen and Weichs and of the opposite heights, particularly hill 508 south-west of Aufhausen, which formed the most probable position for the enemy's artillery. The position was also favourable for long range fire, and for the close support of the infantry in the defence of the position.

The problem was much more difficult on the extreme right flank, *i.e.*, the hill east of Jedenhofen, allotted to the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. Here it was first necessary to decide whether the mill on the Glonn north-

east of Jedenhofen should be included in the line of defence or not. In favour of including it were the facts that it lay immediately in front of the position and masked the field of fire, thereby making it necessary to draw back the main line of defence. Against inclusion was the fact that the mill had all the disadvantages of an advanced post, it would easily be enveloped on three sides, and would then have to be evacuated, while it was possible that the enemy in following up would obtain a footing on the main position. If the mill were to be included in the main line of defence, it would be necessary to push the right wing forward which would cause it to be very exposed. In that case it would not be possible to take advantage of the hill east of Jedenhofen, the special value of which was that it afforded a good defensive position against the north.

For these reasons it seemed advisable to give up the idea of occupying the mill, and to accept the resulting disadvantage of not being able to bring any strong force of artillery into action on the hill, for the infantry line must then run close to its highest point. It would, however, still be possible to entrench a few guns in the infantry line in order to be able to give the infantry close artillery support, by sweeping with fire the Glonn Valley as far as the farther side of Asbach. The shields of the guns would justify the employment of the artillery in this way.

It would not be feasible to employ more than a section of artillery on the hill east of Jedenhofen, the remainder of the battery being used in a similar way to bring flanking fire to bear upon the ground in front of the position. For this purpose two guns might be placed in a retired position behind Jedenhofen to sweep the valley in the direction of Weichs, and two more could be concealed in the wood south-east of Albertshofen to fire eastwards down the Glonn valley. This disposition of the guns would considerably assist the infantry defence.

Lastly, it was intended to entrench machine guns in order to bring fire to bear upon specially important points, such as the mill at Jedenhofen, the mouth of the Ebersbach valley and the exits of Weichs, and also to enfilade the front of the position.

On these grounds the brigadier issued the following instructions to the regimental and artillery *Abteilung* commanders:—

“12.45 p.m. I intend to dispose the brigade as follows:—

“1 battalion, 1st Res. Inf. Regt. on the hill 300 metres east of Jedenhofen.

“2nd Res. Inf. Regt. on the line Jedenhofen—Albertshofen, both inclusive.

“The position will be entrenched; the firing line of the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will follow approximately the lane connecting Jedenhofen and Albertshofen. The battalion of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. will entrench the hill east of Jedenhofen so as to form a point of support for the right flank, and to be able to withstand hostile attacks from the front not only from across the Glonn, but also from the direction of Asbach along the railway line. This position is of special importance, for it forms the extreme right flank of the army.

“I wish the machine guns to be employed to bring flanking fire to bear across the front of the position. One machine gun section, 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., is to be employed at Albertshofen to flank the ground

in front of the 17th Infantry Brigade, of which the 33rd Inf. Regt. connects with our left. Steps are to be taken to arrange with this regiment for mutual support.

"The bulk of the field artillery will be entrenched on this ridge; targets, Aufhausen and the high ground east and west of that place. Artillery fire is to be brought, as far as possible, to bear upon hostile infantry up to the last moment of the assault. One section of guns will be placed on the hill east of Jedenhofen to support the battalion of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. which will be there, one section will be placed in a retired position behind Jedenhofen to fire in the direction of Weichs, and one section in the wood on our left to fire in the direction of Ebersbach.

"Commanders will reconnoitre the position and will come to Rammelsbach, north of Vierkirchen, not later than 1.45 p.m. for final orders."

The brigadier then despatched his brigade major to Rammelsbach to prepare the operation order, and went himself to Esterhofen station, where he met the Chief of the General Staff of the 5th Army Corps at 1 p.m. He there received the following information as to the situation:—

"The enemy, estimated at three army corps, reached the line Schrobenhausen—Pöttmes—Tierhaupten with his advanced troops yesterday evening, the 21st. Hostile infantry have been identified this morning at Hilgertshausen, Pipinsried and Pfaffenhofen (near Altomünster), where they are apparently halted for the present.

"Army headquarters expect an attack from the far bank of the Glonn on the morning of the 23rd, and intend to meet this first of all by holding a defensive position on the south bank of the river. It is intended later to make a counter-attack with the 3rd Army Corps on the left flank of the army.

"The 5th Army Corps is ordered to maintain itself at all costs on the line Jedenhofen—Kloster-Indersdorf. Any portions of the 10th Inf. Div., which is still on the march, not required to hold the position are to be sent to Sulzemoos to be at the disposal of the 3rd Army Corps. The 5th Army Corps has at present the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. in position on the line Jedenhofen—Albertshofen, and the 9th Inf. Div., extending to the left as far as Kloster-Indersdorf. We must maintain ourselves in this position until the decision has been obtained on the other flank. The position of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. is particularly difficult because it is on the extreme right flank, and because Jedenhofen and the hill east of that place, which must be included in that position, cannot be given up in any circumstances. For the present, army corps headquarters are not able to give any further infantry support, but it is intended to place the army corps reserve (20th Inf. Bde., and 20th Field Artillery Regiment) in échelon at Rettenbach and Giebing. It is not at present possible to say when, how, and where these troops will be employed. They are marching by Röhrmoos, Riedenzhofen, and Vierkirchen, and will not reach Rettenbach before 5 p.m.

"The 10th Inf. Div., which has been kept back east of the Isar to watch the right flank of the army, is not expected to reach Dachau with its leading troops before 12 noon. The 19th Inf. Bde. and

the 19th Field Artillery Regiment will be moved at once by Webling to Sulzemoos, to join the 3rd Army Corps.

"The 1st *Abteilung* of the 5th Heavy Artillery Regiment will be attached to the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. as soon as it comes up, in order to strengthen the right flank. It must not be expected before 5 p.m. Army Corps headquarters will pass the night at Esterhofen station. The headquarters of the army will be in Schwabhausen, with which we are in telegraphic communication by way of Dachau. The 1st Res. Inf. Bde. will establish telephonic communication between its headquarters and the headquarters of the army corps."

General P. stated that his brigade would rest till 2 p.m. at Vierkirchen, where it had already arrived, and would then begin the preparation of the position for defence. He added that the 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., had been pushed forward to the far bank of the Glonn to cover the brigade, that he was going first to Rammelsbach, and would later on fix his headquarters at the ganger's cottage on the railway, 1,000 metres north of Esterhofen station. He requested that the commander of the heavy artillery should be sent to him as soon as possible, and that he should be kept informed of the arrival of the corps reserve, and of its subsequent movements. He then rode off.

As he passed through the bivouacs of his brigade, he directed the battalions to be ready to march off at 2 p.m. He ordered the commander of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt., who reported that 600 large spades, 150 picks, and 200 axes, had been collected and loaded on six wagons, to send 400 spades, 100 picks, and 150 axes to the church at Vierkirchen for the use of the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt.; the remainder were to be sent to the ganger's cottage, 1,000 metres north of Esterhofen, for the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. The wagons were then to be used to transport material for obstacles and overhead cover. The 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. was directed to begin requisitioning these at once in Rammelsbach, Vierkirchen, Pasenbach, and Jedenhofen, while the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. did the same in Asbach and Ebersbach. Special efforts were to be made to get wire for obstacles, but care was to be taken not to damage the telegraph or telephone lines. The general then went to Rammelsbach, where he read through the order which had been drafted by his brigade major, and completed it with reference to the information which he had received from army corps headquarters. The operation order, of which many copies had been made, finally ran as follows:—

"Rammelsbach north of Vierkirchen, 22. XI., 1.50 p.m.

"Brigade order No. 2 for 22. XI.

"1. The enemy's army is advancing by Schrobhausen and Aichach. Its leading troops had reached Hilgertshausen, Pipinsried, and Pfaffenhofen (near Altomünster) at noon to-day, the 22nd. Hostile cavalry have been met north of Aufhausen, and near Weichs.

"2. The army will hold the near bank of the Glonn, on the line Jedenhofen—Grossberghofen. Strong reserves are posted on the left flank.

"3. The 5th Army Corps, which is on the right, is to hold the section Jedenhofen—Kloster-Indersdorf; it has the 9th Infantry Division in position from the Pasenbach Valley to Kloster-Indersdorf.

The 20th Inf. Bde. with some artillery form the corps reserve at Rettenbach and Giebing.

"4. The 1st Res. Inf. Bde., which is attached to the 5th Army Corps, is to hold the line Jedenhofen—Albertshofen. The 2nd *Abtg.*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., and the 1st *Abtg.*, 1st Heavy Artillery Regt., are attached to the brigade.

"5. The 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., will entrench and hold the hill east of Jedenhofen against attack from the north and from the direction of Asbach.

"6. The 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will entrench and hold the section Jedenhofen—Albertshofen, both inclusive. The infantry line of defence will follow the lane between Jedenhofen and Albertshofen. One machine gun section will be posted at Albertshofen to flank the position of the 33rd Inf. Regt. which is on the left.

"7. The 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., will post two batteries on the ridge running south-east from the wood south-east of Albertshofen. Targets, hill 508 south-west of Aufhausen, Aufhausen, and the ground east and west of that place. It will post one section on the hill east of Jedenhofen, one section near Jedenhofen, and one section in the wood south-east of Albertshofen, to flank the ground in front of the position.

"8. The remainder of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. will move to the western portion of the wood north of Vierkirchen, and be at my disposal. It will watch the ground towards Kollbach and Asbach, and get communication with the 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., which, for the present, will cover the brigade on the far side of the Glonn, and when compelled will fall back on Asbach and then join the reserve.

"9. The 1st *Abteilung*, 1st Heavy Artillery Regt., which will not arrive before 5 p.m., will be at the disposal of the 1st Res. Inf. Brigade.

"10. A tool depôt has been established at the railway crossing 1,000 metres north of Esterhofen. 200 spades, 50 picks, and 50 axes have been sent from it to Vierkirchen church for the 1st Res. Inf. Regt.; and 400 spades, 100 picks, and 150 axes for the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt.

Asbach and Ebersbach have been allotted to the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. for requisitioning material; Rammelsbach, Vierkirchen, Pasenbach, Jedenhofen, and Albertshofen to the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt.

"11. Field kitchens will fill up at once from the supply wagons, and will be halted west of Vierkirchen, and the supply wagons east of that place, both under the supply officer of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. They will be drawn up by regiments clear of the roads. 2nd Line transport remains where it is.

"12. Brigade headquarters at Rammelsbach, and after 3 p.m. at the ganger's cottage 1,000 metres north of Esterhofen. Regiments will arrange for positions for the telephone detachment which will establish communication with brigade headquarters. An officer of the regimental staff must always be at the regimental telephone station.

"Issued in writing to regimental commanders.

P.,
"Major-General."

Simultaneously a message form was sent to the 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., by cyclist to Ebersbach. Its contents were as follows:—

“Rammelsbach, 22.XI., 2 p.m.

“To 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., Ebersbach, by way of Jedenhofen.

“1. The enemy's army, which is estimated at three army corps, is advancing by Schrobenhausen and Aichach. Its advanced guards had reached Hilgertshausen, Pipinsried, and Pfaffenhofen (near Altomünster) at noon to-day, the 22nd. Hostile cavalry are known to be at Erlhausen.

“2. The army will oppose the enemy on the south bank of the Glonn. The 5th Army Corps, to which the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. is attached, is on the right flank, and will hold the section Jedenhofen—Kloster-Indersdorf.

“3. The 1st Res. Inf. Bde. will begin to entrench its section, which runs from the hill east of Jedenhofen to Albertshofen, to-day at 2.30 p.m. One battalion 1st Res. Inf. Regt. will hold the hill east of Jedenhofen. The 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will hold the line Jedenhofen—Albertshofen. The remainder of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. will be in reserve at the wood north-east of Vierkirchen. The field artillery attached to the brigade will be on the hill south of Jedenhofen.

“4. The advanced guard will cover the brigade, and will remain on the north bank of the Glonn. It will reconnoitre by Jetzendorf, Stachusried, and Ainhofen towards the Klenau—Hilgertshausen road. It will ascertain whether the enemy's detachments reported at Hilgertshausen are still there. It will observe the ground towards Paindorf and Lampertshausen.

It will delay the enemy's advance, and if seriously attacked will fall back on Asbach.

“5. Field kitchens will be sent to Vierkirchen, where they will come under the supply officer of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt.

“6. Brigade headquarters at the ganger's cottage 1,000 metres north of Esterhofen.

P.,

“Major-General commanding 1st Res. Inf. Bde.”

ORDERS ISSUED IN THE 1ST RES. INF. REGT., BASED ON BRIGADE OPERATION ORDER NO. 2.

The regimental commander assembled his battalion commanders and his supply officer, and issued them the following order:—“The field kitchens and supply wagons of the brigade are placed under the supply officer. Field kitchens will fill up at once and will be parked west of Vierkirchen. The supply wagons, orders for refilling which will be issued later, will be parked clear of the 2nd Line Transport and east of Vierkirchen. Transport will be drawn up by regiments clear of the road.

“The 1st Bn. will move to the ganger's cottage, 1,000 metres north of Esterhofen, take over the entrenching tools there and then march to the hill just east of Jedenhofen, where it will halt, covered from the north. One machine gun section, and the tool and

technical wagons of the regiment will accompany this battalion. It will requisition material in Asbach and Ebersbach.

"The 2nd Bn. and machine gun company will move by Rammelsbach to the western part of the wood north of Vierkirchen, where they will halt and watch the ground in the direction of Petershausen and Ebersbach.

"Battalion commanders and the commander of the machine gun company will come as soon as possible to the ganger's cottage 1,000 metres north of Esterhofen, and will ride round the position with me."

The regimental commander found the battalion commanders and the commander of the machine gun company waiting for him at the ganger's cottage. The party thereupon rode off towards the hill east of Jedenhofen. On reaching the hill, they dismounted and ascended high enough to get a good view.

The commander of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. then issued the following verbal instructions at 2 p.m.:—

"The valley of the Glonn lies in front of us. The Glonn is fordable by infantry, but it is necessary to reconnoitre it. That village half right, with the church with the dome, is Asbach. Over there you can see Petershausen; the big red building is the railway station. That place still farther off half-way up the slope, is Ober-Marbach. To the left of Asbach is Wasenhof, the place with the red roofs by that bare ground. Farther, to the left, half hidden in the trees, is Ziegelberg; straight across the valley are Ebersbach and Aufhausen. Our 1st Battalion is in position there. That gently rising hill, on the near slope of which you can see a company of the 1st Battalion, is hill 508 south-west of Aufhausen. That big village to the left in the valley is Weichs. The enemy is advancing by Schrobenshausen and Aichach. His advanced guards reached Hilgertshausen, Pipinsried and Pfaffenhofen (near Altomünster) at noon to-day, the 22nd.

"The 1st Battalion is in touch with the enemy's cavalry. The army is holding the line of the Glonn from Jedenhofen to Grossberghofen. The 5th Army Corps, to which we are attached, has the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. on the line Jedenhofen—Albertshofen with the 9th Inf. Div., extending the left as far as Kloster—Indersdorf.

"The village behind us is Jedenhofen. The right wing of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. which is on our left, is at that place. The 2nd Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., and one machine gun section will hold the hill on which we are standing. This hill is of great importance as it forms the extreme right flank of the army. It must be held at all costs. In the wood on our right front, beyond the railway embankment, the 3rd Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt. and the machine gun company will be posted as a brigade reserve. Later the 1st Battalion will join them if compelled to fall back. The corps reserve will arrive this evening at Rettenbach and Giebing.

"Strengthen the position as much as possible to meet attacks from the north and from the direction of Asbach.

"Jedenhofen will not be held. A section of field artillery will be entrenched in this section. I will be at the railway crossing half right, and will inspect the progress of the defensive works about 4 p.m."

While these orders were being issued, the battalion had reached the ganger's cottage north of Esterhofen and halted there to take over the entrenching tools which had been requisitioned.

The battalion commander directed his adjutant to ride to the battalion to superintend the taking over of the entrenching tools. He was then to lead the battalion into position behind the hill so that the companies, when drawn up in line of company columns, would be under cover from the Glonn valley. The company commanders were to come at once to the battalion commander. The latter then reconnoitred the hill with a view to its defence. He recognized that the most unfavourable part of the position was that opposite the mill, for the enemy would be able to gain that place quickly, and he would then be only about 600 metres from the position, even if the line of defence were drawn back to the highest point of the hill. This part of the position would therefore have to be strengthened specially. It appeared feasible to arrange the trenches in tiers, to construct positions for machine guns, and to place obstacles in front. These measures would considerably strengthen this portion.

The field of fire to the north in the direction of Asbach was very good, and extended to the limits of effective rifle-range. The ground was also favourable for defence on the extreme right flank near the railway. It should be possible to resist all attacks on this part of the position, if the enemy did not attempt a turning movement beyond the railway.

On these grounds, the battalion commander issued the following verbal order to his company commanders at 2.10 p.m. :—"The enemy's army is advancing to the Glonn by Schrobenhausen and Asbach. His advanced guards reached Hilgertshausen, Pipinsried, and Pfaffenhofen, near Altomünster, at 11 a.m. to-day, the 22nd. The 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., which is covering the brigade on the far bank of the Glonn at Ebersbach and Aufhausen, is in touch with the enemy's cavalry. The Glonn is passable by infantry at most points, but it is necessary to reconnoitre the river as it is deep in places. Detachments of our 1st Bn. can be seen on the slope opposite, near Ebersbach and to the left of that place.

"The army is holding the near bank of the Glonn. The 1st Res. Inf. Bde. forms the right wing of the 5th Army Corps, to which it is attached, and holds the line from this hill on which we are standing to Albertshofen, that hamlet with the red roofs which you can see just by the wood opposite.

"The battalion will hold this hill, which forms the extreme right flank, against attack from the direction of Ebersbach or Asbach.

"The 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. is on our left near Jedenhofen, the small village below there. The 3rd Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., will be in the wood on the right beyond the railway embankment, and will be joined later by the 1st Bn. when it is forced to retire. The corps reserve will be at Rettenbach and Giebing.

"I intend to occupy this hill and to hold it to the last. Nos. 5, 6, and 7 Companies will be in the front line. No. 8 Company will be at my disposal. No. 5 Company will be on the right, pointing towards Asbach. Its left will be on the track from Vierkirchen; its line of entrenchments will extend for 200 metres towards the railway line. It will arrange to flank its position from the railway line. No. 6

Company will be on the left of No. 5, at 100 metres interval. Its front will be towards the wood south of Ziegelberg, and will extend for 150 metres. Trenches will be arranged in tiers.

"No. 7 Company will prolong the left at 100 metres interval. Its front will be towards the mill in the valley. Trenches to be in tiers. Its line of defence will be as close as possible to the highest point of the hill. Extent of front 100 metres.

"Two guns of the 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th Field Artillery Regiment, will be entrenched in the section of No. 6 Company, and one machine gun section in that of No. 7 Company.

"The profiles of trenches will be as strong as possible. Flanking fire will be arranged from the inner flanks of companies. Overhead cover and cover for supports are to be provided.

"No. 8 Company will send one section to No. 7 Company to make wire entanglement; the material which has been requisitioned may be used for this. It will also construct communication trenches to the positions of Nos. 6 and 7 Companies. I will point out the places where these trenches are to be begun. No. 8 Company will be posted here, behind the hill.

"Companies will work in reliefs. Reliefs will be ready for action. The position will be marked out at once. Work will begin as soon as I have approved of the positions selected.

"No. 5 Company will watch the ground between Kollbach and the wood south of Ziegelberg. No. 7 Company will watch the ground to the left as far as Weichs.

"Small arm ammunition carts will be behind the hill near No. 8 Company. I will begin the inspection of the position with No. 5 Company."

While this was going on in the 2nd Battalion, the regimental commander had ridden off with the commander of the 3rd Battalion towards the railway crossing 1,800 metres south of Asbach, and during the ride had given him the following instructions:—"You know the situation, the task, and the disposition of the brigade. Your battalion will form the brigade reserve. Move to the gap in the wood east of this railway crossing (on the Vierkirchen—Asbach road) and place your battalion under cover facing north; watch the ground towards Kollbach and Petershausen, and get connection by signal with the 1st Battalion, which has been pushed forward towards Ebersbach. Reconnoitre the wood to find out how far it is passable, and report your position to brigade headquarters. I will be here at the cottage near the railway crossing."

When the two commanders had crossed the railway, they saw the head of the battalion which was marching along the lane between Vierkirchen and Asbach, about 400 metres away. The battalion commander trotted forward to meet it, directed company commanders to come to the head of the battalion and issued the following verbal order at 2.20 p.m.:—"The battalion will take up position at the gap in the wood 400 metres in front of us. Its left flank will be at the railway crossing; it will face north, Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12 Companies will be drawn up in that order from right to left. No. 12 Company will get touch with the troops on the left. 25 metres interval between companies. When the battalion is in position, company commanders will come to me at the northern edge of the wood."

The companies moved at once to their new position. Their formations varied according to the space available. The majority were in company column, but No. 12 Company on the left was in column of squads, in order to take advantage of the cover which the railway embankment afforded. After arms had been piled, the company commanders went to meet the battalion commander who was waiting for them at the north edge of the wood. A hill rose in front of them about 500 metres from the edge of the wood. This hill lay in the direction of Kollbach, the two towers of which were clearly visible, and connected with the gentle slopes of hill 496 west of that place. Hill 496 dominated the hill in question and it was not possible to see beyond it. A better view was obtainable into the Glonn valley. The railway embankment which lay below was only visible in places, but the Glonn, between Ebersbach and Asbach, and the hills rising on the far bank were in full view. The section of the valley towards Aufhausen and Aufhausen itself were also to be seen. A long re-entrant which turned eastwards ran from the edge of the wood, and behind it Piflitz lay in view.

When Major S. had explained the ground to his officers he continued as follows :—"The enemy is advancing by Hilgertshausen, Pipinsried and Pfaffenhofen, and reached those places with his advanced guards during the forenoon of this day, the 22nd. Hostile cavalry have been met north of Aufhausen near Weichs.

"The army will hold the south bank of the Glonn. The 5th Army Corps, to which the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. is attached, forms the right wing, and will entrench a position from the hill east of Jedenhofen to Kloster-Indersdorf. Our 2nd Bn. is on the extreme right flank on the hill east of Jedenhofen, over there where you see the men digging. The 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. is on its left.

"We form the brigade reserve at the wood north of Vierkirchen. The men will lie down.

"No. 9 Company will place an observation post at the corner of the wood, which juts out on our right, to watch the ground from Kollbach, by hill 496, as far as Petershausen. It will keep communication with the section which has been pushed forward to hill 496. Signal messages sent from Kollbach church tower are to be read and reported to me. This company will also post a man at the southern edge of the wood where he can see Giebing and Rettenbach, at which places the corps reserve is expected to arrive towards evening. No. 11 Company will post a sentry at the railway cottage south-east of Asbach to watch the ground between Petershausen and Aufhausen.

"No. 12 Company will post a group near the railway crossing 1800 metres south of Asbach, which will watch the ground from Aufhausen to Weichs, and keep in communication with the 2nd Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., on the hill east of Jedenhofen. Signalling communication will be established with the 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., at Ebersbach. The Glonn will be reconnoitred from the railway bridge north of Asbach by Asbach to Jedenhofen mill. Places where the river is deep will be marked. No. 12 Company will post a sentry at the corner of the wood in front of us. Captain A. will supervise the placing of these sentries and posts. Captain B. will take over the command of the battalion till my return in half an hour."

Major S. next reconnoitred the ground over which the battalion might have to act. In doing this he bore in mind the following considerations:—The battalion forms the brigade reserve and the extreme right flank of the army. Though it is not possible to foresee how the battalion will be employed, it may be assumed that it will be used either to prolong the line of defence or to oppose a hostile turning movement. In the latter case it may be employed either offensively or defensively; it is also possible that it may be used to cover the withdrawal of the 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt. In any one of these cases the battalion will have to act in the area between Kollbach, Asbach, and the wood north of Vierkirchen. It will, therefore, be of advantage to reconnoitre this ground with a view to the employment of the battalion on these various missions, and this reconnaissance can be easily carried out while the battalion is not employed.

In the case of an offensive forward movement, the ground in the direction of Ebersbach and Asbach must be considered. The railway embankment south of Asbach would have considerable influence on a movement in either direction. It is possible to deploy the battalion behind it and to advance direct on Ebersbach if a fire fight from the embankment is not sufficient. Besides this, troops may be pushed forward towards Ebersbach almost unobserved from the far bank of the Glonn, which makes it possible to gain a fire position on the outskirts of Asbach.

The railway embankment is equally important for the purposes of defence whether it be necessary to prolong the position, to assist the retirement of the covering troops, or to oppose a turning movement from the Glonn valley. The high ground between Kollbach and Asbach comes next in importance. Should the enemy attempt a turning movement from the direction of Petershausen, the best position on which to oppose him is hill 496 west of Kollbach, which affords a good defensive position. The fold in the ground running parallel to that hill, and to the south of it affords a second position, and the edge of the wood, in the western portion of which the battalion is posted, forms a final position. The ground is therefore favourable for defensive action in order to gain time, as it is possible to oppose the enemy in a series of positions.

Lastly, the wood north of Vierkirchen is of importance should the battalion be forced to retire, and it will also assist the deployment of the corps reserve, which has been ordered to Rettenbach and Giebing.

Major S. made a personal reconnaissance of the railway embankment, and then galloped off to hill 496 and reconnoitred it also. At 2.50 p.m. he met Lt. M. of No. 5 Coy., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., on that hill. Lt. M. made him the following report:—"I have posted strong standing patrols at Petershausen bridge, at the railway bridge, and at Asbach bridge. At the latter my patrol has reinforced the dismounted troopers of the 1st Squadron who were already there. I have established a signalling station on the western tower of Kollbach church. It is in communication with the brigade signalling station near Vierkirchen, through Rettenbach church, where there is a transmitting station. I have not gained any information of the enemy. In marching through Kollbach, I captured a lancer of the

enemy's cavalry, who had been thrown from his horse and therefore remained behind in Kollbach. Perhaps you would like to cross-examine him ; I have not been able to get much information out of him. He is not seriously hurt, and I was just about to send him back on a requisitioned wagon."

Major S. then gave Lt. M. all available information as to the situation, the intentions of the brigadier, and the dispositions of the brigade. He also pointed out to him the detachments of the 1st Battalion which were visible on the far side of the Glonn. He requested the lieutenant to repeat any important information to him, and told him that the battalion would have a signalling station on the railway embankment south of Asbach, at the point where it leaves the wood. He informed him that this signalling station had been directed to read all messages sent from Kollbach church. He learned from the prisoner that he had formed part of a lancer patrol which had left Klenau at 4 a.m., that the 1st Lancer Regt. had halted the previous evening at that place, and had subsequently marched by Kollbach on Gross-Nöhhach. The prisoner also stated that they had met hostile infantry during the forenoon at Kammerberg, that during the retirement he had had a fall in Kollbach and that his lieutenant had directed him to remain behind.

Major S. returned to the battalion at 3.10 p.m. He was then told that the observation posts were in position. A table and chairs had been got ready for writing. The major dismounted and his adjutant spread out maps, message forms and writing material. Signalling communication was working with the 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., and also with Kollbach church. Cyclist orderlies were at hand. Major S. first dictated to his adjutant a report to brigade headquarters, which stated what he had learnt from the prisoner, and also a message to the 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., giving the disposition of the battalion and the arrangements for its protection.

ORDERS ISSUED IN THE 2ND RES. INF. REGT., BASED ON BRIGADE OPERATION ORDER NO. 2.

Colonel A. had directed his battalion and company commanders to assemble at the southern end of Rammelsbach. At 2.10 p.m. he issued them the following verbal instructions:—"The 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will entrench a position on the line Jedenhofen-Albertshofen and will hold it to the last. The battalion commanders and the commander of the machine gun company will ride with me along the position so that I may allot them their sections.

"Captain B. (the senior captain) will take over command of the regiment, and will arrange for the distribution of 400 spades, 100 picks and 150 axes, equally between the three battalions. The battalions will then move as follows:—1st Bn. to Jedenhofen, 2nd Bn. to the north edge of the small wood north-east of Albertshofen, 3rd Bn. to the south edge of the same wood. One machine gun section will accompany each battalion. On reaching their positions the battalions will halt under cover from the north.

"An officer of the 1st Bn. will superintend the requisitioning of entrenching tools and material for overhead cover and obstacles in

Rammelsbach, Vierkirchen, Esterhofen and Pasenbach, and will bring what he obtains on requisitioned transport to Jedenhofen.

"Field kitchens will fill up from the supply wagons and both will move under the orders of the supply officer 1st Res. Inf. Regt. The supply officer 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will remain behind. Two cyclist orderlies of the 2nd Bn. will be attached to him.

"Brigade headquarters are at Rammelsbach, and after 3 p.m. at the ganger's cottage, 1,000 metres north of Esterhofen station."

Colonel A. then rode with the battalion commanders and the commander of the machine gun company to the hill south of Jedenhofen. During the ride he gave the officers the following information as to the situation:—"The enemy is expected to attack in force to-morrow, the 23rd. His advanced guards reached Hilgertshausen, Pipinsried and Pfaffenhofen, near Altomünster, on the far bank of the Glonn, to-day. These places are from 10 to 12 kilometres (6 to 7 miles) north-west of the Glonn.

"The army will oppose the enemy's attack in a defensive position on this bank of the Glonn, and will seek to obtain the decision with reserves massed on the left bank.

"The 5th Army Corps, to which we are attached, forms the right wing of the army from Jedenhofen to Kloster—Indersdorf. The 1st Res. Inf. Bde. forms the extreme right from the hill east of Jedenhofen to Albertshofen.

"One battalion 1st Res. Inf. Regt. is posted on the hill east of Jedenhofen. The 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will entrench and hold the line Jedenhofen—Albertshofen. One battalion 1st Res. Inf. Regt. forms the brigade reserve at the wood north of Vierkirchen. The 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., is covering the brigade, while entrenching, on the far bank of the Glonn near Aufhausen. The section of the 9th Inf. Div. begins west of Albertshofen. (While the colonel was saying this, the party had reached the hill south of Jedenhofen, where the 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., was already at work.) The artillery which is entrenching here is the 2nd *Abteilung* 17th Field Artillery Regt., which is attached to the brigade. Two batteries will come into action on this hill. They have been ordered not only to employ long-range fire, but also to engage the enemy's infantry at close quarters as long as possible. This must be taken into consideration in selecting the position of the fire trenches. Heavy artillery will come into position near Pasenbach, the church tower of which you can see over the hill behind us. The small village in the valley in front of us, a little to the right, is Jedenhofen. The right flank of the regiment will be at that place. Beyond it, on the far bank of the Glonn, you can see Aufhausen on the left and Ebersbach on the right. Both places may be identified by their church towers, which are of the same character. The big village on the left front is Weichs. Further to the left, past that corner of the wood, you can see Albertshofen, where our left flank rests. The Glonn is passable by infantry, but is deep in places. Mounted troops must use the crossings which have been occupied by our cavalry.

"I allot the sections of the position as follows:—

"The 1st Bn. will hold from Jedenhofen (inclusive) to that clump of bushes on the lane leading to Albertshofen.

"The 2nd Bn. will prolong the left as far as Albertshofen (inclusive).

"The profiles of trenches will be as strong as possible. Neighbouring units will make arrangements for communication and mutual support.

"The material collected at Jedenhofen will be equally divided between the 1st and 2nd Bns. The latter battalion can also requisition in Albertshofen, and, by arrangement with the 33rd Inf. Regt., in Weichs.

"The 3rd Bn. will be posted behind this wood, and will be at my disposal. Later, it will construct covered communication with the front line.

"Work will begin at once in reliefs, reliefs will be ready for action.

"I will ride along the line beginning from the right flank."

He then went to the commander of the artillery *Abteilung*, who was close by, and asked him to send the commander of the battery which would come into action in the infantry position to him. When the battery commander, accompanied by his section commanders, had reported himself, Major S. rode off with them and the commander of the machine gun company towards the hill east of Jedenhofen, which was reached about 2.50 p.m. He there learnt the dispositions of the 2nd Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt. He directed that the artillery section which was to entrench there should be so placed as to be able to fire both in the direction of Asbach and towards Jedenhofen mill, and also that the machine guns with No. 5 Company, 1st Res. Inf. Regt., should sweep the ground in front of the position of the 1st Bn., 2nd Res. Inf. Regt.

It was agreed that the right flank of the 1st Bn., 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., should make arrangements for flanking the ground in front of No. 5 Company, 1st Res. Inf. Regt.

Major S. met the commander of the 1st Bn., 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., in Jedenhofen, and arranged with him that a machine gun section should be so placed, on the west edge of Jedenhofen, as to be able to fire along the ground in front of the position as far as Albertshofen. It was also agreed that two guns should be posted at Jedenhofen for the same purpose.

The position of the 1st Bn., 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., was arranged as follows:—An advanced post for one company was pushed forward a little beyond the northern edge of Jedenhofen, the edge of the village being strengthened to form a second position. On the left of that company, at about 100 metres interval, a trench, about 250 metres long, was to be prepared for two companies, the left flank of this trench being turned back towards the lane connecting Jedenhofen and Albertshofen. The battalion commander intended to keep the remaining company behind Jedenhofen in reserve. A covered position was being prepared for battalion headquarters behind the left wing. It was to be connected by telephone with the front line and with the battalion reserve.

The line of defence for two companies of the 2nd Bn., 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., ran along the line of the lane connecting Jedenhofen and Albertshofen. Two machine guns, protected by traverses, were entrenched at the point where the lane juts forward, in order that they might flank the front. One company was drawn somewhat back into the Pasenbach valley, and was working at a trench which

was intended to bring fire to bear upon the ground between Weichs and Albertshofen. The remaining company was to be posted in rear in the Pasenbach valley as battalion reserve. The headquarters of the battalion was to be placed in a trench to be constructed at the northern edge of the wood south-east of Albertshofen. This trench was to be connected by telephone with the front line.

The regimental commander further directed that the remaining machine gun section should be entrenched behind Albertshofen in order to sweep the ground in front of the 33rd Inf. Regt. A position was then reconnoitred for the guns which were to be posted in the wood south-east of Albertshofen, and a satisfactory position was found near the north-west corner. From this point it was possible to bring Jedenhofen mill under fire, and also to sweep the ground in front of the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. at close range.

Colonel A. determined to fix his position at the northern edge of the wood. He informed the battalion commanders of his intention, and then directed the commander of the 3rd Bn. to come to him. He gave the latter the following verbal instructions at 3.20 p.m.:—"Your battalion will remain where it is and be at my disposal. The material which has been collected in the wood will be at the disposal of the 2nd Bn. Prepare a covered position for regimental headquarters here, and arrange for telephonic communication with the headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Bns. Post a signalling station at the southern edge of the wood to connect with the headquarters of the 17th Inf. Bde. at Breitenweisen, and with the headquarters of our brigade at the ganger's cottage, 1,000 metres north of Esterhofen. Report to me when communication is established. You will also arrange for the construction of a communicating trench between the edge of this wood and the position of the 2nd Bn., and will reconnoitre and mark a covered line of communication between your position and Jedenhofen. The regimental band will be under the orders of the medical officer."

The regimental medical officer was then ordered to take the necessary measures for arranging the dressing station, and to report as soon as possible what steps he proposed to take.

ORDERS ISSUED BY, AND ACTION OF, THE REGIMENTAL MEDICAL OFFICER OF THE 2ND RES. INF. REGT.

The regimental medical officer then rode back to the 3rd Bn., where he found the band, and gave the following order to the band serjeant:—"The band will be under my orders. Place the band instruments together here and divide the men into three parties for requisitioning."

He then gave further orders as follows:—"I intend to employ the band to collect the material necessary for the dressing station. I particularly want you to get horsed vehicles, in which to transport the wounded. The bottoms of the vehicles should be covered with hay and straw for the wounded to lie on. You will also requisition clean linen and materials for bandages of all kinds. No. 1 requisitioning party will work in Vierkirchen, Rammelsbach and Jedenhofen. No. 2 requisitioning party will work in Weichs and Albertshofen. No. 3 requisitioning party will march to Pasenbach church under

the band serjeant and will there receive further orders. All requisitioned material will be sent to the exit of Pasenbach on the Albertshofen road. March off."

Senior Medical Officer L. then asked for the medical personnel of the 3rd Bn. and directed them also to go to the exit of Pasenbach on the Albertshofen road. He then took the medical officer of the battalion with him to that point.

Pasenbach appeared to be well suited for the reception of wounded. There was plenty of water and a big inn near the railway station suitable for a hospital. The inn had a large room which could be used for operations, and the remaining rooms were suitable for accommodating the wounded. A large and pleasant courtyard, close by, afforded space for the vehicles bringing in the wounded, and a waiting room could also be arranged there. If the inn did not provide sufficient accommodation, as seemed probable, for the large number of severely wounded which might be sent in, houses in the vicinity could be gradually adapted for use as field hospitals as required. There was plenty of room between Esterhofen and Pasenbach to park the vehicles of the field hospitals. There could be no question of preparing a central dressing station, as no medical company was available for the purpose. After making this reconnaissance, and considering the various points mentioned above, the regimental medical officer gave the following instructions to the battalion medical officer who had accompanied him:—"It is my intention, provided my proposals are approved by higher authority, to establish a large dressing station in Pasenbach, and to make the best possible arrangements for the proper care of the wounded, who are likely to be numerous. I intend to use this inn for that purpose, and the neighbouring houses also in case of necessity. That shed over there seems to me suitable as a waiting room. You will take all the necessary measures for the reception of the wounded. The party from the band which has been directed to come to the church will be at your disposal for the purpose; you must, in addition, apply to the civil authorities of the place. Only requisitioned material will be at your disposal, as I require the medical appliances with units myself. Your chief duties will be to mark off the various positions for hospitals, &c., to see that they are clean, to requisition beds and bedding, and to arrange for lighting. I am going to ride back to the regiment and will return to issue final orders. You will wait for me here."

Let us see for a few moments what steps were taken by the battalion medical officer who had remained behind. He first went to find the mayor of the place and met him near the church. He addressed him as follows:—"Pasenbach and Esterhofen will be used for the establishment of a field hospital. The inn near the railway station, and houses Nos. 32, 33, 34, and 35 will first be arranged for the reception of the wounded. Direct the inhabitants to leave these houses. I then want you to place some of the inhabitants at my disposal to clean out those buildings, and to send them as quickly as possible with cleaning materials to the inn. I am also compelled to require the inhabitants to give up all beds, bedding, and clean linen, which they do not require for their immediate use, and to allow these things to be collected by my requisitioning party, which will

begin at the west end of the village. I also require you to supply me with food, and particularly medical comforts such as spirits. Everything which is requisitioned will be replaced in full, and if you run short of supplies the military authorities will arrange for the feeding of the inhabitants.

"I want three horsed wagons to be sent to the church for transport purposes. It is desirable that some person nominated by you should accompany my requisitioning party. I will give you one general receipt for everything you deliver. I call your attention to the fact that places which distinguish themselves by showing special care for wounded are entitled to special favours."

The mayor immediately placed three horsed wagons at the disposal of the medical officer, and asked the clergyman who had come up, to accompany and assist the requisitioning party. The battalion medical officer then went to the requisitioning party, which had halted at the church, and said to them:—"You have to requisition and collect, under the orders of the band serjeant, bedding, food stuffs, spirits, clean linen, etc., from all the houses in Pasenbach, beginning at the exit of the village on the Kloster-Indersdorf road, and will bring what you have collected to the inn where I will take it over. The clergyman will accompany and assist you. These three wagons are available as transport."

He then explained to the clergyman what articles were especially required, and returned to the inn in order to superintend its cleaning and the establishment of the hospital.

Meanwhile, the regimental medical officer had returned to the regimental commander and laid the following proposals before him:—"It appears desirable to arrange for the care of the wounded of all the various detachments of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. which are in the front line together. Since medical companies are not available, an extemporized central dressing station should, I think, be made up from the medical material with the units, and in that case it will be necessary to give up any idea of forming a number of battalion dressing stations. Pasenbach seems the best place for this extemporized central dressing station. There is sufficient space there, and the necessary materials are available to allow of the wounded being properly treated. It is, however, necessary that a field hospital be sent there later. All preliminary steps have been taken, except as regards the allotment of personnel and material belonging to the units. For this the situation is not yet sufficiently developed. There should be no particular difficulty in getting the wounded back to Pasenbach. Arrangements for requisitioning wagons are in hand, and I hope to be able to obtain sufficient to establish two wagon stations. I intend to employ the band to accompany these wagons. One wagon station might be near Jedenhofen, and the second near the edge of the wood where the 3rd Battalion is posted. Wounded will be able to reach the latter from the position of the 2nd Battalion, either by way of the wood south-east of Albertshofen or through the Pasenbach valley. Covered communications at Jedenhofen must be reconnoitred and marked out.

"The lack of personnel causes considerable difficulty. It is to be expected that the wounded of the 2nd Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., of the 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., as well as those of the

1st *Abteilung*, Heavy Artillery Regt., will come to Pasenbach, so that the number of wounded to be dealt with there will probably be considerable. It might perhaps be arranged that the medical personnel of the units named should co-operate. As I am the senior medical officer in the brigade, the control of the whole would in that case be in my hands."

Col. A agreed and directed his senior medical officer to prepare the following message to brigade headquarters:—

"No. 1.

2nd Res. Inf. Regt.,

"Wood south-east of Albertshofen,

"22. XI., 4.15 p.m.

"From Senior Medical Officer to Headquarters,

1st Res. Inf. Bde.,

"Ganger's Cottage, 1,000 metres north-east of Esterhofen.

"Desirable that the medical services of the section of the 1st Res. Inf. Brigade should be under one control. It is proposed to establish a collecting station at Pasenbach; preliminary steps have been taken. Suggest that the medical personnel and material of 2nd Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., 2nd *Abtg.*, 2nd Field Artillery Regt., and of the 1st *Abtg.*, 5th Heavy Artillery Regt., should be placed under my orders as senior medical officer of the brigade. Request that a field hospital may be sent to Pasenbach on the morning of the 23rd. Attached is an appendix to the special instructions of the brigade.

L.,

"Seen A.,
Colonel."

"Senior Medical Officer."

NO. 2. APPENDIX TO THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 1ST RES. INF. BRIGADE FOR 23. XI.

"1. Senior Medical Officer L., regimental medical officer of the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., will take over the medical services of the brigade. The medical personnel and material of the 2nd Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., 2nd *Abtg.*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., and of the 1st *Abtg.*, 5th Heavy Artillery Regt., will be at his disposal.

"2. Collecting station at Pasenbach. Slightly wounded and sick will be sent there up to 4 a.m. on the 23rd. After that hour slightly wounded will be sent to the station of the 9th Inf. Div. in Klein-Inzemoos.

"3. Wagon stations after 4 a.m. on the 23rd will be:—

(a) 500 metres south of Jedenhofen on the Vierkirchen road.

(b) South of the wood south-east of Albertshofen on the Pasenbach road. Units will arrange for covered communication with those points.

"4. One-third of the medical personnel, and all material which is not immediately required, will be at 4 a.m. 23. XI., at Esterhofen station at the disposal of Senior Medical Officer L., who will deal direct with units."

The above message was carried by the adjutant of the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., who was directed to report the progress made by, and

the disposition of, the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., to brigade headquarters, where he arrived at 4.30 p.m.

The following corps order had reached brigade headquarters, to which we will now return, at 4 p.m. :—

“ 5th Army Corps, Esterhofen, 22.XI.
 “ Corps order No. 2 for 22. XI. 3.45 p.m.
 “ (Extract for 1st Res. Inf. Brigade.)

- “ 1. Hostile advanced guards which reached Hilgertshausen, Pipinsried, and Pfaffenhofen, near Altomünster, this morning had not advanced further towards the Glonn at mid-day to-day, the 22nd.
- “ 2. The Army Corps is entrenching its position, and at dusk units will go into alarm quarters as follows :—
 1st Res. Inf. Bde. in the area Asbach—Jedenhofen—Albertshofen—Pasenbach—Vierkirchen (all inclusive). Strong covering parties will be held in readiness in the position.
- “ 3. *Outposts*.—The 1st Res. Inf. Bde. will find the outposts on the far bank of the Glonn on the line Ziegelberg—Aufhausen to the Weichs—Fränking road (exclusive), where they will connect with the outposts of the 9th Inf. Div. The roads running north from Jetzendorf, Gumpersdorf, and Hilgertshausen will be reconnoitred during the night, and the valley of the Ilm will be watched.
- “ 4. Army Corps headquarters at Esterhofen.—Brigade headquarters will send reports there by telephone.

Special instructions for 22–23. XI.

(Extract for 1st Res. Inf. Bde.)

- “ A. *Supplies*.—A supply dépôt for the 5th Army Corps will be opened from 11 a.m. at Röhrmoos railway station. The supply wagons of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde., which will use the Vierkirchen—Riedenzhofen road, will fill up after those of the 9th Inf. Div., which will march by Gross-Inzemoos. The road between Röhrmoos railway station, Röhrmoos, and Schönbrunn is to be kept clear of traffic.
- “ B. *Ammunition Supply*.—Small arm ammunition carts will be emptied. They will refill after 3 a.m. on the 23rd from the 1st Infantry Ammunition Column, which will be at that time at the exit of Pasenbach, on the Pasenbach—Albertshofen road. Artillery ammunition with batteries and light ammunition columns will be arranged in ammunition dépôts. The 1st and 2nd Artillery Ammunition Columns will be ready to begin issuing ammunition at Gross-Inzemoos at 4 a.m. on the 23rd. Ammunition wagons of the 2nd *Abtg.*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., will march by Pasenbach, but will not pass through that place before 3 a.m.
- “ C. *Medical*.—No. 5 Field Hospital will be in rear of No. 1 Infantry Ammunition Column in Pasenbach at 2 a.m. on the 23rd, for use of 1st Res. Inf. Bde. No. 6 Field Hospital has been directed to be in readiness at Gross-Inzemoos at 10 a.m. on the 23rd. It may be moved

forward from that place if necessary. A section of the field hospital will be sent forward towards Esterhofen if requisitioned.

"D. *2nd Line Transport*.—2nd line transport may be brought up to units, but will be parked by regiments near the bivouacs, clear of the roads, by 4 a.m. on the 23rd. The 2nd line transport of the 2nd Res. Inf. Bde. will be parked south of Vierkirchen, on either side of the lane leading to Riedenzhofen.

"E. *Horse Depot*.—No. 1 Horse Depot, 5th Army Corps, will be at Röhrmoos to-morrow morning.

"F. *Field Post Office*.—The 1st Res. Inf. Bde. will use the field post office of the 9th Inf. Div. at Röhrmoos railway station. The postal officials have been directed to collect letters at brigade headquarters at 4 a.m. to-morrow.

"G. *Line of Communication 5th Army Corps*.—Klein-Inzemoos—Röhrmoos—Ampermoching—Schleissheim—München.

Nearest stationary hospital, München.

Nearest station on the line of communication, Ampermoching.

"H. *Transport*.—Strict order is to be observed in all transport columns. The right side of roads is to be kept clear. Transport columns will halt clear of all towns and villages.

"Capt. A. of Army Corps Headquarters is charged with the preservation of order in the area Vierkirchen—Pasenbach—Gross-Inzemoos—Röhrmoos—Biberbach. His orders are to be unhesitatingly obeyed."

This order was transmitted by telephone, taken down and repeated for checking.

The brigade major was about to issue the instructions consequent on the above army corps order, the brigade commander having ridden off to inspect the position, when the commander of the 1st *Abteilung*, 5th Heavy Artillery Regt. arrived. He stated that his brigade, which was marching at the head of the 20th Inf. Bde., would reach Pasenbach at 6 p.m., and that he had been directed by Army Corps Headquarters to leave the 20th Inf. Bde., at Röhrmoos, and to march to Pasenbach to come under the orders of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. The brigade major explained the situation, the intentions of the brigadier and the dispositions of the brigade to Major X., and added:

"The brigadier intends to place the heavy artillery on either side of the railway embankment level with this cottage. Its chief duty will be to assist the defence of the right flank. It is particularly desirable that the heavy artillery should be able to bring fire to bear upon the ground on both sides of Aufhausen and about Weichs. The brigadier also wishes you to be able to sweep the ground between Petershausen and Weichs with fire. The position should be reconnoitred at once, as the batteries will have to entrench during the night. You cannot reckon on any assistance from the infantry, which is fully employed."

Major X. went off at once to reconnoitre, while the brigade major returned to his work. Just then, about 4.30 p.m., the brigadier returned. He was about to read the corps order, when the noise of

heavy firing, which increased rapidly, was heard from the north. The brigade staff mounted to ride to the hill east of Jedenhofen, from which a view of the battlefield was to be expected.

We will now return for a short time to the 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., which is on the far bank of the Glonn.

PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE ADVANCED GUARD BATTALION AFTER 3 P.M.

The reports received during the early afternoon stated that Paindorf and Reichertshausen were clear, but that hostile cavalry, round Jetzendorf and Eggersried, made it impossible to reconnoitre towards Hilgertshausen. At least one regiment of lancers was stated to be in Jetzendorf, and at Eggersried were the 2 squadrons of chevaulegers which had been driven out of Ebersbach.

From 2 p.m. onwards the enemy's patrols were active along the whole front. A number of lancer and chevaulegers patrols penetrated as far as the Glonn, but were mostly stopped by the piquets at the bridges.

At 4 p.m. the commander of No. 1 Coy., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., reported personally to the advanced guard commander as follows:—

“For some time my patrols have been unable to get into the wood north of Edenpfaffenhofen, as they have been met by fire everywhere from the edge of the wood. A patrol leader who has just come in reports that Thann is occupied, and he feels certain that there is infantry there.”

The advanced guard commander ordered the reserve to stand to arms and galloped off with the commander of No. 1 Coy., to the small hill, 800 metres north-east of Aufhausen, whence the best view was obtainable. He found the hill occupied by a part of No. 3 Section of No. 1 Coy., and No. 1 Section was seen in position on the hill immediately east of Aufhausen.

About 4 p.m. a few shots were fired from the edge of the wood opposite, and almost immediately afterwards a heavy infantry fire was opened on No. 1 Section. The latter did not reply, both because of the long range, and because nothing was to be seen of the enemy.

About 4.15 p.m. a dense firing line, about 300 metres long, advanced from the edge of the wood towards No. 1 Section, and took up a fresh position 400 metres in front of the wood. This firing line suffered considerable loss from the fire of Nos. 1 and 3 Sections, that of No. 3 Section, which enfiladed the line somewhat, being particularly effective.

A stationary fire fight now began between the two sections of No. 1 Coy. and the enemy, who was constantly being reinforced from the wood.

About this time the adjutant called the attention of his commanding officer to the fact that No. 2 Coy. was going into position on spur 508. He also read with his glasses a signal message from that section which ran as follows:—

“Hostile infantry attack from the wood, S. of Fränking.”

The company appeared to be facing north-west towards the south-east edge of the wood south of Fränking.

At the same time a report arrived that several battalions of infantry with artillery, which had marched from Stachusried about 3.15 p.m., were approaching Eggersried, and that the 2 sections at Ziegelberg were engaged with hostile infantry, in no great strength, advancing from Lindach. Major M. considered that the time had now come to break off the action and begin the retreat. He directed his adjutant as follows:—

“Ride to Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. and tell them to fall back in the direction of Asbach. The medical officer will see that the wounded are brought back to Jedenhofen mill, where their wounds will be dressed. The stretcher bearers of Nos. 3 and 4 Coys., are at his disposal.”

As the enemy's line was considerably reinforced about 3.30 p.m., he gave the following verbal order to the commander of No. 1 Coy.:—

“I do not wish to become heavily engaged here, and intend to move Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. back into a position to cover the retirement on the far bank of the Glonn south of Asbach. No. 2 Coy. will be ordered to fall back towards Jedenhofen mill as soon as the reserves are over the Glonn and have taken up a new position at that place. No. 1 Coy. will hold on until No. 2 Coy. has retired, and will then fall back, beginning from the left. The company will reassemble in Asbach. Wounded will be sent to Asbach. I am going to place Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. in position.”

When Major M. had ridden back to Ebersbach he found his two companies already marching towards a ford on the Glonn 400 metres south of Asbach. He instructed his adjutant to tell No. 2 Coy. to retire slowly on the mill at Jedenhofen, where they were to take up a fresh position. He was to say that Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. would take up a covering position beyond the Glonn south of Asbach.

Major S. then ordered Captain C. to ride back and reconnoitre a position behind the Glonn with its left flank about Asbach, and with a good field of fire towards Ebersbach.

The battalion commander issued the following order, based on Capt. C.'s report, to his two company commanders about 4.50 p.m., after the companies had crossed the Glonn:—

“Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. will take up a position behind the Glonn in order to cover the retirement of No. 1 Coy. on Asbach, and of No. 2 Coy. on Jedenhofen mill. The right of No. 3 Coy. will be at Asbach, its left on the two bushes on the right front. No. 4 Coy. will extend the left for about 150 metres, its left being drawn back towards the railway embankment. Both companies will front towards the Glonn. The firing line is to be widely extended, supports will be behind the railway embankment. I will be behind the railway embankment between Nos. 3 and 4 Coys.”

He then rode off towards the railway embankment. The commander of No. 3 Coy., as soon as his company had crossed the Glonn, gave the order “form company column.” And riding in the centre of his company continued:—“Hostile infantry are engaged with our Nos. 1 and 2 Coys. on the far side of the Glonn. The battalion commander does not wish to become seriously engaged, and intends to withdraw No. 1 Coy. to Asbach on our left, and No. 2 Coy. on Jedenhofen mill on our right. Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. will take

up a position behind the Glonn in order to facilitate the retirement of the other companies. No. 3 Coy. will hold from Asbach on the left to the two bushes straight in front of us. Nos. 2 and 3 Sections will move at 100 metres interval to covered positions behind the railway embankment. No. 1 Section will halt when Nos. 2 and 3 Sections have advanced somewhat, will extend and occupy the whole of the position which has been pointed out. I will be with No. 1 Section. Battalion Headquarters are on the railway embankment."

The covering position was occupied about 5 p.m. Similar orders were issued in No. 3 Coy.

Events had meanwhile developed on the far side of the Glonn. The enemy had been gradually reinforced from the wood east of Eglersried, and Edenpfaffenhofen was in his hands. About one section of infantry was advancing from the southern edge of that village with the intention of occupying Aufhausen. The enfilade fire which they received from hill 508, however, prevented them from advancing farther.

The enemy's firing line opposite Nos. 1 and 3 Sections had been extended by constant reinforcements to more than 600 metres, its left flank was about level with the south-east corner of the wood east of Eglersried. In spite of this the commander of No. 1 Coy. did not feel that his position was threatened. The enemy's line, which had advanced incautiously from the wood, had suffered considerable loss from the well-concealed position of No. 1 Coy., and although the company was widely extended, the effect of its converging fire was such that the enemy could only gain ground very slowly. No. 2 Section reported from Ziegelberg that the enemy opposed to it was in no great strength, and that the section would be able to hold on for some time longer.

Two ambulance wagons were below on the Glonn valley road near the wood which has been so often mentioned. The 1st line transport was marching towards Asbach church where it was to halt.

About 5 p.m. portions of No. 2 Coy. were seen to be retiring towards the Glonn from hill 508; that hill was, however, still occupied. About this time Capt. B. gave the following order to No. 1 Section of his company, which was on the hill east of Aufhausen:—"The company is not intended to become closely engaged. It will retire on Asbach in succession from the left. When No. 2 Coy. has left hill 508, and when its last men have crossed the Weichs—Ebersbach road, No. 1 Section will retire on Asbach. Part of the section will make a short stand on the hill north-east of Ebersbach. No. 3 Section will retire through the wood south of Ziegelberg, and No. 3 Section by Wasenhof. The company will reassemble in Asbach.

"Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. are in a covering position south of Asbach behind the Glonn. Wounded will be sent to Jedenhofen mill or to the wagons south of the wood south of Ziegelberg. I will be with No. 3 Section."

About 5.20 p.m. a number of men were seen to crawl back from the firing line of No. 1 Section, and then to run down towards the ground north of Ebersbach, while the remaining men increased their rate of fire. No. 3 Section also began to retire in a similar

manner. The men who had retired assembled in the north-west corner of the wood under cover, those of No. 1 Section moving direct on Asbach.

About 5.30 p.m. the half of No. 1 Section still on the hill east of Aufhausen began to retire, and moved in widely extended order towards the spur north-east of Ebersbach, where a fresh position was taken up. The men had scarcely reached the new position, when the enemy appeared on the hill east of Aufhausen, being received with a hot fire from those parts of No. 1 Coy. which were still in position. The company commander thereupon gave the following order to the commander of No. 3 Section:—"Retire through the wood behind us to Asbach, where I will issue further orders. Leave one squad, which will be attached to No. 1 Section, behind at the edge of the wood. Nos. 1 and 2 Sections will follow."

When No. 3 Section had employed rapid fire for some little time, and the last of the wounded had been sent off, the men began to creep back towards the edge of the wood.

About this time (*i.e.*, 5.45 p.m.) the guns of the 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., opened fire from the hill south of Jedenhofen. Their shrapnel was soon bursting well above the enemy's firing line east of Aufhausen. The commander of No. 2 Section at Ziegelberg received a message from his company commander about the same time. It ran as follows:—"Conform to the retirement of the company and move on the railway bridge south of Petershausen."

About 6 p.m. the remainder of No. 1 Section left its position on a signal from the company commander, and retired through the wood on Asbach. The enemy pursued them with fire which, owing to the twilight, was comparatively harmless. As No. 1 Section was descending into the Glonn valley from the wood, No. 2 Section was seen to be retiring on Wasenhof. Capt. B. rode on towards Asbach, where he found one and a half sections formed up, and gave the following order:—"The company will hold Asbach. Half No. 1 Section will occupy the edge of the village which runs down towards the Glonn south of the church. The remaining half section when it arrives will extend north of the church. No. 3 Section will be at my disposal at the church."

An under-officer was directed to take the following message to No. 2 Section at the railway bridge south of Petershausen:—"The company is holding Asbach. Leave a strong piquet on the bridge and retire with the remainder of your section along the railway embankment to Asbach church."

By 6.30 p.m. it was quite dark, and the remainder of No. 1 Section under Lt. A. reached Asbach. Lt. A. reported that the enemy had not followed him up, and that he believed that the enemy had evacuated the hill east of Aufhausen in consequence of the artillery fire. He stated that he had left strong patrols at the north and west edge of the wood which he had just come through. Capt. B. thereupon determined to leave the half section already posted in position, and to keep the remainder of the company together. No. 2 Section came in soon after and reported that the enemy had not followed beyond Ziegelberg. One patrol had been left at Wasenhof, and a squad at the bridge south of Petershausen.

About 6.15 p.m. Major M., the commander of the advanced guard, arrived, and on receiving the report of the commander of No. 1 Coy. issued the following verbal order:—"1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., will cover the brigade on the line railway bridge north of Asbach—Asbach—Jedenhofen mill (inclusive). No. 1 Coy. will hold the section from the railway bridge (inclusive) to a point 1,000 metres south-east of Asbach. No. 2 Coy. will hold from that point to the right of the line of the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. west of Jedenhofen. Strong piquets will be posted along the Glonn. Constant patrols will be sent towards Ziegelberg, Aufhausen, and hill 508. Touch must be kept with the enemy. The bulk of No. 1 Coy. will remain in Asbach, which it will hold in case of an attack. 1st Sq., 1st Res. Cav. Regt., will be ordered to cover the right flank at Höckhof. The outpost reserve formed by Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. will be near the railway crossing 1,800 metres south of Asbach. Battalion headquarters and signalling station will be at that place."

THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY, AND ACTION OF, THE BRIGADE STAFF
FROM THE TIME WHEN THE ADVANCED GUARD BECAME ENGAGED.

The brigade staff reached the hill east of Jedenhofen about 4.45 p.m., and was able from that position to follow the course of the action on the far side of the Glonn.

About 5.30 p.m., when the last two companies of the advanced guard were seen to be retiring, the 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., was ordered to open fire in order to assist the evacuation of the position. This the artillery did, apparently with good effect.

About the same time the advanced guard commander reported himself to the brigadier, informed him of what had happened, and told him the information gained about the enemy, which amounted to the facts that about one infantry regiment with some artillery had advanced about 2 p.m. from Hilgertshausen by Gumpersdorf on Stachusried, and that strong bodies were billeted along the Hilgertshausen—Klenau road; the latter had not made any forward movement. The 9th Inf. Div. had also reported that hostile infantry advancing from Ainhofen had captured Weichs, but had not been able to cross the Glonn. The advanced guard commander added, that, after he had disengaged his two companies, which were still fighting, he would occupy in strength a covering position from the railway bridge north of Asbach to the mill near Glonn. He requested that the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. should extend his left at Jedenhofen. He added that he would leave the 1st Reserve Squadron to cover the right flank in the neighbourhood of Höckhof, and to hold the bridge at Petershausen.

The brigadier expressed his agreement with these dispositions and then briefly reviewed the situation as follows:—"The 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., had been driven from its position on the far bank of the Glonn by the enemy in superior numbers. The far bank of the Glonn was now in the enemy's hands. Though the enemy's main bodies were not yet advancing, and they had for the present only to deal with advanced detachments, the possibility of the enemy advancing to the Glonn

in strength during the night, and beginning a general attack on the morning of the 23rd, perhaps at dawn, must not be overlooked.

At the least it was to be expected that the enemy would fight in some strength in order to obtain information. The first and most important duty, therefore, appeared to be to hamper the enemy's reconnaissance, and to be prepared for a general attack.

The corps order issued at 3.45 p.m. on the 22nd (see p. 113) was based upon a different situation and could no longer be carried out. Other measures must therefore be taken.

The outpost line ordered could not be held, and it would not be possible to assure the troops in rear the complete rest which that order had in view.

The line of protection must now follow the line of the Glonn, and to the south of Weichs even this must be given up. The enemy was therefore immediately in front of the main position. Thus it was necessary, in order to guard against surprise, to keep strong bodies in a state of readiness in the position, with reserves in close formation behind them, in order to drive back the enemy should he attempt to effect a surprise under cover of darkness.

On the above grounds the brigadier dictated the following order, which was reduplicated on a number of message forms:—

“1st Res. Inf. Bde.

“Hill east of Jedenhofen.

“22. XI., 6 p.m.

“Brigade Order No. 3 of 22. XI.

“1. The enemy, estimated at one infantry regiment with artillery, has occupied the far bank of the Glonn. Strong bodies of hostile troops are on the Hilgertshausen—Klenau road.

“2. The 1st Res. Inf. Bde. will be prepared during the night to meet any attack on its position. Strong detachments will be held in readiness in the position with reserves in close order behind them.

Troops not immediately required will be billeted as follows:—
1st Res. Inf. Regt. at Rammelsbach and Vierkirchen.

2nd Res. Inf. Regt. at Pasenbach and Esterhofen.

Alarm posts will be occupied as follows:—

3rd Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt. at Vierkirchen.

2nd *Abteilung*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., at Pasenbach.

1st *Abteilung*, 5th Heavy Artillery Regt., at Vierkirchen.

Guns will be left in position.

“3. Protection.—1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., will find the outposts from the railway bridge north of Asbach to Jedenhofen mill, inclusive, the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. extending the left to a point opposite Albertshofen. Strong piquets will be posted along the Glonn. Patrols will be constantly sent towards the hills on the opposite bank. The enemy must be prevented from reconnoitring as far as possible, and any intention to attack discovered; Asbach and Jedenhofen mill will be held.

One section 1st Res. Inf. Regt., will remain on hill 496 west of Kollbach as a support to 1st Sq., 1st Res. Cav. Regt., which will hold the bridge at Petershausen, cover the right flank and continue to watch the Hilgertshausen—Klenau road and the Ilm valley.

"4. Brigade Headquarters will be at the railway cottage 1000 metres north of Esterhofen. Representatives for orders will be there at 9 p.m."

The special instructions which had been meanwhile drawn up by the brigade major were attached to this order. They ran as follows:—

"1st Res. Inf. Bde. 22. XI., 6 p.m.

Special instructions for 22-23. XI.

"1. *Supplies*.—Field kitchens, when filled up, will rejoin their units. Those of the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will go to Pasenbach, those of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. will remain at Vierkirchen.

Supply wagons will be refilled. Supply officers will take the necessary action. The supply wagons of the 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., and of the 1st *Abteilung*, 5th Heavy Artillery Regt., will reach Vierkirchen at 7 p.m. and will come under the orders of the supply officer of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt.

"2. *Ammunition Supply*.—S.A.A. carts will be emptied. They will fill up to-morrow from the 1st Infantry Ammunition Column which is at the exit of Pasenbach on the Albertshofen road. Carts of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. will march by Vierkirchen and Esterhofen and those of the 2nd Inf. Regt. by Albertshofen.

"3. *Medical*.—Senior Medical Officer L. of 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will superintend the medical arrangements. The medical personnel and material of the 1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt., the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt., the 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th Field Artillery Regt., and the 1st *Abteilung*, 5th Heavy Artillery Regt., are at his disposal. He will deal direct with units.

The chief dressing station on the morning of the 23rd will be at Pasenbach, where will also be the collecting station for slightly wounded and sick. The collecting station for slightly wounded will be combined later on with that of the 9th Inf. Div. at Klein-Inzemoos.

No. 5 Field Hospital will be at 2 a.m. to-morrow at Pasenbach, at the disposal of Senior Medical Officer L. Application for an additional field hospital and also for an auxiliary hospital train, to be at Esterhofen station, will be met when required.

"4. *Transport*.—2nd line transport will remain with units, but must be south of Vierkirchen at 4 a.m., where it will be parked under the senior transport officer clear of the road from Riedenzhofen.

"5. No. 1 Horse Dépôt, 5th Army Corps, will be at Röhrmoos village to-morrow morning.

"6. *Postal*.—Field Post Office of the 9th Inf. Div. will serve the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. Letters are to reach brigade headquarters not later than 3.30 a.m.

"7. *Line of Communications*, 5th Army Corps, runs as follows:—Klein-Inzemoos—Röhrmoos—Ampermoching—Schleissheim—München. Nearest station on the lines of communication Ampermoching.

Nearest stationary hospital München.

"8. *Transport*.—Strict order is to be observed in the transport. Captain A. of Army Corps Headquarters is charged with the preservation of order. His instructions will be obeyed even by senior officers.

"Lieutenant X., Brigade transport officer, will control the traffic on the Pasenbach-Vierkirchen road and in those villages. Blocks, halting in villages, driving on the left side of the road, are on no account to be permitted.

In writing to :—

1st Bn., 1st Res. Inf. Regt.

1st Res. Inf. Regt.

2nd Res. Inf. Regt.

2nd *Abtg.*, 17th Field Artillery Regt.

1st *Abtg.*, 5th Heavy Artillery Regt.

Telephone detachment.

"1st Res. Inf. Bde."

The following instructions were prepared at the same time for Lieutenant M., the supply officer of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt., who was in charge of all supply vehicles :—

"The supply depôt of the 5th Army Corps will be ready for issues after 11 p.m. at Röhrmoos railway station. The supply wagons of the brigade, including 2nd *Abteilung*, 17th Field Artillery Regt. and 1st *Abteilung*, 5th Heavy Artillery Regt., which have been ordered to be at Vierkirchen at 8 p.m., will move by the Vierkirchen-Riedenzhofen road to Röhrmoos railway station to fill up. The head of the column will reach the station at midnight. You will fill up after the wagons of the 9th Inf. Div., which are marching by Gross-Inzemoos. You will not use the Röhrmoos station—Röhrmoos—Schönbrunn road. Strict march discipline will be observed. After filling up you will return to Vierkirchen to a position of readiness next to the 2nd line transport. Field kitchens will be sent to units. Those of the 2nd Res. Inf. Regt. will be sent to Pasenbach, those of the 1st Res. Inf. Regt. will remain at Vierkirchen. Report when you have filled up to brigade headquarters at the railway cottage, 1,000 metres north of Esterhofen."

PART III.

THE RETREAT.

GENERAL IDEA.

A main Blue Army has crossed the line of the Isar between Landshut and Freising, and is advancing against a strong Red force, which is known to have passed the Danube at Rain, Ingolstadt and Neustadt, and to be advancing south-east.

The Danube is the frontier between Red and Blue.

SPECIAL IDEA.

The Second Blue Army (Army of the Glonn), which was originally écheloned behind the left flank, had gained touch with hostile detachments on the Glonn. These hostile detachments had advanced on the line Schrobenhausen—Aichach, and had deployed on 22. XI., on the southern bank of the Glonn in order to defend the line Jedenhofen—Gross-Berghofen.

The 5th Army Corps formed the right wing of the 2nd Army; it had the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. in position from the hill east of Jedenhofen to Albertshofen, with the 9th Inf. Div. extending the left as far as Kloster-Indersdorf.

The 1st *Abteilung*, 5th Heavy Artillery Regt., was placed at Pasenbach to fire north. The troops were entrenched.

The 10th Inf. Div. was held back behind the left wing in the area Giebing—Rettenbach.

Early in the morning of 23. XI., the enemy, who had approached the position during the night, had deployed his artillery in strength on the heights on the far bank of the Glonn, and developed a decisive attack with his infantry against the whole of the front of the 2nd Blue Army. A battle ensued which was at its height about midday.

As the enemy kept extending his left through Wasenhof, and hostile reserves were discovered to be in the neighbourhood of

Ziegelberg, the 20th Inf. Bde. of the 10th Inf. Div. was deployed on the line Kollbach—hill 496—Asbach and south of that place to extend the right of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde.

During the early afternoon the enemy developed a decisive attack against this part of the position also, and advanced in force through Petershausen. This caused the commander of the 10th Inf. Div. to deploy his 19th Inf. Bde. which had remained at Giebing and Rettenbach, on either side of the Kammerberg—Kollbach road, and to counter-attack with it, with the object of enveloping the enemy's left, which had been discovered to be opposite Kollbach. The field artillery "*Brigade*" of the division, which had been kept back at Biberbach, was directed to support the counter-attack.

Meanwhile the 39th Inf. Regt. which held Kollbach and the hill west of that place, was in difficulties. By continually putting fresh reserves into the fight, the enemy had gradually gained superiority of fire, and when, about 2 p.m., hostile artillery enfiladed hill 496 from the neighbourhood of Aufhausen, the 39th Inf. Regt. was compelled to employ its last reserves in order to reinforce the northern front of Kollbach.

About 3 p.m., as the 38th Inf. Regt. was advancing through the small wood south of Piflitz, and the 37th Inf. Regt. was marching through Kammerberg in order to deploy for attack east of the Kammerberg—Kollbach road, individual men were seen to be retiring from Kollbach, and these were soon followed by small groups. A final attack with every available man, undertaken by the enemy's left wing, had compelled the 39th Inf. Regt. to give way.

The divisional commander immediately diverted the nearest units of the 37th and 30th Inf. Regts. towards the 39th Inf. Regt. in order to check the retreat.

Events developed in this part of the battlefield up till dusk as follows:—

The advance of the 38th Inf. Regt., which carried the 39th Inf. Regt. forward with it, and that of the 37th Inf. Regt., on the right, succeeded, after heavy fighting from house to house, in driving the enemy, who had penetrated into Kollbach, out of that village and pressing him gradually back to the Glonn.

In this fighting the infantry were supported by the 10th Field Artillery "*Brigade*," which came into action at first on hill 504 north of Kammerberg, and then changed position to the heights on either side of Kollbach. In coming into action west of Kollbach, this "*Brigade*" came for a time under the fire of hostile artillery, which was in the neighbourhood of Sollern, but owing to the long range this fire was not particularly effective.

The fire of the 10th Field Artillery "*Brigade*" combined with the attack of the last battalion of the 32nd Inf. Regt., which advanced from the Weissling wood and struck the enemy's left flank, at last forced the enemy to give way. He suffered heavily during the retreat, for the 5th Dragoon Regt. came up from Glonbercha and charged.

The situation, about 4 p.m., was as follows:—

The 19th Inf. Bde., mixed with which were portions of the 39th Inf. Regt., extended from Petershausen (its right being about opposite Glonbercha) to the railway bridge south-west of that place,

and was in close touch with the enemy who held Petershausen. Petershausen was on fire.

The 40th Inf. Regt., which extended the left, was more or less massed together, with its 1st Bn. holding the outskirts of Asbach, and engaged with hostile skirmishers, who were firing from cover in the re-entrant on the far bank of the Glonn. This battalion was under heavy artillery fire from the neighbourhood of Aufhausen. The 2nd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., which was turned slightly back, occupied the railway embankment south of Asbach, and was engaged with lines of hostile infantry which had attacked the railway embankment about midday, but had fallen back almost to the Glonn when their attack had been shattered.

Still further to the left lay the trenches of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde., the right wing of which was on hill 485 east of Jedenhofen. The enemy's attack on these trenches had also failed, and he had fallen back to Ebersbach.

The 3rd Bn., 39th Inf. Regt., had been collected when the regiment was passing through Kollbach, and was kept back as brigade reserve. The 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., and the 10th Pioneer Coy. were still at the disposal of the divisional commander on the Rettenbach—Kollbach road, west of Piflitz.

One company, 37th Inf. Regt., had been pushed out to Weissling to protect the right flank, and had piquets at Pelka and Waltenhofen.

The 5th Dragoon Regt. had been rallied, and was at Mühldorf. It was watching the Glonn valley as far down as Allershausen, and held the bridges at Hohenkammer and Herschenhofen.

Divisional headquarters were at Piflitz. Observing officers were on the church towers of Kammerberg and Kollbach, in signalling communication with divisional headquarters.

Telephonic communication was established with Kollbach, where were the headquarters of the 19th Inf. Bde. and 10th Field Artillery "*Brigade*," and with the ganger's cottage south of Asbach, the headquarters of the 20th Inf. Bde.

The headquarters of the 10th Inf. Div. were connected with the headquarters of the 5th Army Corps at Esterhofen station by field telegraph.

The field kitchens of the 20th Inf. Bde. were near Rettenbach, those of the 19th Inf. Bde. were just north of Giebing, clear of the road, under the supply officers. Dinners had been issued to the 20th Inf. Bde. at mid-day, but the field kitchens of the 19th Inf. Bde. were still full.

The 2nd line transport of the division, at the head of which were the divisional bridging train and the divisional headquarters baggage, was halted on the Lotzbach—Biberbach road, with its head 1 kilometre south of Biberbach. The ammunition of the 1st line transport was completely expended; the empty S.A.A. carts of the 20th Inf. Bde. were collected north of Rettenbach, clear of the Kollbach road. Those of the 19th Inf. Bde. were south of Giebing in the angles between the roads from Biberbach and Rettenbach. A cyclist officer had been left behind by each brigade in charge of the S.A.A. carts.

The ammunition in the light ammunition columns of the field artillery had been used up to replace the ammunition expended by

the batteries. The light ammunition columns were, therefore, standing empty in the area between Kammerberg and Piflitz, facing north.

The following dressing stations had been established:—

Regimental dressing stations of the 19th Inf. Bde. were collected in Kollbach, those of the 40th Inf. Regt. were in the valley running from the railway embankment south of Asbach towards Piflitz. A small auxiliary dressing station was established in Asbach.

The bearer company of the 10th Inf. Div. was employed at the chief dressing station, which was established at the point where the Rettenbach—Kollbach road leaves the wood north of Rettenbach. The 10th Field Hospital, 5th Army Corps, had been established in Rettenbach since 2 p.m. and looked after the wounded who were brought to that place. A number of houses had been prepared for the reception of the wounded, and about half the beds in the hospital were in use. The stream of wounded increased hourly. No. 9 Field Hospital had been ordered to Kollbach, and was expected to arrive in half an hour.

No. 1 Infantry Ammunition Column and the 1st and 2nd Artillery Ammunition Columns had been directed by Army Corps Headquarters to be at Vierkirchen at 7 p.m., at the disposal of the 10th Inf. Div. The ammunition dépôt of the 5th Army Corps was to be ready for issue at Röhrmoos at midnight.

The Field Post Office of the 10th Inf. Div. was in Rettenbach, that of the 5th Army Corps was at Röhrmoos railway station.

ACTION OF, AND ORDERS ISSUED BY, THE DIVISIONAL STAFF AFTER 4 P.M. (23. XI).

Shortly after 4 p.m. an officer from the headquarters of the 5th Army Corps reported himself at divisional headquarters, and gave a copy of the following order to the divisional commander:—

“ 5th Army Corps.

“ Headquarters, Esterhofen Station.

23. XI., 3 p.m.

“ Confidential.

“ To the Commander of the 10th Inf. Div.

“ 1. According to reports of reliable agents, hostile reinforcements are advancing down the Ilm valley on Ilmmünster. The right wing of the enemy's main army is advancing on Freising.

“ 2. The 1st Army has been driven back behind the Isar by the enemy in superior force to-day, 23rd. The 2nd Army will retire during the night of the 23rd–24th, by Dachau and Palsweis in order to connect with the left of the 1st Army.

“ 3. The 5th Army Corps will take up a position behind the Amper on the line Weng—Ottershausen in order to cover the retreat of the army. Those units which are not in the front line will march to the new position at 4 a.m. to-morrow.

“ 4. Lines of retreat are as follows:—

10th Inf. Div. by Bachenhausen—Gross-Nöbach and west of that place as far as Vierkirchen (exclusive)—Schönbrunn—Amperpettenbach—Haimhausen. The division may use the bridges on the Amper north-east of Haimhausen. The 1st Res. Inf. Bde. will use the Vierkirchen—Schönbrunn Amperpettenbach—Haimhausen road.

The 9th Inf. Div. will use roads west of those allotted to 1st Res. Inf. Bde. as far as the Gross-Inzemoos—Unter-Weilbach—Herbertshausen road inclusive.

“5. The 10th Inf. Div., to which the 5th Dragoon Regt. at Hohenkammer is attached, will reconnoitre at once on the line Allershausen—Hohenkammer—Petershausen towards Freising and the valley of the Ilm, and will find out the position of the right wing of the enemy's main army as well as that of the hostile troops reported in the Ilm valley. Negative reports are required.

“6. Rear guards will follow when the situation admits, under the orders of a brigadier to be appointed by the 10th Inf. Div., who will take over command at 4 a.m. to-morrow of all covering detachments remaining on the Glonn.

“7. The 2nd line transport of all columns under divisional control must be clear of the area between the Glonn and the Amper before 4 a.m. to-morrow. Empty transports will move by Schleissheim to München.

“8. The 1st échelon of the ammunition columns and train of the 5th Army Corps has been ordered to Lohhof; the 2nd échelon to Erching (east of the Isar). The dépôt at Röhrmoos has been evacuated, supply wagons have been ordered to Lohhof, where they can fill up after midnight. Transport vehicles of the 10th Inf. Div. will use the Gross-Nöbach—Maisteig road.

“9. Army Headquarters move at 3.45 a.m. by motor car through Ampermoching to Haimhausen. Representatives of divisions and of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. will be there at 4.30 a.m.

Transmitted by

“Captain F.,

“Adjutant, Headquarters 5th Army Corps. X.,

“General.”

Captain F., the bearer of this order, reported at the same time that the Army Corps Telegraph Detachment would reel up the line from Piflitz to Esterhofen, beginning from Piflitz, at 3.45 a.m., and that he was attached to the headquarters of the 10th Inf. Div. as reporting officer.

Captain G., the general staff officer of the 10th Inf. Div., then marked out on the map spread out in front of him the lines of retreat of the units of the 5th Army Corps, and verified the positions of the places named in the army corps order. He then placed the following appreciation of the situation before his commander:—

“The enemy immediately in front of our infantry on the Glonn has been beaten, and will not be in a condition to interfere seriously with the retreat which is to be begun to-night. The first step necessary is to reorganize the units which have become mixed up in the battle, and to arrange for the proper issue of orders. The section of defence extending from the right wing, east of Petershausen, as

far as the railway bridge, 120 metres south-west of that place, may be placed under Major-General P., commander of the 19th Inf. Bde.; the next section on the left through Asbach, as far as the right flank of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde., may be allotted to Colonel B., commander of 40th Inf. Regt., as the commander of the 20th Inf. Bde. has fallen.

"The next thing is to withdraw troops from the front line and place them in readiness in positions in rear; in doing this the front line must be left sufficiently strong to prevent the enemy breaking through. These measures can only be carried out after dark. The detachments of the 19th Inf. Bde. withdrawn from the front line may be suitably ordered to Kollbach, and behind hill 496, west of that place, those of the 20th Inf. Bde. being sent to the wood north of Vierkirchen. These units can then be fed from the field kitchens which should be brought up to them. They should march at 4 a.m. by Kammerberg and Giebing respectively.

"We are ordered to retire behind the Amper; the bridge at Gross-Nöbach is the only one available. As hostile troops are reported to be in the Ilm valley and the right wing of the enemy's main army is advancing on Freising, it is possible that hostile cavalry coming from the north may reach the Amper at any time. The bridge at Gross-Nöbach must, therefore, be occupied as soon as possible, and also the bridges at Thurnsberg and Kranzberg, but in less strength. It is also necessary to arrange for the reconnaissance of the Amper, and of the country about Weng and Gross-Nöbach, with reference to defence against attack from the west and north-west. It is also necessary to arrange for the construction of bridges south of Gross-Nöbach. The divisional bridging train is available for this, and should march at once to the Amper, together with the pioneer company, a company of infantry and some cyclists.

"It is of special importance to initiate fresh reconnaissances of the enemy's main army and of the enemy advancing down the Ilm valley. The concealment of the retreat from hostile cavalry reconnaissance by occupying the crossings of the Glonn from Allershausen to Herschenhofen must also be arranged. For this the 5th Dragoon Regt. is available.

"Finally, it is very important to clear the area between the Amper and the Glonn of transport as quickly as possible, but the troops must first be supplied with food and ammunition. The supply and forage wagons are at Biberbach. If orders are issued at once, those of the field artillery can be ready at Kammerberg, those of the 19th Inf. Bde. at Giebing, and of the 20th Inf. Bde. at Rettenbach, between 6 and 7 p.m. They can then either fill up the field kitchens direct or be off-loaded for use later. They should have completed the issue of supplies by 10 p.m., and have crossed the Amper at Gross-Nöbach at latest between midnight and 1 a.m., thus clearing the way for the ammunition columns, which will be ready to move from Vierkirchen after 7 p.m. If the ammunition columns begin to issue at Kammerberg, Giebing and Rettenbach about 11 p.m., they can certainly be behind the Amper by 4 a.m.

"The medical services must be informed as soon as possible of the intended retreat, so that they may economize in personnel and material as far as possible. It will be best to make no further use of No. 9 Field Hospital. Slightly wounded can march with 2nd

line transport to Eching, severely wounded can be sent back in the empty supply wagons from Kammerberg, Giebing and Rettenbach. No. 9 Field Hospital should move to Eching, whence the wounded may perhaps be sent to München by train. It will be necessary to apply to Army Corps Headquarters for this. Collecting stations for slightly wounded should be closed at once, and the chief dressing station as soon as possible. The dressing stations of units must still remain open. Personnel no longer required can retire with the rear guard.

"These orders should be drafted at once. As regards the final order for the retreat, the disposition of the division for this purpose must still be considered. In arranging this it must be remembered that it is not impossible that the enemy may operate by way of Hohenkammer, or that he should penetrate into the Amper valley from Allershausen."

Lt.-General D., divisional commander, approved of the proposals of his general staff officer, and instructed him to prepare the necessary orders at once.

Captain G. thereupon dictated the following order to his clerk, who used a typewriter which was carried in the divisional headquarters' motor car. A number of copies were made of the order.

"I., 10th Inf. Div.

"Piflitz, 23. XI., 4.30 p.m.

"To commander 2nd line transport, 10th Inf. Div., Biberbach."

"The 2nd line transport will march at once by Giebing—Kammerberg—Bachenhausen—Water-Bruck to Eching. The Divisional Bridging Train will await the Pioneer Company, which is on its way to Fahrenzhausen. Supply wagons of the Field Artillery "*Brigade*" will march to Kammerberg; those of the 19th Inf. Bde. to Giebing, and of the 20th Inf. Bde. from Giebing to Rettenberg: those of the 5th Dragoon Regt. will march from Kammerberg to Lautenberg. They will park at the places named, clear of the roads, and wait for further orders. The collecting station for slightly wounded at Biberbach will be evacuated. Personnel and material together with the slightly wounded will accompany the 2nd line transport.

G.,

"Capt., Gen. Staff Officer, 10th Inf. Div."

The senior medical officer of the division had meanwhile prepared the following order on a message form, making several copies of it.

"II., 10th Inf. Div.

"Piflitz, 23. XI., 4.30 p.m.

"To No. 9 Field Hospital, Kollbach.

"To Chief Dressing Station, 10th Inf. Div., north of Rettenbach.

"To No. 10 Field Hospital, Rettenberg.

"Only such personnel and material as is absolutely necessary will be used, the remainder will be held in readiness to march.

"Severely wounded will be sent to Kammerberg, Giebing, and Rettenbach, at which places empty supply wagons will be available until 10 p.m., for further transport to Eching.

"No. 9 Field Hospital will march at once to Eching and make preparations for the reception of the wounded there. An auxiliary

hospital train has been ordered to be at Eching on the morning of the 24th.

"The collecting station for slightly wounded at Biberbach will be evacuated. Slightly wounded, together with the personnel and material, will march with the 2nd line transport to Eching.

"A.,

"Senior Medical Officer, 10th Inf. Div."

When Captain G. had looked through the latter order, both orders were handed to an orderly officer of the divisional staff, with instructions to go first to Kollbach to No. 9 Field Hospital, then to the chief dressing station and No. 10 Field Hospital at Rettenbach, and afterwards to the 2nd line transport at Biberbach. When he had done this he was to remain on the Giebing—Rettenbach road with two orderlies from the escort to divisional headquarters and to devote all his energies to the preservation of order in the transport. He was told that, after the supply wagons had marched off, the 1st Infantry Ammunition Column and the 1st and 2nd Artillery Ammunition Columns would come in from Vierkirchen, fill up the ammunition of the various units at Kammerberg, Giebing, and Rettenbach, and then march by Bachenhausen to Gross-Nöbach. He was directed to requisition the assistance of the inhabitants in lighting the roads by means of bonfires, and also in lighting the houses in the various villages, to mark the exits of villages, and to employ men acquainted with the locality to point out the way. He received the following paper as his authority :—

"10th Inf. Div.

"Piflitz, 23. XI., 4.45 p.m.

"Lt. M. of the headquarters, 10th Inf. Div., is charged with the preservation of order on the Rettenbach—Giebing—Kammerberg road, and also on the Giebing—Biberbach road. His instructions are to be rigidly complied with even by officers who are senior to him.

D.,

10th Inf. Div.

"Lt.-Gen. commanding the Division."

Captain G. then requested the two divisional adjutants to ride to the commander of the 19th Inf. Bde. to find out the situation there, to arrange that the brigade should send one infantry company at once to Kammerberg, and that the commander of that company should report himself as soon as possible at divisional headquarters at Piflitz. Three cyclist officers were to be sent at the same time to Kammerberg, to be at the disposal of the commander of this company. The adjutants were directed to return by way of the position of the pioneer company, and to direct its commander to march his company at once by Kammerberg to Unter-Bruck, coming himself to Piflitz for orders.

After issuing these instructions, the divisional general staff officer dictated to the typewriter the following order to the commander of the 5th Dragoon Regt. :—

"10th Inf. Div.

"Piflitz, 23. XI., 4.45 p.m.

"To the Commander 5th Dragoon Regt. (confidential).

"1. The 1st Army has been driven over the Isar on the line

Landshut—Freising by superior force: the 2nd Army will fall back during the night of the 23rd–24th. XI., through and north of München.

“2. According to reliable information the right wing of the enemy’s main army is advancing on Freising. Fresh bodies of hostile troops are reported to be in the valley of the Ilm marching on Ilmmünster.

“3. The 5th Army Corps will cover the retirement of the army from a position behind the Amper on the line Weng—Ottershausen.

“4. The 10th Inf. Div. will retire at 4 a.m. by Bachenhausen on Gross-Nöbach, leaving rear guards opposite Petershausen and Asbach.

“5. Reconnoitre the valley of the Glonn, between Glonn and Ilm, and the valley of the Ilm, and find out the position of the enemy reported to be in the Ilm valley and also that of the right wing of his main army. The enemy at and west of Petershausen must be watched.

At the same time you must delay the advance of the enemy over the Glonn on the line Allershausen (inclusive)—Herschenhausen (inclusive). The bridges over the Glonn may be destroyed. The crossings at Kranzberg and Thurnsberg will be occupied and held to-night by cyclists. If forced back, join the right flank of the division. Send one section as soon as possible to the bridge at Gross-Nöbach to be at the disposal of the infantry commander at that place and two sections to Piflitz to be at the disposal of divisional headquarters.

The regimental supply wagons will be at Lauterbach between 7 and 8 p.m., to march not later than 11 p.m. by Jarzt—Gross-Nöbach to Lohhof, where they will fill up.

“6. Divisional headquarters will be at Piflitz till 4 a.m. and will then move by motor car by Bachenhausen to Gross-Nöbach. Representative for orders is to be at the latter place by 4.30 a.m.

“10th Inf. Div.”

This order was then handed to the first adjutant of the division, who was instructed to deliver it by motor car. He was to hand it personally to the commander of the 5th Regt. at Hohenkammer, and to make himself acquainted with the situation at that place.

The following divisional order was then prepared at divisional headquarters:—

“10th Inf. Div.

“Piflitz, 23. XI., 5.30 p.m.

“Divisional Order No. 3 for 23.XI.

“1. The enemy has been repulsed along the whole front of the army. The 10th Inf. Div. holds the crossings at Petershausen and Asbach.

“2. The division will hold its present position without advancing. The following will be the sections of defence:—Major-Gen. P., commander of 19th Inf. Bde, will hold the section from the right wing as far as the railway bridge south of Petershausen (inclusive); the section from the railway bridge as far as the position of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde will be under Col. B., who will take over command of the 20th Inf. Bde.

“3. Units will reorganize, and after dark will withdraw as many men as possible from the front line, which must, however, be

sufficiently strong to prevent the enemy breaking through. The 19th Inf. Bde. will assemble at Kollbach. The 20th Inf. Bde. will assemble in the wood north of Vierkirchen, west of the road connecting Rettenbach and Kollbach. Brigades will bivouac at the places of assembly.

"4. The Field Artillery '*Brigade*' will leave one *Abteilung* to support the 19th Inf. Bde. on the line of the Glonn. Guns will remain in position after dark. The remainder of the '*Brigade*' will pass the night at Kammerberg, Bachenhausen, and Viehbach. The '*Brigade*' will obtain an escort from the 19th Inf. Bde. in Kollbach.

"5. Divisional headquarters, which will be marked by a lantern, will be at Piflitz. Representatives will be there for orders at 9 p.m. The telephone detachment will establish stations at Kollbach, at the ganger's cottage south of Asbach, and at Piflitz.

Special Instructions for 23-24. XI.

"1. Supply.—Supply wagons will reach the following positions between 6 and 7 p.m. :—

Those of the Field Artillery '*Brigade*', Kammerberg.

Those of the 19th Inf. Bde., Giebing.

Those of the 20th Inf. Bde., Rettenbach.

Issues will be completed as soon as possible, and supply vehicles will march not later than 11 p.m. by Bachenhausen to Lohhof, where they may resume work after midnight. They will march by brigades under brigade supply officers. Requisitions from the medical service for transport for wounded are to be complied with.

"2. Ammunition.—The 1st Inf. Ammunition Column will send one section to Giebing for the 19th Inf. Bde., and one section to Rettenbach for the 20th Inf. Bde., from Vierkirchen at 11 p.m. 1st and 2nd Artillery Ammunition Columns will send ammunition for the Field Artillery '*Brigade*' from Vierkirchen at 11 p.m. to Kammerberg. Issue of ammunition must be completed by 2 a.m. Empty columns will march to München, and must be east of the Amper not later than 4 a.m.

"3. The Field Post Office for the 19th Inf. Bde and the field artillery will be at 10 p.m. in Kollbach, and for the 20th Inf. Bde. at the brigade bivouac.

"4. A mounted officer of the field artillery will be sent to Kammerberg, another from the 19th Inf. Bde. to Giebing, and another from the 20th Inf. Bde. to Rettenbach to preserve order and control traffic.

Lt. M., of divisional headquarters, is charged with these duties on the Rettenbach—Giebing—Kammerberg road.

"5. Villages will be lighted, and guides posted at the exits. Strict discipline is to be maintained among the transport. Transport not in movement will be drawn up on the sides of roads clear of villages."

10th Inf. Div.

After this order had been read to the divisional commander and signed by him, it was dictated to the representatives who had come for orders. The latter left to take it to their units at 5.45 p.m.

Meanwhile, the general staff officer had gone to the telephone, called up army corps headquarters, and asked for an officer. He then asked whether it would be possible to send an auxiliary hospital train to Echting on the morning of the 24th, in order to transport the wounded of the 10th Inf. Div. from that place to München. He received the reply that the train for the 10th Inf. Div. would be ready at Echting on the morning of the 24th.

The following messages were then prepared and handed to a mounted officer of the 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., which was close by, to deliver:—

“I. 10th Inf. Div.

Piflitz, 23.XI., 6 p.m.

“To 1st Infantry Ammunition Column and 1st and 2nd Artillery Ammunition Columns at Vierkirchen.

“The 1st Inf. Am. Col. and 1st and 2nd. Arty. Am. Cols. are under the orders of the 10th Inf. Div.; they will move from Vierkirchen at 11 p.m. (not earlier) as follows:—1st and 2nd Arty. Am. Cols. to Kammerberg for issues to 10th F.A. Bde. 1 section, 1st Inf. Am. Col., to Giebing for issues to 19th Inf. Bde. 1 section, 1st Inf. Am. Col., to Rettenbach for issues to 20th Inf. Bde. The issue of ammunition must be completed at 2 a.m. Columns will then be closed up, and march by Bachenhausen—Gross-Nöbch—Lohhof to München.

“II. 10th Inf. Div.

Piflitz, 23. XI., 6 p.m.

“To the Field Post Office, 10th Inf. Div. at Rettenbach.

“Letters of the 19th Inf. Bde. for despatch will be received at Kollbach till 10 p.m.; those of the 20th Inf. Bde. at the brigade bivouac in the wood north-east of Vierkirchen; and those of the Field Artillery ‘*Brigade*’ at Kammerberg, also at 10 p.m. The Field Post Office will be ready to move off from Rettenbach at 3 a.m.”

Shortly after these messages had been despatched, the commanders of the 10th Pioneer Coy. and of the 10th Coy., 38th Inf. Regt., which had been ordered to Kammerberg, reported themselves. They received the following instructions from the general staff officer, who added that everything relating to the retreat was to be considered as confidential:—

“The 2nd Army is retiring behind the Amper and on München during the night of the 23rd–24th. XI. The 5th Army Corps will cover this retirement against fresh bodies of the enemy which are reported to be advancing up the Ilm valley, and also against the right wing of the enemy’s main army, which is reported to be moving on Freising. The 5th Army Corps will take up a position behind the Amper on the line Weng—Ottershausen. The 1st Army has been driven by an enemy in superior force behind the Isar on the line Landshut—Mossburg—Freising. No. 10 Coy. will move at once to Gross-Nöbch, and will occupy the bridge there and the crossing leading to Weng. 3 cyclist officers and 10 cyclists of the 19th Inf. Bde., who have been ordered to Kammerberg, and 1 section of the 5th Dragoon Regt., which has been ordered to the bridge at Gross-Nöbch, are available to hold the crossings at Kranzberg and Thurnsberg. The company will reconnoitre east of the Amper towards Freising. The pioneer company will join the divisional bridging train, which has been ordered to Fahrrenzhausen,

and will throw a bridge suitable for all arms and a number of foot bridges between Unter-Bruck and Haimhausen. Sketches showing the position of and approaches to bridges to be sent to divisional headquarters as soon as possible. A report on the river Amper between Appercha and Amperpettenbach is required at the same time. Fords in this section of the river are to be reconnoitred and marked.

"The rearmost units of the division will begin the retirement on Gross-Nöbich at 4 a.m. Up to that hour the roads are being used by the transport, supply, and ammunition columns. Divisional headquarters are moving from Piflitz at 3.30 a.m. by motor car to Gross-Nöbich."

Lastly, an artillery lieutenant attached to the divisional headquarters as orderly officer was directed to reconnoitre the roads from Giebing by Gramling to Bachenhausen, from Milbertshofen to Viehbach, and from Rettenbach by Wiedenhof to Biberbach and Oberndorf.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN THE 19TH INF. BDE.

We will now see what instructions were issued in the 19th Inf. Bde. in consequence of the divisional order given above.

Divisional Order No. 3 reached the commander of the 19th Inf. Bde. about 5.45 p.m., just as he had gone to hill 496, west of Kollbach, to examine the general situation.

The various detachments in this part of the battlefield were known to be disposed as follows:—

The greater part of the 37th Inf. Regt. was astride the Höckhof—Petershausen road opposite Petershausen; small detachments held Weissling and Glonbercha to cover the flank; there was a small reserve at Höckhof. The 38th Inf. Regt. extended the left of the 37th Inf. Regt., and held the line of the Glonn as far as the neighbourhood of Asbach. Detachments of the 39th Inf. Regt. were mixed up with both regiments.

The 3rd Bn., 38th Inf. Regt., was still at the disposal of the brigadier south of Kollbach, as he had withdrawn it from the front line after the re-capture of that village. One company of this battalion (the 10th) was on the march to Kammerberg in accordance with instructions from divisional headquarters.

It was nearly dark by 6.0 p.m. The heights on the far bank of the Glonn were only dimly visible, though the position of the enemy's firing lines was still clearly distinguishable, owing to the flashes of the rifles on the outskirts of Petershausen, which the enemy still held obstinately, despite the heavy artillery fire directed on the place.

South and west of Petershausen the fight had almost died out. Thanks to the effective fire of the 10th Field Artillery "*Brigade*," which was still vigorously engaged, the enemy's infantry in this part of the field had evacuated the railway embankment, and had retired on to the Petershausen—Wasenhof road. Wasenhof had just

caught fire, and Petershausen had been in flames since a late hour in the afternoon.

After 5 p.m. the fire of the enemy's artillery about Sollern had gradually lessened, and about 5.30 p.m. it ceased altogether, just after a loud explosion from the direction of Kreithof led to the supposition that a part of its ammunition had been blown up.

The brigade staff had dismounted and had gone to the nearest house in Kollbach in order to be better able to work. A representative of the staff was left on hill 496 in order to direct messengers. The position of brigade headquarters was also clearly marked by a bonfire.

The empty ammunition carts of the 37th Inf. Regt. were at Giebing under a cyclist officer, and those of the 38th Inf. Regt. were at Rettenbach.

The field kitchens of the 37th Inf. Regt. were at the southern edge of the wood north-west of Giebing; those of the 38th Inf. Regt. were close to Rettenbach; both were under the regimental supply officers.

The following order was then prepared at brigade headquarters:—

“19th Inf. Brigade, Kollbach, 23. XI., 6.15 p.m.

“To the 37th, 38th, 39th Inf. Regts.

“1. The Glonn will not be crossed. The positions won will be held.

“2. The section extending from the right flank as far as the railway bridge south-west of Petershausen (inclusive) will be under my command. The section on the left is under Col. B., who is in command of the 20th Inf. Bde.

“3. The 37th Inf. Regt. will hold the line from the right flank as far as a point opposite the south-west corner of Petershausen. The 38th Inf. Regt. will extend the left as far as the railway bridge. Units will be reorganized.

“4. The 39th Inf. Regt. will move back at once to Kollbach, and will bivouac in the wood north of Vierkirchen. Supports and reserves of the 37th Inf. Regt. will be withdrawn from the front as soon as possible and sent to Kollbach, those of the 38th Inf. Regt. to hill 496, west of Kollbach. The following troops will be left as a minimum in the front line:—One bn. 37th Inf. Regt. astride the Höckhof—Petershausen road, 2 coys. 38th Inf. Regt. in the section as far as the railway bridge. Glonbercha and Weissling will be held. The 5th Dragoon Regt. will hold the crossings of the Glonn at and below Herschenhofen. The far bank of the Glonn in the direction of Obermarbach and the woods north-west of Petershausen as well as towards Ziegelberg will be regularly patrolled.

“5. The field kitchens of the 37th Inf. Regt. are at Kollbach, those of the 38th Inf. Regt. have been ordered to the valley south of hill 496, they will be sent up to units under brigade arrangements. Food will be issued to the troops as quickly as possible.

“6. Representatives for orders will be sent as soon as possible to brigade headquarters at the western exit of Kollbach.

“7. The 37th Inf. Regt. will arrange to send this order on as quickly as possible to the 38th and 39th Inf. Regts.

P.,

“Major-General.”

An under-officer from the orderlies attached to brigade headquarters was given the message form with the above order. He was told by the brigade major to ride to Höckhof, the only village between Petershausen and Kollbach, and to ask the infantry companies at that place to tell him the position of the headquarters of the 37th Inf. Regt. He was to give the message to the commander of the 37th Inf. Regt., and at the same time to inform him of para. 7 of the order.

The orderly officer of the brigade was then given the following instructions by the brigade major :—

“Take one of the brigade orderlies and ride to the neighbourhood of Rettenbach. In the wood north-east of that place you will find the field kitchens of the 38th Inf. Regt. and, nearer to Giebing, those of the 37th Inf. Regt. You will have both of them drawn up in one column on the Rettenbach—Kollbach road, and see that those of the 37th Inf. Regt. go to Kollbach, and those of the 38th Inf. Regt. to a position behind hill 496, just west of the village. The regimental supply officers are with the field kitchens.

“You will then see to the issue of supplies and ammunition. The supply wagons of the brigade will reach Giebing from Biberbach about 7 p.m. They will be off-loaded at a suitable place, and the empty vehicles will march together, not later than 11 p.m., under one of the supply officers whom you will select, by Kammerberg and Gross-Nöbach to Lohhof, where they will fill up. They will be used as far as possible to take wounded from the field hospital at Rettenbach.

“One section of the 1st Inf. Am. Col. is marching behind the 1st and 2nd Arty. Am. Cols., which have been ordered to Kammerberg, to Giebing, where it is to be at our disposal at 11 p.m. You will divide the ammunition in this section equally among the ammunition carts of the brigade, which are assembled at Giebing, in the angle between the roads from Biberbach and Rettenbach. The issue of ammunition must be completed by 2 a.m. The empty ammunition column, which will be followed by another section coming from Rettenbach, will then move to Kammerberg and Gross-Nöbach.

“In addition, you will be responsible for the maintenance of order amongst the transport in Giebing. Make use of the inhabitants for such labour as you require, employ them if necessary to light the houses and streets, and to mark the exits of the village. I should advise you to post guides. Afterwards you will see that the field kitchens are refilled. The regiments will report to you when the field kitchens reach Giebing. Report when the issue of ammunition is completed. Orders will then be issued as to the disposal of the ammunition carts. Take two cyclists of the 37th Inf. Regt. with you for use as orderlies. Rettenbach is connected by telephone with Kollbach through Piflitz.”

The orderly officer made notes of the principal points and then rode off.

The brigade major then set to work to draft the final order to the units under the brigade. At 7 p.m. the order, which ran as follows, was ready for dictation to the representatives of units :—

" 19th Inf. Brigade,

" Kollbach, 23. XI., 7 p. m.

" Brigade Order No. 5 for 23. XI.

" 1. *Bivouacs*.—The 37th Inf. Regt. will bivouac south of Kollbach as soon as the 39th Inf. Regt. has left that place.

The 38th Inf. Regt. will bivouac behind hill 496, near the south-west corner of Kollbach. The following areas are allotted for water, wood, and straw :—

To the 37th Inf. Regt.—Kollbach, east of the eastern church and Piflitz.

To the 38th Inf. Regt.—Kollbach, west of the eastern church.

" 2. *Protection*.—The 37th Inf. Regt. will arrange for the protection of the right wing as far as a point opposite Petershausen. Close touch will be kept with the enemy. Glonbercha, Weissling, and Petershausen bridge will be held. Not less than one battalion will occupy the ground opposite Petershausen. Touch will be kept with the 5th Dragoon Regt. which is lower down the Glonn.

The 38th Inf. Regt. will watch the ground from the left of the 37th Inf. Regt. as far as the railway bridge, which will be strongly held. Touch will be kept with the 20th Inf. Bde.

" 3. *Brigade headquarters* are at the western exit of Kollbach.

Special Instructions.

" 1. *Supplies*.—Field kitchens have been ordered to the bivouacs of units. Supplies to refill the field kitchens are at Giebing. After issuing morning coffee, the field kitchens will march by Rettenbach to Giebing. Those of the 37th Inf. Regt. will start not later than 1.0 a.m.; those of the 38th Inf. Regt. not later than 1.15 a.m. Capt. B., of brigade headquarters, who is superintending the issue of supplies in Giebing, is to be informed when the field kitchens reach that place.

" 2. *Ammunition*.—Ammunition carts will rejoin regiments when they have refilled.

" 3. *Medical*.—Wounded will be sent to Kammerberg, Rettenbach and Giebing, at which places empty supply wagons will be available, up till 11.0 p.m., for transport to Eching.

The 37th Inf. Regt. will search for wounded in the area Kammerberg—Weissling—Glonbercha—Petershausen — Kollbach—Piflitz.

The 38th Inf. Regt. in the area between hill 496 and the Glonn on the line Petershausen—railway bridge south of that place.

" 4. *Postal*.—Letters will be collected at the bivouacs of units at 7 p.m.

P.,

" Major-General."

We will now briefly examine the instructions issued in the units of the 19th Inf. Bde., taking the 37th Inf. Regt. first.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN THE 37TH INF. REGT.

When the message with the brigade order issued at 6.15 p.m. (see page 135) reached the headquarters of the 37th Inf. Regt. at Höckhof, it was so dark that very little view was obtainable of the surround-

ing country. Mist was gradually rising in the Glonn valley, in which the houses and church tower of Petershausen, lit up by the conflagration which was still raging, were clearly visible. The infantry fire had died out; only a few scattered shots were heard from time to time as opposing patrols met.

The hostile artillery on the hill near Sollern had ceased fire as darkness came on. On the other hand the 10th F.A. Bde. was still firing at Petershausen, and its shells were bursting both in the village itself and on its outskirts. They were destroying the buildings and the outer walls of the village systematically. Shells from Blue artillery were also seen to be bursting along the road to Wasenhof.

The 1st Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., was known to be to the east, on the extreme right flank, while the 2nd Bn. was west of the Höckhof—Petershausen road. Companies of the 39th Inf. Regt., with which there was no officer of the staff of that regiment, were mixed up with both battalions.

The 3rd Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., had two companies under the battalion commander at Höckhof at the disposal of the regimental commander. The 11th Company of this battalion at Glonbercha, and the 12th Company in Weissling, were protecting the right flank. These companies had protective detachments in Pelka and Waltenhofen.

The front line in the direction of Petershausen was connected with the regimental headquarters by telephone; the line ran to the commander of the 1st Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., near the bridge, where the 7th Company was in close touch with the enemy. The machine gun company, which was originally in action on the right flank, had ceased fire when it became dark. It had already been ordered to retire from the front line and to move to the exit of Kollbach on the Kollbach—Höckhof road, to be at the disposal of the regimental commander. Signalling communication by lamp was established between the most southerly house of Höckhof and the signalling station of the brigade on Kollbach church tower.

Five cyclist orderlies were ready in the village; the horses of the regimental staff, which had been at work in the zone of fire, had been placed in a shed close by, and had been unsaddled and fed. An under-officer of the 3rd Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., was posted on the road to direct messengers to the regimental headquarters.

At this time the enemy was still holding the outskirts of Petershausen, but appeared to become weaker towards the late afternoon. He had a firing line south-west of Petershausen turned back towards the Petershausen—Wasenhof road, and patrols only were on the Glonn itself. It had been ascertained that he had only weak protective detachments east of Petershausen opposite Glonbercha. A large number of wounded, both friend and foe, were lying between Höckhof and the Glonn, for the struggle had raged most fiercely there. In this part of the field the Glonn had proved to be a more serious obstacle than had been supposed. Owing to heavy rain during the previous days, the river had risen and could only be crossed by infantry with safety at the fords.

Mounted troops were confined to the regular crossings because the banks were boggy.

A regimental dressing station for the 37th Inf. Regt. was at Höckhof. The medical officers of the 38th and 39th Inf. Regts. were at work in Kollbach.

After the regimental commander had read the brigade order he called up the 1st Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., and asked its commander, who was the senior of the two battalion commanders in the front line, to come to the telephone. He then gave him the following instructions verbally at 6.30 p.m. :—

“The regiment will not cross the Glonn, it will hold the positions it has gained. The 39th Inf. Regt. is falling back on either side of the Petershausen—Kollbach road, and will assemble south of Kollbach. You will take over command of the front line. You will see that units are reorganized, and will fix the strength of the covering troops to remain during the night opposite Petershausen. At least one battalion must be employed for this. The regiment is to hold the line from the right flank as far as the copse on which the left of the 2nd Bn. is now resting. The 38th Inf. Regt. extends our left as far as the railway bridge. Weissling and Glonbercha will continue to be held by the companies now at those places.

“All troops not required in the front line will be assembled at Kollbach. Bivouacs will be allotted at that place. See that frequent patrols are sent to the north round Petershausen towards the station, into the woods north-west of it, and towards Sollern. Keep communication with the units on your flanks. Touch with the enemy must not be lost. Repeat this order at once to the 39th Inf. Regt. and to our 2nd Battalion.

“Send representatives for orders to regimental headquarters at Höckhof.”

The regimental adjutant was then directed to reconnoitre places for bivouacs for two battalions. The valley running from Kollbach towards Höckhof did not seem suitable. In the first place, the ground was damp meadowland, covered with dense mist. In the next place, bivouac fires would probably be visible from the far bank of the Glonn, and might draw artillery fire. As it was a cold November night, it was not desirable to do without fires.

The most favourable position was on the dry, cultivated land just south of Kollbach; but, as the detachments of the 39th Inf. Regt. were falling back to assemble there, it appeared better to avoid contact with that regiment, to obviate any confusion, so that this ground too was rejected. There remained only the country east of Kollbach. In this area there was a valley, well covered from the north by a wood, through which the road to Weissling ran. The ground was dry and there was room enough for two battalions.

At 8 p.m. the regimental adjutant returned and reported to his commander in the above sense. At this moment Brigade Order No. 5 (see page 137) arrived. At the same time columns were seen in the darkness retiring in the direction of Kollbach. They were mostly companies of the 39th Inf. Regt. under command of lieutenants.

About 8.30 p.m., 1st Lieut. V., the regimental supply officer, reported himself and stated :—

“As the senior supply officer, I have arranged for bringing up the field kitchens. The head of the column is at the southern end

of Kollbach, on the road from Rettenbach. I did not take the column through Kollbach, as the machine gun company of the regiment is there. I have given it its field kitchens. I have had the fires in the field kitchens lighted.

"Lieut. M., the supply officer of the 2nd Battalion, has been left at Giebing. In accordance with the orders of an orderly officer from headquarters, he is superintending the off-loading of supplies from the supply wagons. The supply wagons are to march back as soon as possible by Gross-Nöbach to Lohhof to refill.

"The supply officer of the 1st Battalion has been placed in charge of them, as Lieut. M. must remain in Giebing with the supplies which have been off-loaded. Will you please give me orders as to where the field kitchens are to go."

1st Lieut. V. was told to leave the field kitchens where they were until the battalions had reached their bivouacs; the latter would then fetch their field kitchens themselves.

He was himself directed to undertake at once the requisitioning of food, wood, straw, and forage in the eastern part of Kollbach, in Weissling and Glonbercha, and to send everything which he requisitioned to the exit of Kollbach on the Weissling road. He was told that the regiment would bivouac in the valley running from that point towards Weissling.

One section of the 3rd Bn. at Höckhof was placed at his disposal as a working party. He was directed to place sentries at once on all the wells in Kollbach to prevent the water being fouled or wasted, and to select quarters for the regimental staff in the eastern part of Kollbach. He was told that the regiment would reach its bivouacs in about an hour.

Shortly afterwards Major M., commander of the 1st Bn., reported by telephone as follows:—

"The companies of the 39th Inf. Regt., which were in the position of the 37th Inf. Regt., were withdrawn about 7.30 p.m. The enemy has not made any change in his dispositions in consequence. I have the 1st, 2nd, 7th and 8th Coys. in a covering position opposite Petershausen under my orders. The 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Coys. are on the march to Höckhof under Capt. L., as the commander of the 2nd Battalion has been severely wounded this afternoon.

"One company of the 38th Inf. Regt. is on my left front on the Glonn south of Petershausen. The enemy has about one battalion deployed on the outskirts of Petershausen. It has been ascertained that stronger bodies are in bivouac at Peterhausen station and at Ziegelberg.

"It is my intention to withdraw more troops from the front line during the night, but to keep the companies which are withdrawn handy in close formation, and to make my headquarters at Höckhof. I can send the field kitchens up to the front line. We are short of ammunition; it is very desirable that we should have fresh supplies before daylight. The companies of the composite battalion under L. have been directed to take all wounded, who can be transported, to the dressing station as they fall back."

Major M. was then directed to establish telephonic connection with the regimental headquarters, which he was told would be billeted in the eastern part of Kollbach. He was also informed of the

position of the regimental bivouacs, and told that he might send for his field kitchens.

About 8.45 p.m. Capt. L. reported himself at Höckhof, and stated that his companies were following. Col. C. gave him and the commander of the 3rd Battalion, who was present, the following verbal order at 9 p.m.:—

“The regiment will bivouac in the valley east of Kollbach. It will be covered by No. 12 Coy. at Weissling, No. 11 Coy. at Glonbercha, and the composite battalion under M. opposite Petershausen. The composite battalion under L. and the machine gun company will bivouac on the right, the 3rd Battalion on the left near Kollbach. The regimental adjutant will point out the positions of the bivouacs. The field kitchens are at the exit of Kollbach on the Rettenberg—Kollbach road; they may be fetched at once; the fires have been lighted. Wood, straw, and water may be obtained from the eastern part of Kollbach.

“The supply officer of the 3rd Battalion has been directed to requisition food and forage for the regiment. The composite battalion under L. will keep connection by cyclists with Weissling, and will arrange for local protection towards Hochholz and Glonbercha. Regimental headquarters will remain at Höckhof till 9.30 p.m., and will then move to Kollbach to billets at the eastern end of that place.

“Representatives for orders will be there at 10 p.m.”

The regimental adjutant was then directed to show the battalions the bivouac places he had reconnoitred, and, after the battalions had passed through Kollbach, to see that the field kitchens of the 1st, 2nd, 7th and 8th Companies marched by Höckhof to the front line. Their field kitchens were also to be sent to the companies in Weissling and Glonbercha. The machine gun company was directed to join the composite battalion under L. at its bivouac near the eastern exit of Kollbach.

At 9.30 p.m. the regimental commander rode off to Kollbach.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN THE 39TH INF. REGT.

After it had been withdrawn from Kollbach in the early hours of the afternoon, the 3rd Bn., 39th Inf. Regt., had halted, had been re-formed in three companies, and remained at the disposal of the Brigadier. Up to 9 p.m. five weak companies, for the most part commanded by lieutenants, had joined it from the front line. The regimental commander, and all field officers except the commander of the 3rd Bn., were casualties. The latter, Major N., took over command of the regiment. After he had received the order from the 19th Inf. Bde., dated 6.15 p.m., and transmitted to him by the 37th Inf. Regt., he called the officers to the front and gave them the following order:—

“I take over command of the regiment. Capt. O. will command the battalion formed from A, B, C, and D Coys.,* and Capt. L. that formed from E, F, G, and H Coys.* Company commanders will

* Companies made up from parts of other companies in consequence of the intermixture of units during the battle. Normally, companies in the German Army are numbered not lettered.—G. S.

remain with their companies. The regiment will move to the northern edge of the wood north of Vierkirchen, where it will pass the night. It will march under Capt. O. along the road to Rettenbach, which is the road running southwards from our left front. I am going on ahead with the adjutant to reconnoitre a place for the bivouac. Carry on."

As he rode back, the regimental commander gave the following order to the adjutant, who accompanied him:—

"Ride towards Rettenbach and find out where the field kitchens of the regiment are. Direct the supply officer in charge of them to fill up from the supply wagons, which have been ordered to be at Rettenbach at 6 p.m., and tell him to bring them as soon as possible to the battalion, which will bivouac at the northern edge of the wood in front of us and west of this road. A second supply officer will take charge of the empty supply wagons, which will transport the wounded from the field hospital in Rettenbach, and will march to Lohhof to refill from the dépôt which is there. He will receive further orders there. If a third supply officer is with the field kitchens, place him in charge of the issue of ammunition. One section of the 1st Inf. Am. Col., which is to march from Vierkirchen at 11 p.m., remains at Rettenbach to fill up our ammunition carts which are at that place. As soon as they have been refilled they are to be sent at once to the regiments. If there is no third supply officer present, you must undertake the latter duty yourself."

Major N. then left the road, followed by two orderlies and his groom, and went towards the northern edge of the wood to find a suitable place for the bivouac. A cavalry under-officer, who was in charge of the mounted orderlies attached to the regiment, was left on the Rettenbach road, at the point where it enters the wood north of Vierkirchen, with orders to direct the regiment, when it arrived at that point, to follow the northern edge of the wood and march westwards.

As far as it was possible to see in the dark, a wide re-entrant ran north from the wood and sloped gently up to a long and broad ridge at its northern end. The southern end of this re-entrant was closed by a large tract of wood consisting partly of high trees and partly of thick copse, and at about the centre of the northern edge a portion of the wood ran out in a point towards the north. At the western end of the valley the dark shadows of the high railway embankment were visible. Behind the bit of wood which jutted out to the north was a clearing which, though partly covered with pine seedlings, was large enough to accommodate the regiment.

The ground appeared dry and the place was completely covered from view and sheltered from the wind. A little further to the east, near the point where the Rettenbach—Kollbach road left the wood, the medical company of 10th Inf. Div. was at work at the chief dressing station, and the dressing station of the 40th Inf. Regt. was established in the space between the railway embankment and the projection in the wood.

Major N. found a spring close by with a good flow of water, to which his attention was directed by wounded men of the 40th Inf. Regt. who were lying there. It was the source of a small stream running westwards and its water was clean and fit to drink. The

regimental commander had barely finished his reconnaissance when the regiment came up, marching along the edge of the wood. He ordered it to halt, called for battalion and company commanders, rode with them to the clearing in the wood and then issued the following verbal order at 9.45 p.m. :—

“The regiment will bivouac in this clearing, O. Bn. on the right near that plantation; L. Bn. 300 metres further to the left; the front will be towards the north. Water may be drawn as follows:—O. Bn. from that spring where the fire is burning, a guard is to be placed over it at once; L. Bn. from the stream flowing westwards from the spring; horses may be watered at the stream 200 metres west of the point where the wood juts out.

“O. Bn. will send a party under an officer to requisition straw, food and forage from Rettenbach. L. Bn. will send a similar party to Vierkirchen. Wood may be taken from this wood.

“Capt. L. will be in charge of the bivouac; he will arrange for its protection towards Asbach and the Glonn south-west of that place, and will get connection with the 40th Inf. Regt. at Asbach, and the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. at Jedenhofen.

“Fires may be lighted. The arrival of the 2nd line transport cannot be counted upon. Regimental headquarters will bivouac between the two battalions. A Coy. will supply the fatigues for headquarters.”

While the battalions were going into bivouac and were sending off parties for water, wood and requisitioning, the regimental commander dictated the following message to an under-officer whom he had called up for the purpose:—

“39th Inf. Regt.

“Wood N. of Vierkirchen,

“23. XI., 10.15 p.m.

“To the 20th Inf. Bde. (Col. B.) at Asbach.

“The 39th Inf. Regt., which has been re-formed into 2 battalions of 8 weak companies, has been assembled under my orders south of Kollbach. I have moved it to the wood north of Vierkirchen. It is bivouacking in the centre of the northern edge of that wood, facing hill 496.

N.,

“Major.”

Before this message had been sent off, the regimental adjutant who had been sent to Rettenbach, returned and reported that he had not been able to find the field kitchens. He stated that so much transport was moving to and fro through Rettenbach that it would be very difficult to make the issues from the supply wagons there, and further that the supply wagons had not arrived. He said, that he merely wished to inform the commander of these facts, and intended to start at once to do what was possible to obtain supplies and ammunition. The regimental commander directed him to carry out his difficult task with the utmost energy, and then authorized the regiment to use part of the iron ration.

An addition was then made to the message given above. A mounted officer was given the message to deliver, and told to find out Col. B., the brigade commander, near Asbach, and to acquaint himself with the general situation and the disposition of the brigade.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN THE 10TH FIELD ARTILLERY "*Brigade*."

The divisional order reached the 10th F.A. Bde. at 6.30 p.m. The staff of the brigade was on the highest point of the ridge south of Kollbach, which is marked by a high poplar. The brigade had originally come into action on hill 504, north of Kammerberg, to support the attack on Kollbach, but owing to the poor field of fire it had moved forward as soon as Kollbach was taken. In changing position it had been surprised by the fire of hostile artillery, which had not been observed till then, and which was only discovered, after a long interval, to be in action in the neighbourhood of Sollern. The fire of this artillery was, however, not particularly effective, as it was well over 4,000 metres distant. The brigade then came into action on the ridge running towards Weissling with one regiment firing towards Sollern; the remaining regiment, the 20th, took up a position on hill 496 in order to support the infantry attacking through Kollbach on Petershausen. The left flank of this line of guns suffered so much from the *rafales* of the enemy's artillery, which was still firing from Sollern, that it became necessary to divert the fire of the *Abteilung* of the 20th F.A. Regt. on the left against this artillery. During the early afternoon the remaining *Abteilung* was first engaged against lines of the enemy's infantry retiring slowly from Höckhof, towards the Glonn. After 3.30 p.m., when the enemy had been driven back to Petershausen, and was obstinately holding that place, fire was turned upon Petershausen. Percussion shrapnel was used systematically to destroy the buildings. About 4.30 p.m. the village was on fire at several points, but the enemy still held it. At 4.0 p.m., the 19th F.A. Regt., which had been unable to bring effective fire from its former position east of Kollbach, either against the enemy's artillery, which was now definitely identified on the north-east slope of the spur running down from Sollern towards the Glonn, or against the troops in the Glonn valley, had sent its 1st *Abteilung* forward to the hill north-east of Kollbach and had joined in the fight round Petershausen. The 2nd *Abteilung* changed position to the ground east of the ganger's cottage in front of Asbach; it was directed to support the hard-pressed 40th Inf. Regt., particularly by engaging the hostile artillery near Aufhausen, which had been for a long time bringing a heavy fire to bear on Asbach. About 4.30 p.m., as it began to grow dusk, the position was as follows:—

The 2nd *Abteilung*, 19th F.A. Regt., was on the hill north-east of Kollbach, where it was assisting in the infantry struggle round Petershausen.

The 20th F.A. Regt. was on hill 496, with its 1st *Abteilung* firing on Petershausen and the 2nd engaged with the enemy's artillery at Sollern. The 1st *Abteilung* of the 19th F.A. Regt. was on the ridge east of the ganger's cottage south of Asbach, engaged with hostile artillery at Aufhausen.

The headquarters of the brigade, at the poplar on the hill south of Kollbach, were connected by telephone with the headquarters of the 20th F.A. Regt. on hill 496, and with the headquarters of the 19th F.A. Regt., which was with the 1st *Abteilung* of that regiment. The wagons of the 2nd *Abteilung* of the 19th F.A. Regt. were

in the hollow between Kollbach and Weissling; those of the 20th F.A. Regt. were in the broad re-entrant south of hill 496, and those of the 1st *Abteilung*, 19th F.A. Regt., were close to the northern edge of the wood north of Vierkirchen. The ammunition of the 1st Am. Col. had all been issued to the batteries, which, towards evening, had barely one-third of the ammunition carried in the batteries left. The light ammunition columns, which were empty, were in the re-entrant between Kammerberg and Piflitz, drawn up by regiments. The vehicles were in column of route, with 500 metres interval between regiments. When it began to grow dark the 1st *Abteilung*, 19th F.A. Regt., and the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., ceased firing upon the enemy's artillery and changed their target to Petershausen. The hostile artillery ceased fire. It was quite dark* by 6.0 p.m. Only the country in the immediate vicinity could be clearly seen from the position of the brigade headquarters, and by the observer on the small church spire of Kollbach. The Glonn valley was shrouded in mist, through which the flames of Petershausen and Wasenhof were dimly visible. The course of the Glonn was barely discernible. It was indistinctly marked by a denser line, rising above the bank of mist which shrouded the valley. It was a cold starlight night.

When the above-mentioned divisional order arrived about 6.0 p.m., the following brigade order was prepared after some consideration, and re-duplicated by dictation to members of the staff:—

“10th Field Artillery Brigade. Kollbach, 23. XI., 6.30 p.m.

“Brigade Order for 23. XI.

“1. The division will not pursue the beaten enemy across the Glonn: it will hold the positions gained.

“2. Protective detachments of the 19th and 20th Inf. Bdes. are holding the line of the Glonn in touch with the enemy. The main body of the 19th Inf. Bde. is passing the night at Kollbach. Part of the 20th Inf. Bde. is in the wood north of Vierkirchen.

“3. The 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., will remain in position and support the 19th Inf. Bde., to which it will be attached, in holding its section of the Glonn during the night.

It is desirable to disturb the enemy in his bivouacs and to bombard Petershausen and Wasenhof. Connection will be at once established with the 19th. Inf. Bde. Ammunition wagons which have not been refilled may be sent to the northern exit of Kammerberg up to 10.0 p.m.

“4. The remainder of the 20th F.A. Regt. will billet and bivouac in Kammersberg, the 19th F.A. Regt. in Bachenhausen and Viehbach. The 1st Am. Col. will bivouac with its regiment. The wagons attached to the 19th F.A. Regt. will receive orders from that regiment as to moving to Bachenhausen. Quartermasters will proceed at once to the billeting areas to which the supply vehicles have been ordered from Giebing.

Regiments will evacuate their positions as quietly as possible, and will form up on the Kollbach—Kammerberg road, 19th F.A. Regt. in front. The 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., will not follow until the 19th F.A. Regt. has cleared Kollbach.

* *Sic*, but see p. 134, 11th line from bottom, “nearly dark.”—Translator's note.
(B 760) K

"5. *Ammunition Supply*.—The 1st and 2nd Art. Am. Cois. will be at Kammerberg, on the Giebing road, at midnight. The column which arrives first will supply the 19th Regt., the rear column will supply the 20th Regt. Regiments will meet the columns at the western exit of Kammerberg and make arrangements for unloading ammunition as quickly as possible. The ammunition columns will march by Bachenhausen, Unter-Bruck, and Lohhof to München as soon as they are empty.

"6. Brigade headquarters will be at Kammerberg House. Representatives will be there for orders by 10.0 p.m. The 20th F.A. Regt. will establish telephonic connection with Kammerberg through the 19th Inf. Bde. at Kollbach.

M.,

"Major-General."

This order was transmitted to the regiments by telephone. General M. then instructed his orderly officer to ride at once to Kammerberg and direct the light Am. Col. of the 19th F.A. Regt. to Bachenhausen. He was to wait for the supply vehicles of the brigade and to send them to the billeting areas of the regiment to off-load their supplies at suitable points. The empty wagons were to march back as soon as possible to Lohhof to refill from the dépôt of the 5th Army Corps. One of the supply officers of the brigade was to take charge. The orderly officer was then to prepare quarters at Kammerberg House for the brigade staff which would arrive at 8.0 p.m.

1st Lt. D., the orderly officer, met the light ammunition columns at 7.0 p.m. They were drawn up, with their teams hooked in, in the re-entrant which has been described above. The columns of the 19th Regt. were on the left, *i.e.*, on the west and nearest to Piflitz. All the columns were facing north. 1st Lt. D. asked the column commanders to come to him, and gave them the following order in the name of the brigade commander:—

"The brigade is going into billets and bivouacs; the 19th Regt. at Bachenhausen and Viehbach; the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., at Kammerberg; the 1st *Abteilung* of that regiment will remain in position throughout the night. The light ammunition columns will pass the night with their regiments, those of the 20th F.A. Regt. where they now are, those of the 19th F.A. Regt. will march at once to Bachenhausen, where they will receive further orders from the quartermaster of the 19th Regt. who has gone on. Supply wagons will be sent to the columns. Brigade headquarters are going to Kammerberg House."

The light columns of the 19th F.A. Regt. marched off at once, moving by the rear of the columns of the 20th F.A. Regt., to the Giebing—Kammerberg road, which they struck about 200 metres west of the point where it enters Kammerberg, just in front of the head of a column of transport approaching from the direction of Giebing, which had not been observed in the darkness, and which proved to be the 2nd line transport of the 10th Inf. Div. The two columns were only prevented from crossing (which must have caused some intermixture of vehicles) by the officer in charge of the 2nd line transport giving the order to halt. The light columns thereupon moved through Kollbach at a trot in order to gain ground. In

about a quarter of an hour the road was clear for the 2nd line transport, which had closed up in the meantime. While this was going on, 1st Lt. D. went to the officer in charge of the 2nd line transport and said:

"Will you please turn off the supply wagons of the 20th F.A. Regt. to the left, and have them assembled close to the outskirts of Kammerberg. Please take those of the 19th F.A. Regt. along with you to Bachenhausen and hand them over to the regiment which is quartered about Bachenhausen and Viehbach."

He had hardly issued this order when a lieutenant who had ridden to the head of the column reported himself as supply officer of the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt. He was directed to collect the supply and forage wagons of the regiment just west of Kollbach, between that place and the light ammunition column of the 20th F.A. Regt., north of the Giebing road, and to off-load. He was told to ask for men from the 1st Am. Col. to look after the supplies which were unloaded. The wagons of the 1st Am. Col. were to be sent to that unit at once, those of the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., were to be kept loaded in readiness to join the *Abteilung* at Kollbach. He was informed that the regimental commander would give further instructions as to the latter, and that the empty wagons were to march as soon as possible to Bachenhausen, whence they were to move, not later than 11 p.m., to Lohhof. They were to refill at the latter place from the depot of the 5th Army Corps. He (the supply officer) was, in accordance with the orders of the brigade commander, to take charge of all the supply wagons moving from Bachenhausen. While the 2nd line transport continued its march through Kammerberg, the supply wagons were turned off to the left out of the column, and formed up in a stubble field, the surface of which was frozen fairly hard.

1st Lt. D. had, meanwhile, gone to Kammerberg House. He took over the ground floor for the brigade staff, gave the necessary orders for preparing a room as an office and for having it marked and lighted, and then rode back to brigade headquarters. As he passed Kammerberg he met the 2nd line transport, only half of which had passed through the village, on the march.

He met the 19th F.A. Regt. with the regimental staff at its head about half-way between Kammerberg and Kollbach. He informed the commander that the 2nd line transport had not yet cleared Kammerberg, and reported that the supply wagons of the regiment were marching with the transport to Bachenhausen and would wait for orders at that place.

"The supply wagons," he continued, "must march from Bachenhausen to Lohhof not later than 11 p.m. Lt. X., of 2nd F.A. Regt., is in charge of them. The light ammunition columns have already gone on to the billeting area of the regiment." 1st Lt. D. met the brigade staff just as it was about to move to Kammerberg. The brigade major was not with it; he had been sent to the 19th Inf. Bde. to tell the latter that the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th Regt., was remaining in position, and that the rest of the artillery was falling back, and to ask at the same time for a detachment of infantry to cover the billets of the artillery brigade.

ACTION OF THE 20TH FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT.

We will go now to the 20th F.A. Regt. and consider its action on receipt of the brigade order issued at 6.30 p.m. The regimental commander had received and read this order on hill 496 about 6.45 p.m. He had at once called for representatives for orders to whom the following regimental order, which was taken down at the same time by the regimental adjutant, was dictated at 7.20 p.m.

" 20th F.A. Regt.

" Hill 496, W. of Kollbach.

" 23. XI., 7.20 p.m.

" Regimental Order for 23-24. XI.

" 1. The division will hold the positions it has gained. The 19th Inf. Bde. is covering the front on the line Petershausen—Asbach (exclusive), connecting with the 20th Inf. Bde. at the latter place. The main body of the 19th Inf. Bde. is passing the night at Kollbach and behind hill 496. Parts of the 20th Inf. Bde. are in the wood north of Vierkirchen.

" 2. The F.A. Bde., with the exception of the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., will leave its positions and go into billets and bivouacs, the 19th F.A. Regt. about Bachenhausen and Viehbäch.

" 3. The 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., will remain in position during the night, and will fire upon Petershausen, the enemy's position as far as Wasenhof, and the enemy's bivouacs. The *Abteilung* will send for further orders to the 19th Inf. Bde. at Kollbach, to which it is attached. Transport may be sent to Kollbach with the approval of the 19th Inf. Bde. Ammunition wagons which have not been refilled will be sent to the northern exit of Kammerberg up till 10 p.m.

" 4. The 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., will gradually evacuate its position, as soon as the 19th F.A. Regt., which will fall back first, has passed through Kollbach, and go into billets and bivouacs about Kammerberg. The light ammunition columns of the regiment will be at the same place. Major P. is appointed Commandant of Kammerberg.

" 5. Quartermasters will be sent on at once under charge of senior officers. Units will not enter Kammerberg until quarters have been allotted to the *Abteilung* and to the two light ammunition columns. Kammerberg House is at the disposal of the brigade, regimental and *Abteilung* headquarters.

" 6. Supplies will be drawn at once from the supply wagons which have been ordered into the billeting area. Empty supply wagons will be assembled at the exit of Kammerberg on the Bachenhausen road, poles towards Bachenhausen, and will march off so as to reach the latter place not later than 11 p.m. They will join the wagons of the F.A. Regt. at that place and march together to Lohhof to refill. A separate order will be issued as to the supplies for the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt.

" 7. Ammunition will be issued to the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., at the gun parks, and to the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., just north of Kammerberg; further orders will be issued later.

One officer from each *Abteilung* and a representative from each of the light ammunition columns will be at the regimental office by

8.30 p.m. Demands for ammunition are to be sent in as early as possible.

"8. Representatives for orders will be at regimental headquarters at Kammerberg House by 9 p.m."

This order reached *Abteilung* commanders about 7.35 p.m.

We will now consider briefly how this order was carried out by the commander of the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., which was on the left flank of the regiment behind hill 496, facing Sollern.

The batteries were in position unlimbered. The men were resting by the guns. Some officers were with the infantry covering the front on the Glonn below, for communication purposes. Look outs were lying down in front. Some men selected for their good eyesight were observing the front, as far as the darkness allowed. The battery commanders were with the *Abteilung* commander when the order given above arrived. The *Abteilung* commander looked through the order, read out extracts from it, and added :—
"7.50 p.m.

"The F.A. Bde., with the exception of the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., which is remaining in position, is going into quarters for the night at Kammerberg, Bachenhausen and Viehbach. The 19th Regt. is quartered at Bachenhausen and Viehbach. Kammerberg is allotted to us. The light ammunition columns of the regiment will be at the same place.

"Batteries will limber up. Words of command are to be given in a low tone. The position is to be evacuated as quietly as possible. I will give the order to move off. Captain M. and 1st Lieutenant P. will hand over their batteries. A mounted man will be sent from each battery to act as quartermaster to report to Captain M."

While the battery commanders were giving the necessary orders for evacuating the position, Captain M. received the following instructions:—"The 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., and the light ammunition columns of the regiment will go into billets and bivouacs about Kammerberg. Take the quartermasters, who have been ordered to come here from each battery, and go on to Kammerberg as quickly as possible. Allot quarters there and fix the positions of the gun parks. Avoid changing the quarters of the ammunition columns, which are already there, as far as possible. Lieutenant X., the supply officer of the *Abteilung*, must have already reached Kammerberg with the supply wagons, or will arrive there very shortly. He is to off-load supplies at suitable points if there is no time to take them direct to the batteries, which will reach Kammerberg at 9 p.m. In any case the supply wagons must be drawn up empty by 10.30 p.m., at the exit of Kammerberg on the Bachenhausen road, poles towards Bachenhausen. The *Abteilung* will halt north of Kammerberg on the Kollbach road until I hear from you that the allotment of quarters is completed. The headquarters of the *Abteilung* will be at Kammerberg House, where the headquarters of the "*Brigade*" and of the regiment will also be."

1st Lieutenant P. was then directed to ascertain the ammunition expended by each battery, to ask for an under-officer from each battery, and to go with them to Kammerberg to supervise the issue of ammunition. The *Abteilung* commander continued :—

"Two ammunition columns coming from Giebing are expected to

reach Kammerberg about midnight; the rear one belongs to the 20th F.A. Regt. You will find out all other details from regimental headquarters at Kammerberg House, where you are to go at once. You must take the ammunition states of the batteries with you."

The adjutant of the *Abteilung* was then sent to Kollbach to wait for the 19th F.A. Regt., and to report when it would have cleared that place. At 8.30 p.m. he returned and reported that the 19th F.A. Regt. would have passed through Kollbach in about five minutes. The batteries then moved off, on a signal from the *Abteilung* commander, round the rear of hill 496 in order to gain the Kammerberg road.

Captain M. had, in the meantime, reached Kammerberg at about 8.15 p.m.

Kammerberg proved to be a long narrow village composed of small mud cottages, with a fairly large number of spacious sheds. The north side of the village extended half-way up the southern slope of a ridge running east and west. The western end sloped gently into the broad valley lying between Pifitz and Kammerberg. The lights of the former place, and a large fire burning there, were visible. The part of Kammerberg consisting of Kammerberg House and its farm buildings lay somewhat apart to the south.

To the south and south-west, the valley mentioned above separated Giebing, where a number of lights were to be seen, from the hill near Bachenhäusen.

It appeared best to leave the 1st Am. Col. in the valley west of Kammerberg and north of the road from Giebing, and to quarter its personnel in the western part of the village adjoining.

The battery parks would be most suitably placed on the northern part of the village at the side farthest from the enemy, that of the leading battery being on the east. The part of the village immediately behind could then be divided into three billeting areas for the three batteries. This arrangement would allow of the part of the village south of the main street being allotted to the light ammunition columns.

At first sight it did not seem easy to arrange for water supply, but further reconnaissance proved that the brook running down from Pifitz, and the small stream which joined it from Giebing, provided enough water for the horses. It would, however, be necessary to arrange an allotment of the watering places.

When the quartermasters had been given general instructions as to the parks and billeting areas, and had been told that the order of the batteries was not definitely settled, they were ordered to mark out the positions of the parks and the boundaries of the billeting areas, and to meet Captain M. in a quarter of an hour at the northern exit of Kammerberg.

The latter then rode to Kammerberg House where he took over the first floor for the regimental and detachment staffs. He fixed on one of the neighbouring out-buildings for the offices. He had not quite finished doing this when the regimental staff arrived. Captain M. pointed out to the regimental adjutant the room intended for the office, informed him of the quarters allotted to the staff in the house, and then rode off. As he was passing the western edge of Kammerberg, on his way to the light ammunition columns, he met Lieutenant

X., who was engaged in issuing orders for unloading his supply wagons. He said to him : —

“Do not unload. The batteries will be here so soon that your wagons can be sent to them without fear of delay. Leave your wagons here and ride with me to the *Abteilung*, where you will get further orders.”

He then informed the commander of the light ammunition columns of the billeting area allotted to him, and told him that his horses must water in the stream south of the Giebing—Kammerberg road.

At 9 p.m. he met the batteries halted a few hundred yards north of Kammerberg with the *Abteilung* staff and the battery commanders at the head. The 4th, 5th and 6th Batteries were in that order. Captain M. made the following report:—“I left the light ammunition columns west of Kammerberg, in the valley running towards Piflitz. Piflitz lies over there where that large fire is burning. I have allotted them the part of Kammerberg west of the road from Kollbach, and also the part south of the main street.

“The parks of the *Abteilung* will be just here, east of the road and north of the village. The 4th Battery will be farthest to the east, then the 5th, and the 6th Battery nearest to this road. The under-officers who are allotting quarters know the position of the parks and of the billeting areas immediately in rear of them. The latter in no case extend south of the village street. The boundaries of the areas allotted to batteries are marked out. Lieutenant X. will send the supply wagons to the gun parks when the batteries are drawn up. They must be unloaded at once as they must be ready to march off at the exit of Kammerberg on the Bachenhausen road at 10.30 p.m., with poles facing towards Bachenhausen. Lieutenant X. has received orders from the brigade to take all the supply vehicles of the brigade to Lohhof to refill.

“The only wells available for the batteries are those in their billeting areas. The horses may be watered in the brook running from Piflitz, but only as far as the point 300 metres north of the Giebing—Kammerberg road, which point is marked by a large bush. The quartermasters know the watering places allotted to the batteries.

“I have arranged quarters for the *Abteilung* and regimental staffs on the first floor of Kammerberg House. The office is in an out-building. The regimental and brigade staffs have already arrived.”

The batteries moved to their parks after 9 p.m.; sentries were posted over the parks, the necessary orders for protection were issued, the supply and forage wagons joined the batteries, and were unloaded as far as was necessary. By 10 p.m. the horses had been groomed and the men were busy feeding the horses and preparing their own meal.

We will now accompany 1st Lt. P. who had been told, on hill 496, to superintend the issue of ammunition.

He had reported himself at the regimental office at 8.30 p.m., and stated the amount of ammunition used by the batteries. It was clear from the reports received from the other *Abteilung*, and from the light ammunition columns, that it would only be possible to replace

the ammunition of the battery wagons and a very small part of the ammunition of the light ammunition columns from the ammunition column allotted to the regiment. The batteries of both *Abteilungen* required about 900 rounds of shrapnel and common shell; so that there would only remain about 400 rounds for the light ammunition columns; it therefore appeared best to allot the whole of this to one light column so that the regimental commander might have a reserve of ammunition under his hand. It also seemed most suitable to distribute the common shell of the artillery ammunition column to the two *Abteilungen*. On these grounds the regimental adjutant laid the following proposal for orders for the issue of ammunition before his commanding officer:—

“Two artillery ammunition columns will reach Kammerberg about midnight from Giebing. The first is allotted to the 19th and the second to the 20th F.A. Regt. The ammunition will be unloaded at the gun parks, that for the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., just north of Kammerberg. Preparations are to be made for doing this as quickly as possible. Representatives from both *Abteilungen* and from the light ammunition columns, under 1st Lt. P. of the 2nd *Abteilung*, will be at 11 p.m. at the western exit of Kammerberg towards Giebing, to guide the various parts of the ammunition columns to the gun parks. 1st Lt. P. will arrange the necessary details with the commander of the column. The following is the allotment of the ammunition:—

“1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., 800 shrapnel,* 200 common shell.

“2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., 700 shrapnel, 200 common shell.

“1st Light Am. Col. remainder of the available ammunition.

“The 2nd Light Am. Col. will hand over its ammunition to-night to the 1st Am. col. The empty wagons of the Arty. Am. col. will be sent without delay to the eastern exit of Kammerberg. Reports as to the issue of ammunition will be made in the morning, on marching off.”

Simultaneously with this order, 1st Lt. P. received the following verbal instructions:—

“It will be quite sufficient to distribute the ammunition of the Artillery Ammunition Columns by wagons, without taking account of what little ammunition the *Abteilungen* have left. In any case a detailed distribution of ammunition by boxes should be avoided in order not to lose time. The commander of the ammunition column is to be informed that the issue of ammunition must be completed by 2 a.m. The ammunition column is then to move at once by Unter-Bruck and Lohhof to München.”

Thanks to the energetic measures taken by the commandant of Kammerberg for the preservation of order, the issue of supplies and ammunition was completed without serious hitch, in spite of the amount of traffic passing through the village. The empty wagons were despatched at the right time, and in the right order, towards the area east of the Amper without any block ensuing on the roads.

* 100 shrapnel to replace rounds fired during the night.

The only hitch was that the supply wagons of the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., ordered to Kollbach, did not clear Kammerberg on the march to Bachenhausen till 1 a.m., and were so much delayed by the issue of ammunition, which was in full swing at that hour, that they were unable to resume their march till the empty wagons of the 2nd Arty. Am. Col. were ready to move off.

The *Abteilung* provided for the local protection of its billets and bivouacs. It was covered in addition by a company of the 19th Inf. Bde., which had been sent at the request of the artillery brigade commander to Lauterbach.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED AT DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS AFTER 6 P.M.

We will return to the divisional headquarters which were still at Piflitz. Shortly after Divisional Order No. 3 had been issued, the general staff officer of the division laid the following appreciation before his commander:—

“The distribution of the division for the retreat must now be considered. The 19th Inf. Bde. which is in the neighbourhood of Kollbach, and the 20th Inf. Bde. which is in the wood north of Vierkirchen, are available to form the main body of the division. As they are not in touch with the enemy they can march at once. One battalion, 37th Inf. Regt., at Petershausen, 2 companies, 38th Inf. Regt., to the south of that place, and parts of the 40th Inf. Regt. at Asbach and south of it remain facing the enemy during the night. It should be sufficient to leave one battalion of the 37th Inf. Regt., which has been ordered to include the railway bridge south of Petershausen in its line, and one battalion of the 40th Inf. Regt. in the neighbourhood of Asbach to watch the beaten enemy, the remainder being withdrawn from the front line. With the addition of the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., which is now on hill 496, and of a machine gun company, an advanced guard of sufficient strength can be formed, and may be suitably placed under the commander of the 37th Inf. Regt. At the same time, a brigade commander from the division should be nominated to command all the rear guards of the army corps. The Kollbach—Kammerberg—Gross-Nöbach road, the track from Rettenbach by Wiedenhof to Biberbach and thence by Oberndorf to the Amper, are available as lines of retreat. In order to hasten the retreat it seems advisable to retire in several columns. The grouping of the division and the available roads make it best to move in two columns. Of these, that moving from Rettenbach on Biberbach should consist only of infantry, owing to the bad stretch of road at Wiedenhof. It therefore becomes necessary to move the 20th Inf. Bde. by this road, the 19th Inf. Bde. and the F.A. Bde. marching by the good road through Kammerberg and Bachenhausen.

“We must take into consideration that the enemy may threaten the retreat from the valley of the Ilm. The enemy discovered to-day near Ilmmünster would, if he advanced by Hohenkammer, not have much further to go to reach Unter-Bruck on the Amper than would the division moving from Kollbach. Care must, therefore, be taken that such a hostile advance is held off till the main body of the division is east of the Amper, and until the remainder of the army moving further to the west is out of danger. It might be

thought that sufficient protection would be afforded by pushing a strong flank guard out at once to the Lauterbach hills. This would, however, split up the division and necessitate a strong force being kept on this bank, of the Amper, whereas the division is required on the far bank. It is probable that it is the more necessary for it to move to the far bank, because a hostile advance between the Isar and the Amper from the direction of Freising, whence the right wing of the enemy's main army is known to be advancing, is well within the region of probability. Therefore it seems preferable not to occupy the Lauterbach hills till such a course becomes necessary, in consequence of a hostile advance by Hohenkammer. These hills can be rapidly occupied by deploying to a flank the column which is retiring through Kammerberg. But for this it is essential that early information be obtained of such a hostile movement. Steps must, therefore, be taken to establish rapid and certain communication between the 5th Dragoons and headquarters.

"My proposal for action is, therefore, as follows:—The 20th Inf. Bde., to retire at 3.30 a.m. by Rettenbach—Wiedenhof—Biberbach—Oberndorf on the bridges thrown by the pioneer companies south of Unter-Bruck; the 19th Inf. and the F.A. Bdes. to retire at 4 a.m. by Kammerberg—Bachenhausen—Gross-Nöbich to a position behind the Amper; the second divisional adjutant to be sent, with one of the divisional motor cars and 10 cyclists of the 20th Inf. Bde., to the 5th Dragoons to report at once if any serious danger threatens on that flank."

The divisional commander expressed his agreement with the views of his general staff officer. The divisional staff at once began to work out the necessary orders, as follows:—

In the first place the senior medical officer of the division was directed to arrange for the evacuation of the chief dressing station, so that the bearer company should be at Rettenbach at 3 a.m. ready to move off behind the 10th Field Hospital, which was at work in Rettenbach. He was told that orders for the march would follow later.

Only such personnel and material as were absolutely necessary were to remain behind. Wounded were, as far as possible, to be taken to Eching. It was intended to have an auxiliary hospital train there in the forenoon of 24. XI., which would transport the wounded to München. Orders would be issued to units to cease sending wounded to the chief dressing station, to arrange the transport of wounded, as far as wagons were available, to Eching, and to leave the remainder in the adjoining villages in charge of the local authorities, with such personnel and material as were absolutely essential. Such of the medical personnel and material as was not to remain behind would move off not later than the rear guard.

Shortly after receiving these instructions the senior medical officer of the division rode off to see personally to the execution of his orders. The second divisional adjutant was then requested to go to Hohenkammer with the second motor car and 10 cyclists, which he was to get from the 40th Inf. Regt., and to join the 5th Dragoons as reporting officer. He received the following orders from the general staff officer:—

"Keep us informed of all important events in that direction. It

is particularly important that divisional headquarters should be informed early if fresh bodies of hostile troops are in the Ilm valley and, if so, where they are, also where the right flank of the enemy's main army is at the present time. Negative reports should also be sent in.

"Hostile movements from the direction of Ilmmünster or Freising to the south or south-west must be reported at once. A hostile advance on or through Hohenkammer should be reported by motor car. Report the dispositions of the division for the retreat to the commander of the 5th Dragoons."

During the next few hours a number of reports reached divisional headquarters, for the most part by telephone. These did not delay the issue of the final order for the retreat. By 11 p.m. the following information was available as to the situation of the various units composing the division:—

Opposite to the 37th Inf. Regt., which had one battalion astride the Kollbach—Petershausen road in close touch with the enemy, the enemy had again become active during the early hours of the night. Numerous hostile patrols were coming down to and across the Glonn; hostile patrols were also in touch with the 5th Dragoons at Hohenkammer and Mühldorf. An attempt by the enemy from the direction of Goppertshausen to seize the road bridge at Petershausen was discovered in time by the detachments of the 37th Inf. Regt. at that place and defeated. A reconnaissance had established the fact that Petershausen was occupied by one battalion, but that strong bodies of hostile troops were at Petershausen station, and at Sollern. The fire of the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., from hill 496, which was occasionally directed on those places, had only caused the bivouac fires to be extinguished.

Opposite the 40th Inf. Regt. which was at, and south of, Asbach, all was quiet. Patrols found no enemy nearer than the small wood south-west of Ziegelberg and Ebersbach. Hostile troops appeared to be bivouacked north of Aufhausen. Two troops of the 1st Squadron, 5th Dragoons, had arrived at Piflitz to be at the disposal of headquarters.

Shortly before midnight the artillery lieutenant, sent out to reconnoitre the roads, arrived and reported:—

"The road through Wiedenhof towards Biberbach is barely practicable for vehicles. It is, however, suitable for infantry; the only obstacle consists in the mud. The track running from Biberbach through the wide re-entrant towards Westerndorf and Oberndorf is of similar character. The track running from Milbertshofen towards Viehbach is also very bad, and not practicable for vehicles, but the Kammerberg—Bachenhausen—Unter-Bruck road, though somewhat cut up by the large number of transport columns which are using it, is suitable for all arms. The road from Lauterbach to Fahrenzhausen is a first class main road, well-metalled, and suitable for the heaviest vehicles.

"The pioneer company began the construction of a bridge one kilometre east of Oberndorf about 10 p.m. The commander of the company expressed the opinion that the bridge would be finished about 2 a.m. There is little difficulty in constructing the bridge at that point."

The latter report was confirmed by the following report from the pioneer company, which arrived about midnight by cyclist orderly :—

“10th Pioneer Coy.

East of Oberndorf, 23. XI.

“To the 10th Inf. Div., Piflitz.

11 p.m.

“1. The Amper between Weng, Unter-Bruck, and Haimhausen is not passable by any arm. The water is at average height. Depth 2 to 3 metres. The river is nowhere fordable by infantry. Mounted men can cross with difficulty at certain points. The banks are boggy in places. The valley consists of dry firm meadow land.

“2. The bridge at Unter-Bruck is a solid timber bridge available for all arms. It is held by the 10th Coy., 38th Inf. Regt., which has pushed out covering parties towards Gesselshausen and Weng, and has occupied the bridges at Kranzberg and Thurnsberg.

“3. A bridge suitable for all arms will be finished, 1 kilometre east of Oberndorf, at 2 a.m.; position and approaches marked on the attached sketch.

“4. Orders may be sent to Oberndorf, where representatives of the company, who know the way to the bridge, will always be found.

X.,

“Capt. commanding the Coy.”

A message had meanwhile come in from Army Corps headquarters that the 3rd and 4th Arty. Am. Cols. would be in Lohhof at 6 a.m. at the disposal of the 10th Inf. Div.

About midnight the following order was sent by telephone to the 19th Inf. and 20th F.A. Bdes. :—

“10th Inf. Div.

Piflitz,

12 midnight, 23–24. XI.

“The division will retire to-night behind the Amper. All troops except one battalion of the 37th and one battalion of the 40th Inf. Regt. will be withdrawn from the front line, and will be ready to move off from their bivouacs at 3 a.m. Fires will be left burning.

“Dressing stations will be evacuated, and the wounded will either be sent to Eching or handed over to the authorities of the adjoining villages.

“Units remaining in the front line, together with the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., and the machine gun company of the 37th Inf. Regt., are placed under the commander of the 37th Inf. Regt. The 19th Inf. Bde. and the F.A. Bde. are placed under General M. commanding the F.A. Bde. General P., commanding the 19th Inf. Bde., will come as soon as possible to divisional headquarters. Operation orders follow.”

The final divisional order was then prepared, and dictated to the representatives of units who were able to start off with it at 1 a.m. It ran as follows :—

“10th Inf. Div. P.

“Piflitz,

24. XI., 1 a.m.”

“Divisional Order No. 1 for 24. XI.

“1. The 1st Army has retired behind the Isar, before superior force on the line Landshut—Freising. The 2nd Army will retire to-night, on and through München in order to connect with the left wing of the 1st Army.

"2. Fresh bodies of hostile troops are believed to be in the Ilm valley advancing south; the right wing of the enemy's main army is believed to be advancing on Freising.

"3. The 5th Army Corps is to cover the retreat of the army in a position behind the Amper on the line Weng—Otterhausen. The 1st Res. Inf. Bde. is retiring by Vierkirchen—Schönbrunn—Lotzbach—Amperpettenbach, and Haimhausen, the 9th Inf. Div. is retiring further to the west; the 5th Dragoons and the rear guards remain on the Glonn.

Rear guard.

"Under command of Col. C. (commanding 37th Inf. Regt.).
 1 bn., 37th Inf. Regt. } in front
 1 „ 40th „ „ } line.
 Machine gun coy. 7th Inf. Regt., 1 troop, 1st Sqn., 5th Dragoons, 1st *Abtg.*, 20th F. A. Regt.

"Column 'M.'

Under Maj.-Gen. M. (comg. 10th F.A. Brigade); 19th Inf. Bde. (less 1 bn. and machine gun coy.); $\frac{1}{2}$ troop, 1st Sq., 5th Dragoons (which has been ordered to Kammerberg); 10th F.A. Bde. (less 1st *Abtg.*, 20th F.A. Regt.); Bearer Coy. and 10th Field Hospital; Field Post Office, 10th Inf. Div.

'Column 'B.'

Under Col. B. (comg. 40th Inf. Regt.); 20th Inf. Bde. (less 1 bn., 40th Inf. Regt.).

"4. The rear guard will remain on the Glonn in touch with the enemy; it will maintain connection with the 5th Dragoons, who hold the line of the Glonn, east of Peterhausen, as far as Allershausen. The rear guard will be under the orders of Maj.-Gen. P., who will take over command of all rear guards of the 5th Army Corps, and of the 6th Dragoons, at 4 a.m.

"5. 'M' Column will march at 4 a.m. from Kammerberg by Bachenhäusen to Unterbrück. It will reconnoitre the line Grandmiltach—Weissling towards the Glonn. Strong standing patrols will be sent to Belcha to watch the bridge over the Glonn at Hohenkammer, and keep touch with the 5th Dragoon Regt. which has been instructed to send reports to column 'M.'

The Bearer Coy., 10th Field Hospital, and Field Post Office will be at Rettenbach ready to march off at 3 a.m.

"6. Column 'B' will march at 3 a.m. from Rettenbach, by Mitten Wiedenhof—Biberbach—Oberndorf, to a bridge which has been thrown east of Oberndorf and south of Gross-Nöbach.

"7. Troops are to move off as silently as possible. Bivouac fires will be left burning.

"8. Dressing stations will be evacuated as far as possible to

Eching. The chief dressing station and the field hospital at Rettenbach have been closed. Only such personnel and material as are essential will be left behind. Wounded will be handed over to local authorities.

"9. The 3rd and 4th Arty. Am. Cols. will be at Lohhof at 6 a.m., at the disposal of the 10th F.A. Brigade.

"10. Divisional headquarters will be at Pifflitz till 3.30 a.m., will move to Kammerberg at 3.45 a.m. to interview Maj.-Gen. M., and thence by Bachenhausen to Gross-Nöbach. Representatives for orders will be at that place at 4 a.m.

"Dictated to representatives of units.

D.,

"Lt.-Gen. comg. division."

While this order was being issued, Maj.-Gen. P. arrived and reported himself to the divisional commander who was in the office. He received from the latter the following instructions:—

"In accordance with instructions from Army headquarters you are to take over command of all the rear guards of the 5th Army Corps remaining on the Glonn. The 10th Inf. Div. on the right wing has been holding the line Petershausen—Jedenhofen (exclusive), with the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. extending the left as far as Albertshofen, and the 9th Inf. Div. from Albertshofen to Kloster-Indersdorf. All information necessary for you to know is contained in this corps order, which I request you to read at once."

When Maj.-Gen. P. had read the corps order of 3 p.m., 23. XI., and had marked the positions on his map, the divisional commander continued:—

"The 10th Inf. Div. will retire in two columns. The first, composed of the 19th Inf. Bde. and the F.A. Bde., will march at 4 a.m. from Kammerberg by Bachenhausen to Gröss-Nöbach; the second, consisting of the 20th Inf. Bde., which is bivouacked in the wood north of Vierkirchen, will march by Wiedenhof—Biberbach—Oberndorf to a bridge which has been thrown east of the latter place. The following troops remain on the Glonn:—

"The 5th Dragoon Regt. east of Peterhausen holding the crossings over the Glonn as far as Allershausen inclusive; one battalion, 37th Inf. Regt., with a machine gun company, opposite Petershausen, and one battalion, 40th Inf. Regt., at Asbach. The 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., which is west of Kollbach, is placed under the orders of the commander of the 37th Inf. Regt., who commands the whole of the rear guard of the 10th Inf. Div. We shall be in telephonic communication with Kollbach till 3.30 a.m.; at that hour the line

connecting the division with army corps headquarters in Esterhofen will also be reeled up.

"Divisional headquarters leave Piflitz at 3.30 a.m. and go to Unter-bruck by way of Kammerberg."

Maj.-Gen. P. thereupon placed himself in telephonic communication with army corps headquarters, reported himself and received instructions to come at once to Esterhofen to receive orders personally. He asked for some mounted orderlies from divisional headquarters and, on receiving these, rode off.

Meanwhile the commander of the 2 troops of the 1st Sq., 5th Dragoons, which were at Piflitz, received the following orders from the general staff officer :—

"One troop will join Column "M" at Kammerberg at 3 a.m., the other, less 5 orderlies, who will remain with divisional headquarters, will be at Kollbach at the same hour and will join the rear guard."

The officer in charge of the telephone detachment received orders to reel up at 3 a.m. and to join Column "M" by way of Kammerberg as soon as possible.

Instructions were then issued for the horses of divisional headquarters to march at 1 a.m. by Kammerberg and Bachenhäusen to Unter-bruck; they were to be ready for the staff at the latter place at 4 a.m., having been watered, fed, and saddled.

ORDERS ISSUED IN COLUMN "M."

The telephonic instructions from the division issued at 12 midnight reached Kammerberg House at 12.33 a.m., where the commander of the 10th F.A. Bde. was billeted and had established his office. The adjutant was woken up by the under-officer who brought the order, and acted as follows on his own initiative :—

1. The following messages were sent simultaneously to the 19th and 20 F.A. Regts. :—
"10th F.A. Bde.

Kammerberg,

24. XI., 12.55 a.m.

"The division will retire during the night behind the Amper. Regiments will be ready to march off from their bivouacs at 3 a.m. Commanders will be at Kammerberg at that hour, at the exit on the Kollbach road."

2. The following was sent by telephone to the 19th Bde.

"Kammerberg,

24. XI., 12.55 a.m.

"Representatives for orders will come at once to the headquarters of the 10th F.A. Bde. at Kammerberg House."

The adjutant then went to his commander, reported the arrival of the divisional order and the instructions he had issued, with which Maj.-Gen. M. expressed his agreement. When Divisional Order No. 1 had arrived, they proceeded to consider the best arrangement of Column "M" for the retreat.

The detachments composing the column were in various groups.

The 19th F.A. Regt. was in Bachenhausen and Viehbach, the 20th F.A. Regt., less the 1st *Abteilung*, was in Kammerberg, the 19th Inf. Bde. was for the most part about Kollbach. Companies of the latter brigade were holding Weissling and Glonbercha, and 1 company was at Lauterbach covering the bivouac of the F.A. Bde. The bearer company, No. 10 Field Hospital, and the field post office would have to be drawn in from Rettenbach to Kammerberg.

As the infantry company at Lauterbach was most conveniently placed to form the support for the 5th Dragoons, it appeared advisable to move a battalion of the 37th Inf. Regt. off first through Kammerberg, and to let the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., follow it. One company of the 37th Inf. Regt. would come next, and then the 19th F.A. Regt. The 19th Inf. Bde. which would push out a small rear guard, would form the rear of the column. The bearer company and the field hospital would join the column according to the time of their arrival at Kammerberg. The 1st Am. Col. would have to be moved off at once, in order that it might fill up at Lohhof; as it was empty, there would be no difficulty in arranging this.

As a first step Capt. M., the senior of the commanders of the light ammunition columns of the 20th F.A. Regt. was summoned to the office, and given the following verbal instructions:—

“You will take over command of all the light ammunition columns of the brigade, and will march with them at once by Bachenhausen and Unter-Bruck to Lohhof, where you will fill up from the 3rd and 4th Arty. Am. Cols., which have been ordered to be at that place at 6 a.m., and will await further orders.

“The division is retiring this morning, the 24th, in two columns behind the Amper, in order to take up a position on the line Weng—Ottershausen to cover the retreat of the army, which is moving through Dachau and München.

“Brigade headquarters are moving at 4 a.m. by Bachenhausen on Unter-Bruck, with the easternmost column of the division, to which the whole of the field artillery is attached. You will leave a representative for orders at the latter place. No vehicles of the light ammunition columns should be on this bank of the Amper after 4 a.m.”

At the same time the following message was given to him to deliver to the 19th F.A. Regt.:—

“All the light ammunition columns of the brigade are placed under the orders of Capt. X., those of the 19th F.A. Regt. are to be aroused at once, and will move in accordance with the instructions of Capt. X. to join the light ammunition columns of the 20th F.A. Regt. which are already on the march.

“10th F.A. Bde.”

At 1.45 a.m. the following telephone message was sent to the 19th Inf. Bde. at Kollbach:—

“We are retiring by Bachenhausen on Unter-Bruck.

“The following is the order of march of column “M”:—

1 bn., 37th Inf. Regt.

2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt.

1 coy., 37th Inf. Regt.

19th F.A. Regt.
19th Inf. Bde.

"The following will march from Kollbach to Kammerberg to join the column :—

5 companies, 37th Inf. Regt., at 3.15 a.m.

Remainder 19th Inf. Bde., at 4 a. m.

"Orders will be issued direct to the company at Lauterbach which will remain there till further orders. The commander of the 19th Inf. Bde. and the commander of the battalion marching off at 3.15 a.m. will be at Kammerberg at 3 a.m."

The following message was then sent by cyclist orderly to the company of the 38th Inf. Regt. at Lauterbach :—

"To No. 10 Coy., 38th Inf. Regt.,

"24. XI., 2 a.m.

"Lauterbach.

"The division is retiring behind the Amper in two columns, moving by Kammerberg and Fahrrenzhausen to Unter-Bruck and by Rettenbach and Biberbach to Oberndorf, respectively.

"The 19th Inf. Bde. and the field artillery march under my orders at 4 a.m. from Kammerberg by Fahrrenzhausen to Unter-Bruck. The 5th Dragoons remain on the Glonn and watch the crossings from Petershausen to Allershausen. Two battalions from the 37th and 40th Inf. Regts. are on their left, at Kollbach and Asbach, as rear guard to the division. Fresh bodies of the enemy are believed to have reached the Ilm valley at Ilmmünster to-night. The right wing of the enemy's main body is believed to be advancing on Freising.

"The 10th Coy., 38th Inf. Regt., will remain at Lauterberg as a flank guard, and will watch the southern exit of the wood at Weissling, especially the road from Hohenkammer. If the enemy advances it will delay him as long as possible, in conjunction with the 5th Dragoons, who will retire on Thurnsbeg if pressed. Six cyclists of the 28th Inf. Regt. will join the company at 4.30. a.m. to be at the disposal of the company commander for orderly duties. The company will reconnoitre through Hohenbercha and Dörnbach. Brigade headquarters will leave Kammerberg at 4.30 a.m., and march between the 19th F.A. Regt. and the head of the 19th Inf. Bde. which forms the rear of the column.

M.,

"Maj.-Gen. Com. I. 10th F.A. Bde."

The brigade staff met the commanders of the 19th and 20th F.A. Regts., and of the 19th Inf. Bde. at 3 a.m. at the exit of Kammerberg on the Kollbach road. The commander of the 19th Inf. Bde. reported that the 3rd Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., and 1 company of the 2nd Bn. had been ordered to march to Kammerberg and would arrive at 4 a.m., and that the companies at Glonbercha and Weissling had been called in.

He stated that the remainder of the 19th Inf. Bde. was ready to move off from its bivouacs and would march at 4 a.m. The respective commanders also reported that the field artillery was ready as ordered. Lt. A. of the 5th Dragoons reported himself as in charge of the troops which had reached Kammerberg to join column M.

The following verbal order was then issued at 3 a.m. to the

assembled commanders, the brigade major taking it down in shorthand:—

“Northern exit of Kammerberg. 24. XI., 3.15 a.m.

“The 2nd Army is retiring behind the Amper in order to connect with the 1st Army which is falling back on the lines Landshut—Moosberg—Freising before a superior hostile force, the right wing of which is located at Freising.

“Fresh bodies of hostile troops coming from the north are believed to have reached Ilmmünster in the Ilm valley to-night.

“The 5th Army Corps is covering the retreat of the army, which is retiring through and north of München, in a position behind the Amper on the line Weng—Ottershausen, against the hostile main army and the enemy's troops in the Ilm valley.

“The 10th Inf. Div. will retire in two columns, the 20th Inf. Bde. moving west of us by Wiedenhof—Biberbach—Oberndorf to a bridge which has been thrown south of Unter-Bruck.

“The 19th Inf. Bde. and the field artillery march under my orders by Fahrenzhausen and Unter-Bruck to the neighbourhood of Gross-Nöbach.

“3rd Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., less 1 coy., will detach one company as advanced guard 600 metres in front, the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., will follow this battalion from Kammerberg, another company 37th Inf. Regt., will come next, and then the 19th F.A. Regt., and the 19th Inf. Bde. One battalion of the latter brigade will follow as rear guard at 600 metres distance. As the time of arrival of the bearer company and the field hospital at Kammerberg is not yet known, they will join the column when they arrive. Two battalions and one F.A. *Abteilung* remain in touch with the enemy at Kollbach and Asbach under Col. C. The 5th Dragoon Regt. is watching the Glonn from Allershausen to Petershausen. The 10th Coy., 38th Inf. Regt., is at Lauterbach as a flank guard; six cyclists will be sent to that company by the 19th Inf. Bde. The adjutants will see to the ordering of the column, the commanders will remain here, as I expect the divisional commander at 3.30 a.m. and, after interviewing him, may have to issue further orders.

“The commander of the cavalry troop will detach a squad to the advanced guard and to the rear guard of the column, the remainder of the troop remaining with brigade headquarters.”

While the adjutants were riding off about 3.45 a.m., divisional headquarters arrived in a motor car from Rettenbach. At that hour the head of the 3rd Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., was just approaching.

When General M. had reported himself, the divisional commander said to him:—

“General, you are in command of the easternmost column of the army. It will be your duty to oppose any hostile movements from the direction of Hohenkammer or Allershausen.

“My chief object is to get behind the Amper, as far as possible without fighting, but that will only be possible if the enemy does not bring pressure to bear from the direction of Hohenkammer till after 5 a.m. The 5th Dragoon Regt. has just reported that it has strong bodies of the enemy opposite it at Hohenkammer, but at 2.30 a.m., when this report was sent off, the regiment was still in possession of

the bridge over the Glonn at that place. It has been instructed to repeat important information direct to you. If the enemy debouches from the exit of the woods at Hohenbercha and Dörnbach before your main body has passed Bachenhausen, you must attack him with all your available force.

"Divisional headquarters are now moving to the neighbourhood of Hetzenhausen. You will receive orders at Unter-Bruck in good time as to your next objective. If such orders do not reach you, take up a position facing the Amper on the line Weng—Gross-Nöbach and occupy all the crossings over the Amper in that section. Reports to Hetzenhausen."

The commanders were then dismissed to join their units and the divisional staff went off to Unter-Bruck. Maj.-Gen. M. remained in Kammerberg to supervise the formation of the column, and to place himself at the head of the 19th Inf. Bde. The latter marched through Kammerberg at 4.55 a.m., while the 19th F.A. Regt. joined the column at Bachenhausen.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO THE 19TH INFANTRY BDE.

We will now turn to the 19th Inf. Bde. Maj.-Gen. P. had, as we know, established his quarters in the western part of Kollbach. When the telephone message which placed him in command of all the rear-guards of the 5th Army Corps arrived from the division about 12.30 a.m., he summoned the commander of the 38th Inf. Regt., the senior of the two regimental commanders, and handed him over the 19th Inf. Bde. with the following instructions:—

"I am placed in command of all the rear guards of the 5th Army Corps remaining on the Glonn, and am going to ride at once to divisional headquarters at Piflitz. You will take over command of the 19th Inf. Bde. in my absence.

"I am leaving the subordinate staff of the brigade at your disposal as well as my orderly officer, who is at the present moment at Giebing, where he is superintending the issue of supplies and ammunition. The supplies from the supply wagons are ready in Giebing to be taken over by the field kitchens, which have already gone there. The ammunition carts must also have been refilled by now. Instructions for their further movements have not yet been issued. It was intended, however, to issue orders for this to the orderly officer, who will report when the issues are completed. The brigade is disposed as follows:—

"In the front line, a composite battalion of the 37th Inf. Regt. under Major M. is opposite Petershausen; 2 coys. (11th and 12th), 3rd Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., are at Glonbercha and Weissling in touch with the 5th Dragoon Regiment, which holds the bridges over the Glonn from Allershausen to Herschenhofen and has its main body at Hohenkammer.

"As you know, 2 coys. of the 38th Inf. Regt. are between Petershausen and Asbach, the latter place being held by detachments of the 40th Inf. Regt.

"Of the 37th Inf. Regt., the 3rd Bn. (only 2 coys. strong) is bivouacked just east of Kollbach on the road to Weissling, the composite battalion L. is alongside at 200 metres interval.

"You know the disposition of the 38th Inf. Regt. The following order for the retirement of the division behind the Amper has just arrived. I have taken no action on it. You are connected by telephone with the divisional headquarters in Piflitz and the 10th F.A. Bde. in Kammerberg."

When Maj.-Gen. P. had ridden off, Col. N., who was now in command of the brigade, had Maj. A., the commander of the 3rd Bn. 38th Inf. Regt., informed that he was to take over command of the 38th Inf. Regt., and asked Col. C., the commander of the 37th Inf. Regt. at Kollbach, to come to the brigade office. At 1.15 a.m. the final order for the retreat, Divisional order No. 1 for 24. XI., arrived. When this had been read, the following written order was sent to the 37th and 38th Inf. Regts., whose headquarters were billeted in Kollbach:—

"All units are to be ready to march from their bivouacs at 3.30 a.m. Medical personnel and material, which it is not essential to leave behind, will be called in."

Instructions were added to the 37th Inf. Regt. that the companies at Weissling and Glonbercha, with the exception of one section of the latter, which was to remain behind, were to be drawn in at once, and that the 5th Dragoons and M. Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., at Petershausen were to be informed. The two wagons of the 37th Inf. Regt. were to remain at Kollbach, and be at the disposal of the commander of the rear guard.

Shortly after this order was despatched, the orderly officer of the brigade, who had been sent to Giebing, reported by telephone as follows:—

"The ammunition carts have been refilled and are drawn up ready north of Giebing in the hollow running north. The supply wagons have been sent off with wounded from the hospital at Rettenbach, and their supplies have been collected in a large dépôt at Giebing, near a detached house north of that place. The field kitchens have come in to fill up. I will remain at the telephone until I receive orders as to the disposal of the ammunition carts and field kitchens. Call up Kammerberg, Hd. Qrs. 10th F.A. Bde."

He received the following answer at once from Col. N.'s adjutant, who had meantime arrived at the brigade office:—

"Col. N. is in command of the brigade; you remain with the brigade staff. The division is retiring to-night in two columns behind the Amper. The 19th Inf. Bde. and field artillery march at 4.0 a.m. from Kammerberg by Bachhausen to Gross-Nöbich, the 20th Inf. Bde. by Rettenbach—Wiedenhof—Biberbach—Oberndorf to a bridge which has been thrown east of Oberndorf.

"You will remain in charge of the ammunition carts and field kitchens, and will have them ready at Kammerberg at 3.45 a.m., so that they can take their places in the column of the 19th Inf. Bde. which is marching from Kollbach. The brigade will march through Kammerberg as follows:—

"At 4 a.m. 5 coys. 37th Inf. Regt.

"At 4.45 a.m. remainder of brigade in the following order:—

"37th Inf. Regt. 38th Inf. Regt.

"One battalion and the machine gun company, 37th Inf. Regt., remain in touch with the enemy. Major M. will issue instructions to

these vehicles, which will wait for orders at Kammerberg. One ammunition cart and one field kitchen should join each company, it is immaterial which carts join which companies. You must avoid crossing the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., in Kammerberg. Brigade headquarters, which you will rejoin as soon as possible after you have carried out these orders, will be at the northern exit of Kammerberg at 3 a.m."

About 1.55 a.m. the telephone message from Maj.-Gen. M., commanding the column, arrived. At the same time Col. C. reported himself at the brigade office. He received the following instructions from the brigade commander:—

"Fresh bodies of hostile troops are believed to have reached Ilm-münster in the Ilm valley to-night.

"The right wing of the enemy's main army, which is pressing back our 1st Army behind the Isar, is moving on Freising. Our army is retiring through and north of München, and its main bodies are marching off at 4 a.m. The 5th Army Corps is covering the withdrawal of the army behind the Amper, on the line Weng—Ottershausen. The 10th Inf. Div. is retiring to this position in 2 columns as follows:—

"19th Inf. Bde. and F.A. Bde. march at 4 a.m. from Kammerberg by Bachenhausen to Gross-Nöbach; 20th Inf. Bde. marches at 3.30 a.m. from Rettenbach by Wiedenhof, Biberbach, Oberndorf to a bridge thrown east of the latter place. You will take over the command of the rear-guard of the 10th Inf. Div., which remains on the Glonn. The following are placed under your orders:—

"The composite battalion M. at Petershausen together with the machine gun company, 37th Inf. Regt., and the tool carts of the 37th Inf. Regt., which are at Kollbach: 1 bn., 40th Inf. Regt. near Asbach and the 1st *Abtg.*, 20th F.A. Regt., which is in position west of Kollbach, as well as 1 troop, 5th Dragoon Regt., which has been ordered from Piflitz to Kollbach. Maj.-Gen. P., who has just ridden off to the divisional headquarters at Piflitz, takes over the command, at 4 a.m., of all the rear-guards of the 5th Army Corps remaining on the Glonn."

Meantime the acting brigade major had prepared a brigade order, had it reduplicated on message forms and now laid it before his commander to sign. It ran as follows:—

"Kollbach, 24. XI., 2.30 a.m.

"We are retiring behind the Amper.

"The division is falling back in two columns.

"19th Inf. Bde. and F.A. Bde. under Maj.-Gen. M., commanding F.A. Bde., by Bachenhausen on Gross-Nöbach. The 20th Inf. Bde. from Rettenbach, by Biberbach and Oberndorf, to a bridge which has been thrown east of the latter place.

"M. Bn. with the machine gun company, 37th Inf. Regt., 1 bn., 40th Inf. Regt. and the 1st *Abtg.*, 20th F.A. Regt., remain under Col. C. to form the rear-guard.

"Regiments will be ready to move off from their bivouacs at 3 a.m. Fires will be stoked up and left burning. Regimental dressing stations will be closed. Wounded will be sent as far as possible to

Eching, or will be handed on to the local authorities. Only such medical personnel and material as is essential will be left behind. "The brigade will move off as follows :—

5 coys., 37th Inf. Regt., which regiment will be under the command of Major L., will march to Kammerberg at 3.15 a.m. The remainder of the brigade will follow at 4 a.m. under the senior field officer in the following order :—

37th Inf. Regt., 38th Inf. Regt.

Units will move off as quietly as possible. Words of command will be given in a low tone. Units will march in the fields alongside the road in the neighbourhood of Kammerberg. Waterbottles will be carried in the haversacks. Ammunition carts and field kitchens will join the column at Kammerberg from Giebing. Units must not expect to receive their own vehicles. Col. N. commanding 38th Inf. Regt., has taken over command of the brigade. Brigade headquarters will be at the northern exit of Kammerberg on the Kollbach road at 3 a.m.

"Representatives for orders will come to that point.

N.,

"Col. in command of the Bde."

As soon as this order was issued, Col. N. mounted, directed brigade headquarters to move off, and rode away in the direction of Kammerberg. He arrived there shortly before 3 a.m. and met the orderly officer of the brigade who was waiting at the northern exit of Kammerberg; the latter reported as follows :—

"The ammunition carts and field kitchens have been refilled. The former are parked close by, to the west of the road, the leading vehicle being close to the exit of the village where we now are. The field kitchens are on the Giebing—Kammerberg road with their poles towards Kammerberg, the head of the column is about 50 metres from Kammerberg. The vehicles allotted to the composite battalion M., the machine gun company and the company of the 38th Inf. Regt. at Lauterbach are back at Giebing."

The orderly officer was told to see the vehicles take their places in the column and then to rejoin the brigade headquarters. He was to send off the wagons for the company at Lauterbach before the head of column M passed through Kammerberg.

The brigade commander met Maj.-Gen. M. the commander of the column, about 3.50 a.m., was present at the interview between the latter and the divisional commander and then waited for his brigade to come up. About 3.45 a.m. the 5 companies, 37th Inf. Regt., under Major C., were approaching Kammerberg. Major C. had been present when orders were issued in Kammerberg, and had previously collected his company commanders and given them the following verbal order :—

"Kammerberg, 24. XI., 3.45 a.m.

"The 10th Inf. Div. is retiring in two columns behind the Amper. The 19th Inf. Bde. and the 19th F.A. Bde. by the Kammerberg—Bachenhausen—Farenzhausen road : the 20th Inf. Bde. moving west of us by Biberbach and Oberndorf to a bridge which has been thrown

west of Oberndorf. The rear guards remain on the Glonn. No. 10 Company, 38th Inf. Regt., is at Lauterbach behind the 5th Dragoon Regt., which is holding the section of the Glonn below Petershausen. Maj.-Gen. M., in command of the 10th F.A. Bde., is in command of our column.

"My battalion (less No. 9 Company) forms the advanced guard. G Coy. will form the vanguard and will move at a distance of 600 metres in front of the main guard. I will halt the battalion till this distance has been gained. Further instructions for the march, after the bridge at Unter-Bruck has been reached, will be issued later."

On reaching Kammerberg the battalion commander gave the signal to halt, and directed G Coy. to march on. He then gave his company commanders the following information as to the situation :—

"The 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., which is here in Kammerberg, will follow us. When the battalion moves on, No. 9 Company will halt until the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., has marched off, and will then take its place in the column behind it. The 19th F.A. Regt. will join the column, in rear of No. 9 Coy., at Bachenhausen. Our brigade forms the rear of the column."

When the ammunition carts and field kitchens had taken their places in the column, the battalion resumed its march. The vehicles belonging to G Coy., which had not been able to join it, marched with the main body of the battalion. No. 9 Coy. waited until the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., had moved off.

While these events were taking place at Kammerberg the brigade commander had ridden towards Kollbach to join his brigade, and met it about 4.30 a.m. half-way between Kammerberg and Kollbach. He sent for the commanders of regiments and battalions to come to the head of the brigade and issued the following verbal instructions as the column was approaching Kammerberg :—

"We are just marching through Kammerberg and form the easternmost column of the 10th Inf. Div., which is moving, under Maj.-Gen. M., commander of the F.A. Bde., by Bachenhausen and Unter-Bruck to the country east of the Amper.

"The 10th Inf. Div. will take up a position at and south of Weng, on the right flank of the 5th Army Corps, in order to cover the retirement of the army through and north of München against hostile troops which are believed to be at Ilmmünster in the Ilm valley. On our right, to the west, the 20th Inf. Bde. is moving from Rettenbach, by Biberbach and Oberndorf, to a bridge which has been thrown east of Oberndorf. Parts of the 37th and 40th Inf. Regts. remain behind in touch with the enemy. The 5th Dragoon Regt. is on the Glonn at Petershausen and below it, 1 coy. of the 38th Inf. Regt. is supporting it at Lauterbach.

"The order of march of our column is as follows :—

"Composite battalion C. is in front, and furnishes the advanced guard, then come the 2nd *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., 1 coy., 37th Inf. Regt., and the 19th F.A. Regt. We form the rear of the column. The 38th Inf. Regt. will leave one company at 600 metres distance to form the rear-guard. Bde. Hd. Qrs. will be at the head of the brigade."

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN 38TH INF. REGT.

We will now turn to the 38th Inf. Regt.

The 38th Inf. Regt. had been withdrawn from the front during the evening of 23. XI., and had been assembled behind hill 496, west of Kollbach, Nos. 1 and 9 Coys. were in the front line, and covered the front between composite battalion M. of the 37th Inf. Regt. on the right and the detachments of the 40th Inf. Regt. in Asbach on the left. No. 1 Coy. held the ground between Petershausen and the railway bridge, No. 9 Coy. was close to the railway bridge.

The regiment was bivouacked in the re-entrant which runs east and west, south of hill 496. The 1st Bn. (3 coys.) and the machine gun company were on the right near the south-west corner of Kollbach, the 2nd Bn. was 300 metres further to the left, and the 3rd Bn. was still further to the left, on the small brook which rises a little to the south-west of the highest point of hill 496. The headquarters of the regiment were billeted in the western part of Kollbach.

The 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., was about 100 metres north of the bivouac of the 38th Inf. Regt. along the lane between Kollbach and Asbach, with its wagons close behind it.

Rations had been issued ready cooked from the field kitchens. Coffee had then been prepared and had been issued to the men, part of it being used to fill the water-bottles. The field kitchen had then joined those of the 37th Inf. Regt., moving from Rettenbach to Giebing, in order to fill up again from the supplies which had been placed ready there. Shortly after midnight the regimental commander had been summoned to brigade headquarters and had been placed in command of the brigade. Maj. A., commander of the 3rd Battalion, took over command of the regiment, the senior captain taking over command of the 3rd Battalion.

The greater part of the medical personnel of the 38th Inf. Regt. was at work at the general dressing station of the brigade at Kollbach. The work was under the direction of the senior medical officer, 38th Inf. Regt., who was also the senior medical officer of the brigade. Shortly after 2 a.m. the instructions issued at brigade headquarters at 2 a.m. were received at regimental headquarters. Maj. A., commander of the regiment, then gave the following instruction to his adjutant:—

“Take one of our orderlies with you and ride to the dressing station of the brigade at Kollbach. Tell the senior medical officer of the regiment, who is there, that in view of the impending retreat he is to leave only such personnel and material as are absolutely essential at the dressing station, and to send the remainder at once to the regiment. Wounded may be sent by Gross-Nöbich to Eching as far as transport is available, the remainder will be handed over to the local authorities. After that, ride to the commander of the battalion opposite Petershausen and inform him that I am withdrawing the 1st and 9th Coys., 38th Inf. Regt., from the front line, and ask him to take over the post at the railway bridge.

“Then go to the officer in command of those two companies, and direct him to withdraw at once from the front line. The post holding the railway bridge is not to be withdrawn until it has been

relieved by a detachment of the 37th Inf. Regt. Take care that the companies do not retire through the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., but that they go round its left flank.

"After informing the officer in command of the detachments of the 40th Inf. Regt. at Asbach of the situation, come back to the regiment where I shall be. I shall march at 4 a.m. through Kollbach to Kammerberg."

Let us now accompany Lt. D., the adjutant, on his journey.

He found the senior medical officer of the regiment hard at work at the dressing station which had been established close to the church. Wounded men were continually being brought in by the search parties and the stretcher bearers, though the number had diminished after dark. The whole of the medical personnel of both regiments was employed; that which had accompanied the units during the battle had joined for duty at the dressing station, as soon as the troops had gone into bivouac. The temporary dressing station of the 37th Inf. Regt. at Höckhof had been closed after dark, and its personnel and material were being used at Kollbach.

The senior medical officer of the 38th Inf. Regt. was engaged at the receiving station, the senior medical officer of the 39th Inf. Regt. at the dressing station, and the senior medical officer of the 37th Inf. Regt. was in charge of those whose wounds had already been dressed in the village of Kollbach. The latter officer had the whole of the personnel and material of the 37th Inf. Regt. at his disposal. Some of the wounded were in the houses on beds, which had been hurriedly collected, some were lying on straw in the church and in the adjoining barns. Owing to the deficiency of transport, few wounded had been sent off either to Eching or to the chief dressing station. Some 25 wounded had been placed, about midnight, on the supply wagons of M. Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., which were passing through Kollbach, and had been sent off to Eching. No more vehicles were available.

In addition to the medical personnel, three civilian surgeons from the neighbourhood were engaged in looking after the wounded. When the senior medical officer of the 38th Inf. Regt., who was in charge of the brigade dressing station, received through Lt. D. the order from his regimental commander to retire, he replied that he was working under the brigade commander, but that brigade headquarters had apparently forgotten to send him orders. He said that he would, therefore, carry out the instructions of the regimental commander. Thereupon Lt. D. gave him detailed information as to the situation, and told him in particular that the retreat was general, and that the 19th Inf. Bde. would move off at 4 a.m., M. Battalion alone remaining opposite Petershausen. Brigade orders stated that only such material and personnel as were absolutely essential should remain behind, and that even these were, as far as possible, to fall back with the rear-guards. Lt. D. then rode off towards Höckhof.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE SENIOR MEDICAL OFFICER, 38TH INF. REGT., AT KOLLBACH.

The clergyman of the village was also at work at the dressing station, in order that he might give the dying, who had been

placed apart in a large barn near the church, the comfort of their religion.

Senior Medical Officer C. addressed him as follows at 2.30 a.m. :—

“The division is marching off. I am only able to leave such personnel as is absolutely essential behind, and I must hand over all the wounded who are lying here to the care of the local authorities. As I am unable to look for the mayor, I request you to give every assistance to the medical officers who remain behind, and to get the inhabitants to assist in the care of the wounded. Thorough search must be made again at daylight over the whole of the surrounding district as far as the Glonn. The dressing station will remain open with reduced personnel. The personnel which remains behind is under the protection of the Geneva Convention.”

The order was then passed by means of stretcher bearers inhabitants, etc., that all the medical personnel in Kollbach, with the exception of those men who were absolutely indispensable at the receiving and dressing sections, should assemble in front of Kollbach church.

Senior Medical Officer C. then handed over the work at the receiving section to the staff surgeon of the 38th Inf. Regt., who was assisting him, and went to the dressing section, where he gave the following order to the senior medical officer of the 39th Inf. Regt. who was at work there :—

“The division is retiring by Bachenhäusen and Gross-Nöbich, and by Biberbach and Oberndorf, behind the Amper.

“Our brigade is marching off from Kollbach at 4 a.m., rear-guards being left on the Glonn at Petershausen.

“The dressing station at Kollbach will remain behind with reduced personnel and will be under your orders. I am leaving Staff Surgeon M., of the 38th Inf. Regt., in charge of the dressing section, and 3 medical officers besides. I am also leaving some of the stretcher bearers and medical personnel. I am sending off the remainder to join their units. I have requested the local clergyman to give assistance. Wounded are to be handed over to the local authorities. You will retire with the rear-guard if it is in any way possible. In any case send off as much personnel as possible with it. I am leaving two infantry ambulances at your disposal.

“I am returning to my regiment as soon as I have issued the necessary orders.”

About 3 a.m. Senior Medical Officer C. found the personnel of the 37th, 38th and 39th Inf. Regts. assembled in front of the church; they had been drawn up by the senior medical officer by regiments.

The strengths were as follows :—

37th Inf. Regt.—

4 medical officers, 10 medical under-officers, 24 stretcher bearers,
10 bandsmen.

38th Inf. Regt.—

3 medical officers, 4 medical under-officers, 8 stretcher bearers,
20 bandsmen.

39th Inf. Regt.—

3 medical officers, 6 medical under-officers, 12 stretcher bearers,
15 bandsmen.

The remainder of the medical personnel was either engaged in looking for wounded or employed in the receiving and dressing sections.

Senior Medical Officer C. was given the following verbal order at 3.15 a.m. :—

"The division is moving off. The 19th Inf. Bde. is moving from Kollbach by Kammerberg and Fahrenzhausen to a position behind the Amper. The medical personnel here will join its units.

"The personnel of the 37th Inf. Regt., under the senior medical officer, will join the regiment which is bivouacked just east of Kollbach. If the regiment has already marched off it will follow it down the road to Kammerberg.

"Staff Surgeon A. of the 38th Inf. Regt. will take charge of the personnel and material of the 38th and 39th Inf. Regts. and move them to the western exit of Kollbach, where they will await me. Infantry ambulances will accompany the personnel of their regiments. One ambulance from the 37th Inf. Regt. and one from the 38th will be left at the disposal of the senior medical officer of the 39th Inf. Regt., who will take charge of the dressing station which remains here."

Senior Medical Officer C. then returned to the senior medical officer of the 39th Inf. Regt., and informed him that half the personnel was marching off, and impressed upon him that he was to bring back as much of the remaining personnel as possible with the rear guard.

He then went to the western exit of Kollbach and gave the following order to the personnel of the 39th Inf. Regt., which was still waiting, after he had learnt from the 1st Bn., 38th Inf. Regt., that the 20th Inf. Bde. had marched off from Rettenbach at 3.30 a.m. :—

"Personnel of the 39th Inf. Regt. will join the 1st Bn., 38th Inf. Regt., during the retreat and will be for the present under my orders. I will send it to join the 39th Inf. Regt. when we have crossed the Amper, as soon as the position of that regiment is known. Senior Surgeon M. will ride back by Rettenbach and seek out the 39th Inf. Regt. He will wait for me at Gross-Nöbich, and report where the personnel of the 39th Inf. Regt. is to be sent."

The adjutant of the 38th Inf. Regt. had meanwhile ridden on. At Höckhof he met Major M. of the 39th Inf. Regt., who was in command of the composite battalion at that place. Major M. had withdrawn A and B Companies during the night, while C and D Companies were covering the front on either side of Petershausen bridge, and were in close touch with the enemy's outposts, which were holding the outskirts of Petershausen. Glonbercha was still held by one section of the 11th Coy., 37th Inf. Regt. Just as Lieut. D. was reporting himself, Colonel C., the commander of the rear guard of the 10th Inf. Div., arrived. When Major M. had informed the latter of the position of his battalion, Colonel C. gave the following verbal order to Major M. about 2.30 a.m. :—

"The division is marching in two columns by Fahrenzhausen and Oberndorf across the Amper where it will take up a position near Weng on the right flank of the 5th Army Corps in order to cover the

retreat of the army, which is retiring behind the Isar through and north of München. Fresh bodies of hostile troops are believed to have reached Ilmmünster in the Ilm valley to-night. The right wing of the enemy's main army, which is pressing back our 1st Army, is advancing on Freising. Your battalion, the machine gun company of the 37th Inf. Regt., 1 battalion, 40th Inf. Regt., near Asbach, the 1st *Abtg.*, 20th F.A. Regt., on the hill behind us west of Kollbach, are remaining behind under my orders. The whole of the rear guards of the 5th Army Corps are under the command of Major-General P. Hold the line of the Glonn weakly, from the point down the river, where you connect with the 5th Dragoon Regt., which is remaining in its former position, as far as the railway bridge (inclusive). The railway bridge must be occupied when the companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. at that place retire. Send one company to Kollbach to be at my disposal. Troops must be withdrawn from the front line as quietly as possible. You must endeavour to deceive the enemy as to this withdrawal by increased patrolling and activity of the outposts remaining in the front line. If the enemy attacks you must be ready to meet him at the bridges. You must defend the lower slopes of the hills on the Glonn at Höckhof, and prepare fresh trenches for that purpose before daylight. You may use the reserve company, which has been ordered to Kollbach, until 6 a.m. for this work. I have ordered the tool wagons of the 37th Inf. Regt. to Höckhof, they are at your disposal. I will ask the 5th Dragoons for explosives. You will prepare the bridges which are in our possession for demolition, but will not destroy them without orders from me.

"The field kitchens and ammunition carts which have been refilled are at Kammerberg at your disposal. Do not fetch them up until the 19th Inf. Bde. has passed through Kammerberg. Extend the infantry telephone line to Kollbach. I am now going to ride to Asbach, and will afterwards fix my headquarters at Kollbach."

Colonel C. then turned to his adjutant and dictated to him the following message to the 5th Dragoons:—

"Rear-guard 10th Inf. Div. Höckhof 24. XI., 2.45 a.m.

"To 5th Dragoon Regt.

Herschenhofen.

"The division is moving in two columns from Kollbach by Kammerberg and Gross-Nöbach behind the Amper. The easternmost column starts at 4 a.m. 2 battalions and 1 F.A. *Abteilung* remain on the Glonn, under my orders, to form the rear-guard. My right flank (one section) is at Glonbercha. I intend to make a temporary stand at the bridges, if the enemy advances, and to hold the lower slopes of the hills on the Glonn obstinately. Please send sufficient explosives to Höckhof near Kollbach to destroy the three bridges. I shall be at Kollbach, where there is signal communication with Glonbercha. It is desirable to get signalling communication with you. Please repeat important reports to me.

C.,

Colonel,

"Commanding rear-guard, 10th Inf. Div."

This message was handed to a cyclist of M. Battalion, who was directed to take it by Glonbercha to the commander of the 5th

Dragoons at Herschenhofen. He was to be escorted by two other cyclists.

I will deal with the order issued to M. Battalion later (see page 182).

We will now go to the two companies, 38th Inf. Regt., which had been covering the front on the line Petershausen—Asbach, and were, in particular, charged with holding the railway bridge.

COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE 1ST AND 9TH COYS., 38TH INF. REGT.

These companies were not in close touch with the enemy. Patrols did not come in contact with the enemy's outposts, which seemed to be in no great strength, until they reached the Wasenhof—Petershausen road. Ziegelberg and the small wood south of that place were apparently held in greater strength. As the night was fairly bright, it was possible to identify strong bodies of troops resting in the re-entrant between the small wood and Ziegelberg.

One section of No. 1 Coy. was finding the piquets between Petershausen and the railway bridge, and watched the line of the Glonn. The sentries were connected by a number of visiting patrols which were constantly on the move. The remainder of the company was some 500 metres behind the centre of this line, behind a large clump of low bushes, the dark outline of which was only visible at a short distance in the surrounding darkness.

One section, No. 9 Coy., was pushed forward on to the railway bridge; the bridge was blocked by an overturned cart which formed a barricade. The barricade was permanently occupied, and the side of it nearest to the enemy could be swept by fire from the near bank of the Glonn. Two sections at the disposal of the senior company officer, who was in command of both companies, were on the railway embankment, about 500 metres from the bridge.

The adjutant of the 38th Inf. Regt. arrived, about 2.45 a.m., with the order for the two companies to withdraw. He said at the same time that the railway bridge was not to be evacuated until the arrival of the relieving detachment of the 37th Inf. Regt., which was on its way from Höckhof. The commander of the two companies then rode off to No. 1 Coy., the commander of which he found with the main body of his company at the clump of bushes mentioned above. He gave him the following order in a low tone:—

"The companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. are to withdraw from the front line and rejoin the regiment, which is behind that hill on which the artillery is in action. Withdraw your section, which is on the river, as quietly as possible, and fall back with your company on the 9th Coy. at the railway embankment. Orders are to be given as quietly as possible, and all noise is to be avoided. The post at the railway bridge is to remain there at present. I am going there."

1st Lieutenant T., in command of No. 1 Coy., began to assemble his company at once. The sentries posted by the company were drawn in, and the men put on their packs. The following written order was sent to the section extended along the Glonn:—

"No. 1 Section will withdraw as quietly as possible to the position of the company. All sentries and patrols will be called in."

The men of this section had rejoined the company about 3.30 a.m. The company had meanwhile piled arms and formed column of squads. As soon as the section commander had reported his section present, the company moved off on a signal from its commander. Water-bottles had been placed in the haversacks, rifles were slung, and the men held their bayonets and entrenching tools in their left hands to prevent them rattling. The company joined No. 9 Coy. about 3.45 a.m. The latter company was formed up ready to march off in column of squads. The commander of No. 9 Coy. had not yet returned. A lieutenant was in command of the two sections.

No. 1 Coy. had unslung arms and the men had just lain or sat down on a signal from the company commander, when heavy rifle fire was suddenly heard from the direction of the railway bridge. The flashes of the rifles were seen clearly. It appeared from the direction of the flashes that the section holding the bridge was firing at an enemy who did not return the fire. After a few moments the firing increased to a well sustained rapid fire, and then suddenly ceased almost entirely. A few single shots fired from the near bank of the Glonn and at a greater distance from the railway bridge were heard after a short interval, then everything was quiet. These events passed in a much shorter time than it has taken to narrate them.

1st Lieutenant T., the senior officer present, was quite sure that the enemy had succeeded in capturing the bridge. He also had no doubt but that he must retake the bridge if it was in the enemy's hands. He at once sent two good scouts of his company down both sides of the embankment to find out what had happened. He told them he would follow along the embankment with the two companies. He then ordered the companies to rise, load, and fix bayonets, and summoned the section commanders.

He issued them the following order rapidly in a whisper :—

"Both companies are under my orders. I intend to advance on the railway bridge which must be recaptured. No. 9 Coy. will advance on the bridge on the right of the embankment, No. 1 Coy., less No. 3 Section, on the left of the embankment. Each company will have one section in line with its inner flank on the embankment, and one section in *échelon* on the outer flank, at 50 metres interval and distance, in column of half-sections. Both companies will keep level with me. I will move along the railway embankment. I will signal my position with my pocket lantern. No. 3 Section will follow me down the embankment at 100 metres distance. When I signal a number of flashes in succession, the whole will charge. The enemy must be assaulted. No cheering; no firing; only the bayonet will be used. Companies will move to their places at once. I will signal the advance. No words of command will be given."

1st Lieutenant T. mounted the railway embankment and took his electric lamp in his hand. As soon as he saw that the two companies were level with him on either side, he gave the signal for the advance, and moved forward with two under-officers along the railway embankment. Shortly afterwards one of the scouts returned and reported as follows :—

"The bridge is in the enemy's hands, our piquet at the bridge has been surprised. The enemy has a firing line in a semi-circle round the bridge and about 50 metres from it. Entrenching is going on at

the bridge, the noise can be clearly heard. There appears to be a formed body of the enemy on the bank. I was not able to find out anything about the commander of No. 9 Coy. or of the officer in command of the piquet.

"It is about 300 metres from here to the enemy's firing line."

At this moment the flashes of some rifles were seen, first half right and then half left. The scout added in a whisper, "They are firing on our patrols which are lying down there." Then all was quiet again.

The companies had meanwhile advanced silently some 300 metres from their first position. A hedge which came right down to the embankment was then discernible about 50 metres in front of 1st Lieutenant T. Men were heard whispering, and one of the under-officers who was with the company commander, said in a low tone, "There are men lying down at that bush there." The gleam of a torch showed the position of the bridge dimly in the background. The companies moved on for a short distance, when a wild uncontrolled fire suddenly broke out in front of them. The noise of the firing was deafening. An under-officer fell close by the company commander and rolled down the embankment.

1st Lieutenant T. thereupon gave the agreed signals, and the companies, which were wavering at the moment, charged forward. For a brief period the enemy's fire made many gaps in the ranks, but the semi-circle of the enemy's firing line was then broken through at the point where it met the embankment. 1st Lieutenant T. allowed No. 3 Section, which was moving on the embankment a short distance behind him, to overtake him, and then charged towards the bridge at its head. Some of the enemy, who were engaged in removing the barricades, had barely time to stand to arms. They were overwhelmed, and the men of No. 3 Section occupied the barricade just in time to bring an annihilating fire to bear upon hostile reinforcements which were hurrying forward in close order. Parts of the two companies had meanwhile pushed down to the Glonn close to the bridge, and had closed when they saw the bridge in the hands of No. 3 Section, No. 1 Coy. Other parts of these companies were still engaged with the remnants of the enemy's firing line which they had surprised. Shortly afterwards prisoners, about equal to one section in numbers, were brought in. The enemy appeared to have had about one company in action. By 4.30 a.m. all was over. The firing died out, only a few shots being occasionally heard in the distance towards Petershausen from patrols which came into sudden collision with parties of the enemy which had been cut off.

About 4.45 a.m. Lieutenant A. of the 37th Inf. Regt. arrived at the bridge, and reported that he had been sent from M. Bn., 37th Inf. Regt., to relieve the companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. at the railway bridge.

Though the bridge had been recaptured, and only small parties of the enemy remained on the near bank of the Glonn, the struggle at the bridge had shown that the enemy opposite to the two companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. was becoming more active. The far bank of the Glonn appeared at this time to be everywhere occupied by the enemy; the patrols, who waded through the Glonn at the various

shallow places, were captured by the enemy and did not come back.

1st Lieutenant T. believed the situation to be as follows at 4.45 a.m.:—

No. 3 section of No. 1 Coy. held the barricade on the bridge, the remainder of the company was west of the railway embankment close to the Glonn. No. 1 section of No. 9 Coy. was assembled just east of the embankment in reserve, while No. 2 Section had drawn off about 200 metres to the east after some of the enemy who had retired in that direction, and was lying down facing north close to the Glonn. A half-section of the enemy which had been surprised in this part of the field, had been driven into one of the bends which the Glonn makes here, some being killed and the remainder taken prisoners.

Lieutenant A.'s section, which had just arrived, was drawn up close to No. 1 section of No. 9 Coy. There were no signs of the commander of No. 9 Coy. nor of the commander of the section of that company, which had originally held the railway bridge. A number of wounded were lying in the neighbourhood of the bridge, and groans heard some way off showed that it would be necessary to seek further afield for the victims of the hand to hand struggle.

1st Lieutenant T. had very little information as to the orders which had arrived from the 38th Inf. Regt. He had, however, the impression that it was essential to hold the railway bridge, and he therefore determined, as the relieving detachment under Lieutenant A. did not appear to be strong enough, not to march off in the altered circumstances, but to continue to hold the bridge on his own responsibility. He therefore gave Lieutenant A. the following verbal instructions at 4.30 a.m. (*sic*)*:—

"You will hold the bridge itself with your section, and will relieve No. 3 Section of No. 1 Coy. which is at the barricade. You are under my orders. At the same time you will patrol the Glonn downstream towards Petershausen and upstream towards Asbach, where are portions of the 40th Inf. Regt. The Glonn is fairly deep towards Petershausen and is only passable at crossings. The river is shallow at a point some 300 metres downstream where No. 2 section of No. 9 Coy. is now lying. This point will be held by a post from No. 9 Coy. Serjt. P. of No. 1 Coy., who knows the Glonn well, will remain here.

"No. 9 Coy. will be about 200 metres behind you on the embankment, and will support you in holding the bridge. I am taking No. 1 Coy. back to the track between Höckhof and Asbach, where it will form my reserve. It will be about half-way between the two places. I shall be there. Find out the nearest way to No. 1 Coy. at once and mark it out. No. 3 Section of the company will be sent back to me when you do not any longer require it."

1st Lieutenant T. then turned to the senior N.C.O. of No. 9 Coy., who had taken over the command, as the last officer of the company had fallen in the attack on the bridge, and said:—

"You will remain in command of No. 9 Coy. and will take it about 200 metres back along the embankment. You will remain

* This time and those in the account of the remainder of this incident appear to be about 20 minutes too early.—G. S.

there in support of the detachment holding the bridge and will give it every assistance. Search the area between the embankment and Asbach with strong patrols for parties of the enemy, who have been cut off, and for wounded. Prisoners will be sent to No. 1 Coy. on the Höckhof—Asbach lane, wounded to the dressing station of the 40th Inf. Regt. in Asbach.

“Leave a strong post at the ford where your 2nd section now is.”

While No. 9 Coy. was preparing to march off, 1st Lieutenant T. gave the following order to Nos. 1 and 2 Sections, No. 1 Coy. :—

“No. 3 Section and the section of the 37th Inf. Regt. which has just come up are remaining at the bridge and on the Glonn. No. 9 Coy. forms the support for the detachment at the bridge and will be 200 metres back on the embankment. No. 1 Coy. will be in reserve and will march to the lane between Höckhof and Asbach, where it will take up a position about half-way between those two places. Serjt. P. will fall out and remain with Lieutenant A. at the bridge. The medical under-officer of the company, with the stretcher bearers and 8 men of No. 1 Section, will search the ground east of the embankment for wounded and will take them to the dressing station of the 40th Inf. Regt. at Asbach. Serjt. R. and 10 men of No. 2 Section will search the same area for any of the enemy who have been cut off, and will take them to the company. No. 1 Section will escort the prisoners and move off at once. No. 2 Section will follow.”

When No. 1 Section had taken over the prisoners, 1st Lieutenant T. placed himself at the head of the company and led it to the Höckhof—Asbach lane, halting near a large clump of bushes about half-way between the two places, and piling arms.

He then called up a man who wrote a good hand and dictated to him the following message to the 38th Regt. :—

“1st Coy., 38th Inf. Regt.

Between Höckhof and Asbach.

“1st Lieut. T.

24. XI., 4.45 (*sic*) a.m.

“To the 38th Inf. Regt.

“As Captain M. of the 9th Coy. is missing, I have taken over command of the 1st and 9th Coys., 38th Inf. Regt. I am unable to carry out the retirement ordered, as the enemy opposite me on the Glonn is in strength. The railway bridge, which was temporarily seized by the enemy, has been retaken. I have placed myself under the orders of the commander of the rear-guard of the 10th Inf. Div. until I receive orders to the contrary from the regiment. Orders should be sent to the Höckhof—Asbach lane.

T.,

1st Lieutenant.”

This message was handed to the under-officer in charge of the prisoners with the following order :—

“Take the prisoners to the bivouac of the regiment behind this hill. If the regiment has already marched off, follow it towards Kammerberg. Take 10 men of No. 1 Section with you. You can march off as soon as the prisoners have been disarmed. You will give this message personally to the commander of the 38th Inf. Regt.”

A second message was then dictated to the commander of the rear-guard :—

"1st and 9th Coys., 38th Inf. Regt. Between Höckhof and Asbach.

24. XI., 4.45 a.m. (*sic*).

"To the commander of the 10th Inf. Div. at Kollbach.

"The enemy captured the bridge about 4.30 a.m.; the 1st and 9th Coys. of the 38th Inf. Regt. have recaptured it. The activity of the enemy in front of me has prevented me from withdrawing. I am holding the line Petershausen (exclusive)—railway bridge (inclusive), as originally ordered, and have placed myself under the commander of the rear-guard 10th Inf. Div. I request that the 38th Inf. Regt. may be informed if my action is approved.

T.,
1st Lieutenant."

This message was given to a corporal of No. 1 Coy. with two men as escort. He was told to go down the lane to Höckhof, to deliver the message to the composite battalion M., and to ask that it should be read, and forwarded to the commander of the rear-guard.

Three selected corporals each with two men were then called out and given the following instructions:—

"Corporal A. will go with No. 1 patrol to the bridge at Petershausen, thence along the Glonn to the railway bridge and return. He will watch the far bank of the river, and will report at once any attempt of the enemy to cross. Corporal B. will reconnoitre and mark out the nearest way to the railway bridge. He will then remain with Lieutenant A. at the bridge for orderly duties.

"Corporal C. will perform the same duties with the commander of No. 1* (*sic*) Company at the railway embankment."

One under-officer and 4 men were directed to go to Höckhof and to prepare coffee, either in one of the houses, or by borrowing one of the field kitchens of the battalion of the 37th Inf. Regt. at that place. The coffee was to be sent as soon as possible to the company. The coffee required was taken from the iron ration. Similar measures were taken in No. 9 Coy. About 5 a.m., just as No. 1 Coy. was engaged in pushing out listening patrols towards the Glonn and posting a sentry over the arms, Colonel C. arrived from the direction of hill 496 and met 1st Lieutenant T. When the latter had reported what had happened, Colonel C. gave the following orders:—

"The two companies 38th Inf. Regt. will be under your orders. I will take the responsibility for ordering them to remain on the Glonn and prevent the enemy from advancing between Petershausen and the railway bridge. This line must be held at all costs. You will form Detachment T. under my orders, and will be attached to the rear guard of the 10th Inf. Div. Leave weak posts on the Glonn at daybreak and take up a position for your main line of defence farther back. You should be able to bring effective fire to bear from your position on the Glonn and the railway bridge. The 19th Inf. Bde. has retired by Kammerberg and Fahrenzhäusen behind the Amper, and the parts of the 5th Army Corps which were on our left are in full retreat. There has been no change in the situation in M. Battalion on the right, or in that of the detachments of the 40th Inf. Regt. at Asbach.

* No. 9 Company is apparently meant.—G. S.

The 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., is in action behind you on hill 496. I am going to Kollbach by Höckhof. Get signalling communication with Höckhof, and send a representative to Kollbach for orders."

ACTION OF AND ORDERS ISSUED BY COLONEL C., COMMANDING
REAR GUARD, 10TH INF. DIVISION.

It may perhaps be interesting at this point to look back and see what Colonel C. did after he left Höckhof at 3 a.m.

He first went to the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., on hill 496. Thence he had the following view of the surrounding country :—

The ground in front of the detachment fell in a glacié-like slope to the Glonn valley, in which the mist, which had veiled everything the previous evening, had more or less dispersed. The valley was recognizable as a dark hollow from which a number of black-looking bushes and single trees rose more or less clearly. The river itself was not clearly visible, though a bright stretch of water showed up here and there, and the burning houses of Petershausen were reflected at points in the dark pools and stagnant ponds, which lay at intervals along the course of the river. The conflagration at Petershausen, above which rose the church tower, wrapped in flame, resembled a huge burning torch, and lit up the whole of the ground round that extensive village. At this point the part of the Glonn, which winds round the outskirts of the village, was clearly visible, and the bridge lying between the opposing forces, but occupied by neither, was also lit up. Parts of the hills rising behind Petershausen were brightly illuminated so that it was possible to recognize the movements of troops, particularly in the area north-west of the railway station as far as the large woods. The station buildings, which had not been damaged by the fire, rose conspicuously, and were clearly recognizable from the red reflections of the fires in the windows. The far bank of the Glonn west of Petershausen and about 500 metres from that place, was shrouded in darkness. Here and there a few lights which belonged to Ziegelberg gleamed through the night above the smoking, smouldering ruins of Wasenhof, from which tongues of flame occasionally shot up. Two hours previously it had been possible to recognize the edge of the woods south of Zeigelberg in the light of the burning houses of Wasenhof, but now darkness once more hid the whole neighbourhood. The light which glimmered over the latter woods appeared to belong to Lindach, and a bright glare from behind the wood led to the supposition that hostile detachments were bivouacking there. The 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., had occasionally directed its fire on that point during the night without much result. The conflagration at Asbach had also nearly died out, though the glow still lit up the valley of the Glonn for a few hundred metres, so that portions of the river and of the adjoining meadow land were visible. Beyond Asbach nothing could be distinguished. A house was burning in the extreme distance, but it was not possible to decide on which bank of the Glonn it was. To the rear, that is, south of hill 496, the re-entrant running down from that hill was bright with a number of small and large bivouac fires. Here was

the 38th Inf. Regt., with the 37th Inf. Regt. closer to Kollbach. Though the 38th Inf. Regt. was about to march off and the bivouac shelters had been struck, the men were still engaged in feeding the fires. All the batteries of the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th FA. Regt., the commander of which had taken up his position at the eastern exit of Kollbach, were in line at full interval. The 1st and 2nd Batteries faced generally towards the line Petershausen—Ziegelberg, the 3rd Battery was écheloned slightly back on the left, facing the small wood south of Ziegelberg. During the night one battery was held in readiness in turn, while the men of the remaining batteries rested after the guns had been entrenched. The fire action had been limited to shelling Petershausen, where hostile troops had been observed moving to and fro, and to firing at the places where the enemy was assumed to be bivouacked. The commander of the *Abteilung* had not, on the whole, expected much from this night firing, and therefore had economized the ammunition. His wagons had been refilled and had returned at 3 a.m., but the light ammunition columns were still absent. An observer connected with the *Abteilung* by telephone was on the western church tower of Kollbach, and a second was on the spur running down towards Asbach.

Colonel C. had met the commander of the *Abteilung* shortly after 3 a.m. and given him the available information as to the situation and the retreat of the division. He also informed him that the *Abteilung* formed part of the rear-guard and concluded with the following order:—

“You will be ready to open fire, at daylight, at all targets on the far bank of the Glonn between Petershausen and Aufhausen. It is specially important to keep the bridges and fords under fire so as to make it as difficult as possible for the enemy to cross the river. The *Abteilung* must get the infantry, which is still on the Glonn, to mark the position of the fords.

“As the infantry will be withdrawn slightly back from the river at daybreak, it will be in no danger from the artillery fire directed on the bridges. The section which is still holding the railway bridge will also fall back at daybreak. It is intended to destroy the bridges, but the possibility of doing this depends upon whether the 5th Dragoons can supply the necessary explosives. The *Abteilung* must cover the section of the Glonn between Petershausen and the railway bridge without assistance, as the companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. in that section have been ordered to fall back.

“I am now going to Asbach and then to Kollbach, where I shall remain. You will eventually reconnoitre artillery positions, when it is light, from which you can effectually assist the retirement of the rear-guard, which is intended to fall back by Kammerberg and Bachenhäusen on Gross-Nöbach.”

Colonel C. then rode off. He met the commander of the 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., which was charged with holding Asbach, at the ganger's cottage, 600 metres south-west of Asbach.

The latter made him the following report at 3.45 a.m.:—“I have been in and around Asbach since yesterday forenoon. My command has suffered heavily from the hard fighting of yesterday. My battalion is now formed in three companies. One company is on the outskirts of Asbach facing the Glonn, with outposts extending

from the railway line (exclusive) to Asbach (inclusive). Half a company is watching the Glonn above Asbach as far as the right of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde., which is about half-way between Asbach and Jendenhofen. The remaining $1\frac{1}{2}$ companies are assembled here. Yesterday afternoon I beat off a determined attack, and the enemy has remained throughout the night opposite to and in close touch with me, but has attempted nothing serious. Since midnight his patrols appear to have become more active. My field kitchens have not come up, and the men had no food till the evening. After dark I allowed a portion of the iron ration to be issued, and I have had coffee prepared from it. I have not been in communication with my regimental headquarters since midnight. My ammunition carts, which were to have filled up at Rettenbach and were expected yesterday afternoon, have not yet arrived. After collecting all available ammunition my companies have about 30 rounds per man. Ammunition is urgently needed. I have a dressing station at Asbach. I have been able to send off most of the wounded yesterday afternoon to the chief dressing station. A considerable number more, however, have come in during the night; these are billeted in Asbach, but are not properly cared for."

Thereupon Colonel C. gave him the following verbal order at 4 a.m.:—

"The division is retiring, the 19th Inf. Bde. and the field artillery by the Kammerberg—Fahrenzhausen road, the 20th Inf. Bde. by Biberbach and Oberndorf on a bridge, which has been thrown south of Gross-Nöbach.

"In order to cover the retirement of the army, which has already begun, through and to the north of München, the 5th Army Corps will take up a fresh position behind the Amper, on the line Weng—Ottershausen, against both the enemy opposite us on the Glonn, and fresh forces which are reported to be moving up the Ilm valley through Ilmmünster. The right wing of the enemy's main army, which is advancing on the Isar, is believed to be moving by Freising.

"I have taken over command of the rear-guard of the 10th Inf. Div. It is composed of the composite battalion of the 37th Inf. Regt., opposite Petershausen, of the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., which is on the hill rising in the direction of Kollbach, and of your battalion.

"The two companies of the 38th Inf. Regt., which are between the battalion and you, have been ordered to withdraw and should have fallen back by this."

A short burst of heavy firing interrupted the speaker at this moment. In reply to the question, "What can that be?" the commander of the 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., replied that it must be another attempt by the enemy to take the railway bridge, attempts having been made several times during the night, all of which, however, had been repulsed. He said he would at once reconnoitre in that direction. While the adjutant of the battalion was arranging for the despatch of a patrol towards the railway bridge, Colonel C. continued his order as follows:—"I intend to leave the infantry on the Glonn till daybreak. The following is the allotment of sections for protective duties:—M. Battalion, the line Petershausen to the

railway bridge inclusive; you will extend the left through Asbach as far as the 1st Res. Inf. Bde.

"You must hold the outskirts of Asbach in any circumstances. Turn your right back to the railway embankment at daybreak, as the 37th Inf. Regt. will then evacuate the railway bridge and will fall back to a position on the hills on this bank of the Glonn.

"Send your wounded, as far as transport is available, by Rettenbach, Kammerberg and Gross-Nöbach to Eching; if this is impossible, hand them to the local authorities with such personnel as is absolutely indispensable.

"Establish telephonic communication with Kollbach; I shall be there.

"I will send you ammunition if possible."

Colonel C. then rode back along the lane to Kollbach. When he reached the position of the 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., he was informed by the commander that a severe struggle had apparently taken place at the bridge. Heavy firing had not only been heard, but flashes from a number of rifles had been seen. The companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. in that neighbourhood had apparently not marched off. Colonel C. thereupon rode off rapidly towards the position of these two companies. He met 1st Lieutenant T. at 5 a.m., and gave him the order described on p. 178. He returned to Kollbach at 5.25 a.m. and remained there.

ACTION OF THE COMMANDER OF COMPOSITE BATTALION M. FROM 2.30 A.M. ONWARDS.

Major M. had received Colonel C.'s verbal order, given on p. 171, at 2.30 a.m. He at once sent for the commanders of A and B Companies, which were close by in Höckhof, and gave them the following verbal order:—"The army is evacuating its position on the Glonn and is retiring behind the Isar. The 5th Army Corps is moving to a position behind the Amper on the line Weng-Ottershausen to cover the retreat of the army, both against the enemy on the Glonn, and against hostile forces which, according to reliable information, have reached Ilmmünster in the Ilm valley. Possible action by the enemy's right wing, which is advancing on the Isar, must also be taken into account.

"The 10th Inf. Div. is marching at 4 a.m. to the Amper, the 19th Inf. Bde. and the field artillery by Fahrenzhausen, the 20th Inf. Bde. by Biberbach and Oberndorf on a bridge, which has been thrown east of the latter place. We, together with 1st Bn., 40th Inf. Res., at Asbach and the *Abteilung* of the 20th F.A. Regt. which is in position behind us, remain as rear-guard under Colonel C.

"The 5th Dragoon Regt. extends our right at Herschenhofen, while the rear-guard of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. is on the left of the 40th Inf. Regt.

"The two companies in position on the line Petershausen-Asbach have been ordered to fall back.

"The section allotted to the battalion for protection extends from Glonbercha to the railway bridge south of Petershausen (inclusive).

"A Company will send one section at once to the railway bridge

to relieve the post of the 38th Inf. Regt. This section will hold the railway bridge, and patrol down the Glonn as far as the single oak tree, about half-way between Petershausen and the railway bridge, where the section allotted to C Company begins.

"The bridge will be evacuated at daybreak, and a position occupied in rear from which effective fire can be brought to bear upon the bridge.

"After daybreak I intend to make the foot of the hills on this bank of the Glonn my main position and will draw the companies slightly back from the Glonn for that purpose.

"B Company will move at once to the small wood, the outline of which you see half right, beyond the road, and will entrench itself along the edge facing the Glonn. The left flank must be able to fire on the bridge; extent of front 250 metres.

"A Company will entrench a position, west of the road from here to Petershausen, with its right on the road at the point where the lane from Glonbercha joins it. Extent of front from west to east about 200 metres.

"Work is to be begun as soon as possible; reports as to the progress made will be sent to me at 6 a.m. Half the tools in the tool carts are allotted to each company. Capt. A. will see to the issue.

"Telephone stations will be established in the trenches of A and B Companies and at Höckhof.

"Battalion headquarters will be at Höckhof."

While the companies started upon the tasks allotted to them, Major M. turned to Lt. R., who was in charge of the telephone detachment attached to the battalion, and gave him the following instructions:—

"Establish stations with A and B Companies and at Höckhof, and then arrange for connection with the headquarters of the commander of the rear guard at Kollbach."

The adjutant of the battalion was directed to ride to Kammerberg, to look for the field kitchens and ammunition carts of the battalion, and to bring them to the battalion after the 19th Inf. Bde. had marched through Kammerberg towards Kollbach.

After the battalion adjutant had ridden off, the commander went to the telephone, which was at a haystack close by, and called up the advanced station, near Petershausen Bridge. He asked the commanders of C and D Companies to come to the telephone, and gave them similar information as to the situation to that given above. He then continued—

"Your companies will continue to watch the Glonn during the night in the sections already allotted. The section allotted to D Company will be extended on the left, about half-way between Petershausen and the railway bridge south of that place, as the companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. now in that section have been ordered to withdraw. One section of A Company has marched off towards the railway bridge; it will watch the Glonn as far as the left of D Company.

"Towards daybreak only weak piquets will be left on the Glonn. You will then fall back with your main bodies on to a position at the foot of the hills, which is now being entrenched.

"A trench will be prepared for C Company at the north-western

edge of the small wood between Glonbercha and the Höckhof-Petershausen road.

"A Company is entrenching a position for D Company, with its right at the junction of the lane from Glonbercha with this road.

"Get connection with the companies which are entrenching at once; reconnoitre the positions and mark out the ways to them.

"Telephone stations will be in the trenches and at Höckhof; the advanced station will be given up. Battalion headquarters will be at Höckhof."

I am unable to give the orders issued in the various companies on these instructions, as it is a question of choosing positions, which can only be fixed on the ground.

We will now return to Kollbach to Col. C.

ACTION OF, AND INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY, THE REAR-GUARD COMMANDER FROM 5 A.M. ONWARDS.

On his return from his ride round the positions of the units under his command, Col. C. found his adjutant in one of the houses of the main street of the village. The house was marked by a lantern, on one side of which red paper had been pasted. The necessary maps had been spread out in a room on the ground floor, and writing materials and message forms, etc., had been placed ready. Col. C. found the positions of the units composing the rear-guard marked on the map.

The adjutant reported as follows:—

"I have taken 3 cyclists and some orderlies from the composite battalion M., and 3 orderlies from the troop attached to the rear-guard. They are ready in the next room. The telephone station of the 37th Inf. Regt. (M. Bn.) is also close by. An orderly is stationed there permanently.

"Two mounted orderlies have been sent off, one to M. Bn. and one to the battalion of the 40th Inf. Regt. in Asbach. The troop of cavalry has stabled its horses in Kollbach, but is ready to move off at any moment. Its commander is with his men.

"I have placed the machine gun company of the 37th Inf. Regt., which asked for orders, in readiness just south of Kollbach, by the single poplar, which you will remember is there, sir.

"The 37th and 38th Inf. Regts have marched off. The rear of the 37th Inf. Regt. passed through the village at 4.30 a.m. They were moving on Kammerberg.

"The telephone to Esterhofen station was working till 3 a.m. General P. has spoken to me and directed that cyclist relays should be established at once through Rettenbach to Esterhofen; I asked for and received the necessary cyclists from M. Battalion. The first relay post is at the door.

"Shortly after 3 a.m. the telephone was reeled up, beginning from the rear."

An under-officer of the 5th Dragoon Regt. arrived at 5.30 a.m. and reported as follows:

"I have been sent here by the commander of the 5th Dragoon Regt., who is at Hohenkammer, to deliver explosives. My men are

halted in front of the house and have 10 charges with them. I am also to deliver this message."

The message ran as follows:—

"5th Drag. Regt.

"Hohenkammer, 24. XI.,
3.45 a.m.

"To the rear-guard, 10th Inf. Div.,

"The main body of the 5th Dragoons is at Hohenkammer, with posts at Allershausen, Englhausen and Mühldorf. All bridges in the above area are occupied; only that at Hohenkammer is prepared for demolition.

"The enemy opposite the regiment has been very active throughout the night. Fresh bodies of hostile troops have been met at Ober-Wohlbach and Mittenkammer. An attack on the bridge at Hohenkammer at midnight has been repulsed.

"No more charges than those sent can be spared. A signalling party is at Mühldorf, and is trying to communicate with Kollbach.

"Beg to be informed when the rear-guard retires. Am at the brickworks (Zgl.), 1,000 metres south of Hohenkammer on the road to Pelka.

X.,

"Col. Comg. 5th Drag. Regt."

At the same time a cyclist from the line of relays handed in the following written order from General P.:—

"Major-General P.

"Esterhofen Station, 24. XI.,
4.45 a.m.

"To the rear-guard 10th Inf. Div. at Kollbach.

"The rear-guard of the 10th Inf. Div. will prevent the enemy opposite it on the Glonn from crossing the river on the line Glonbercha—Petershausen—Asbach (all inclusive) as long as possible, and will also prevent the occupation of the bridges at Petershausen, of the railway bridge and of the crossing at Asbach. These bridges should be destroyed.

"It will hold the foot of the hills on the near bank of the Glonn against hostile attack, and if pressed will fall back on the line Kollbach—hill 496. This line will not be evacuated without orders from me.

"Get communication with the 5th Dragoon Regt. and with the 1st Res. Inf. Bde. at and west of Jedenhofen.

"Ammunition is at Riedenzhofen. Report whether and when the ammunition carts arrive.

"I remain at Esterhofen: hourly reports to be sent there after 6 a.m.

P.,

"Major-General."

When Col. C. had read this report, he instructed his adjutant to prepare a message to the 5th Dragoons, giving briefly the disposition of the rear-guard. The message was then to be given to the under-officer of the regiment, who was still waiting.

The message was still being prepared, when the rattle of vehicles passing along the street was heard.

The field kitchens and refilled ammunition carts of M. Battalion were passing through the village, in charge of the adjutant of the

battalion. The latter was summoned to Col. C. and given the following verbal order :—

“The field kitchens and two ammunition carts remain at the disposal of the battalion; I will take two ammunition carts for the battalion of the 40th Inf. Regt., which is at Asbach.”

“Ammunition carts will be emptied at once and sent back to Kollbach, where they will receive further orders as to refilling from me.

“You will take these charges with you; 4 are for M. Battalion, which will prepare Petershausen bridge for demolition; 6 are to be sent at once to the two companies of the 38th Inf. Regt., which are still on the Höckhof—Asbach lane, with orders to prepare the railway bridge for demolition.

“I will give the orders for the demolition of the bridges.”

The two last ammunition carts were then sent off to the 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., with orders that they were to be emptied at once and sent back to Kollbach.

By this time it was 6 a.m. Dawn began to break.

About 7.0 a.m. when it was getting light, the commander of the rear-guard, who had placed himself at the western exit of Kollbach, had the following view of the situation :—

Immediately in front of his position, and west of the main road to Petershausen, which ran down like a white ribbon, the broad northern slope of hill 496 fell gently into the Glonn valley. The level slope was only once broken by a steep drop of about 10 feet, at the point where it joined the valley, the width of which between the foot of the hills and the Glonn varied from 400 to 1,000 metres.

The river wound along in a number of pronounced bends from south-south-west to north-north-east, with thick clumps of grass and pools of stagnant water, which glistened in the morning sun, along its banks. In the valley itself, which was composed for the most part of dry cultivated land, were a number of single trees and clumps of bushes, distributed equally on both banks. From the position of the rear-guard commander the whole valley was, except in one or two places, in full view as far as the foot of the hills on the opposite bank.

To the right, *i.e.*, beyond the Kollbach—Petershausen road, the view was limited, more especially by the hills east and north of Kollbach and by the tongue-shaped wood, which jutted out northwards east of Höckhof.

Past the left of this wood the valley east of Petershausen was visible, but it was difficult to see clearly, partly owing to the rising sun, partly because of the mist in the valley. The small village of Goppertshausen, close against the hills on the river bank, was recognizable, and beyond it the outline of the woods north of Mitterkammer could be seen. The part of the railway line near Ober-Marbach was particularly prominent, and the point of the church spire of this pleasant little village, which nestled in the slope half-way up the hill, could be distinguished.

In the foreground, on the far side of the valley at Höckhof, where it is some 1,000 metres wide, lay Petershausen. It was still burning. The church tower had fallen in the early hours of the morning and

between the church and the Glonn there was nothing but ruins, over which rose a thick cloud of dark yellow smoke, through which bright tongues of flames burst at intervals.

A light east wind drove this cloud of smoke like a curtain in front of the hills at Ziegelberg and Sollern, and it was only when a strong puff of wind made an occasional gap that a peep was obtainable of the broad slopes and big features of the hills in this part of the field, which was crowned by the woods north-west of Petershausen, the single farm at Sollern and the small hamlet of Ziegelberg.

The white road, running along the far bank of the Glonn from Petershausen to Wasenhof between an avenue of trees, was very noticeable amid the green and brown of the surrounding cultivation. Wasenhof, which formerly consisted of a small group of three buildings, had been destroyed. The smoke which rose from it mingled with the cloud of smoke from Petershausen or floated away in light lines towards Ebersbach.

A chapel, that of Lindach, was visible above the firs of the small wood west of Wasenhof, which appeared bright green in the morning light.

The valley of the Glonn north-west of Asbach and Asbach itself were concealed by the convex slope of hill 496. The green church tower of Asbach, which formed a landmark to the country round, alone was to be seen.

Infantry fire had broken out again some time ago—as soon as it began to grow light. Firing lines, under good cover, were recognizable on the far bank of the Glonn at Petershausen, and at the railway bridge. They were firing at the covering detachments, which had now fallen back somewhat from the Glonn.

Permission had been given at 6 a.m. to blow up the bridges, when a favourable opportunity should arrive, but up to the present they had not been destroyed.

D Company was clearly visible in the valley straight below, in the trenches which had been dug west of the Petershausen road. The company occupied the whole of these trenches. Of C Company, which was deployed in the small wood east of Höckhof, only a signal station was to be seen. This station was opposite Höckhof in an angle of the edge of the wood.

There did not appear to be any piquets left on the Glonn, but a few infantrymen were seen taking cover behind a fold in the ground near Petershausen bridge, apparently the men intended to fire the charges. Rifle fire could also be heard from the north-east.

Shortly after 7 a.m. the 1st *Abtg.*, 20th F.A. Regt., opened fire with all its batteries on the ground near Petershausen station, where strong bodies of hostile troops were observed drawn up. This fire was soon answered by hostile artillery from a well-concealed position between Sollern and Ziegelberg. The batteries of the 1st *Abtg.*, 20th F. A. Regt., which were entrenched and provided with shields, suffered little from this fire and remained in action against Petershausen, except the third battery on the left flank, which returned the fire of the enemy's artillery. The target of the first battery was a firing line deployed on the outskirts of Petershausen, the second battery directed its fire upon the neighbourhood of the railway station, where bodies of the enemy's troops appeared from

time to time and seemed to be constantly changing their positions owing to the artillery fire.

B Company, which had been withdrawn when the entrenchments were completed, and the machine gun company of the 37th Inf. Regt. were just south of Kollbach at the disposal of the commander of the rear guard. Behind were the field kitchens of M. Battalion, which had been sent back after coffee had been prepared and issued. Shortly after 6 a.m., the ammunition carts had returned to Kollbach and had been sent off to Riedenzhofen to refill. They had been directed to move by Biberbach and Viehbach to Bachenhausen after refilling, and to wait for orders at the latter place. A cyclist officer of the 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., had been placed in charge of them.

About 7.15 a.m. after C and D Companies had opened fire from their trenches against the enemy lying along the Glonn, a short burst of rapid fire was observed near the railway bridge and then a loud report was heard. As the smoke cleared away, the rear-guard commander saw through his glasses that the bridge had been blown up. Two of the girders were lying in the water and the broken end of the railway lines were sticking up in the air.

The destruction of the wooden bridge at Petershausen was less successful. Before the railway bridge was blown up, the two infantrymen detailed to fire the charges had been seen to creep forward under cover of the ditch and of the trees alongside the road. An explosion followed by a cloud of smoke had also been observed, but when the smoke cleared away, the bridge was seen to be little damaged. There was a slight depression in the roadway.

As Col. C. attached great importance to preventing the enemy from crossing this bridge in strength, he issued the following verbal order to the commander of the machine gun company, who was with him, as soon as he was sure that the bridge had not been destroyed:—

7.20 a.m.

“The enemy must be prevented from crossing Petershausen bridge in force.

“C Company is on the right at the small wood, which you see near Höckhof, D Company is in the trenches in the valley straight below us, both companies are firing towards the Glonn.

“The machine gun company will take up a position near Höckhof to fire on the bridge.

“If I withdraw the advanced companies later on, the machine gun company, which I place under Major M., will assist their retirement.

“Be as quick as possible.”

Major M. was informed by telephone of the orders issued to the machine gun company.

The adjutant was still at the telephone sending this message when the following order from General P. arrived by the relay line:—

“Major-General P. Esterhofen Station, 24. XI., 6.45 a.m.

“To the rear-guard of the 10th Inf. Div., Kollbach.

“The 5th Army Corps will be behind the Amper at 8 a.m.

"Rear-guards will fall back as follows:—

"That of the 10th Inf. Div., at 8 a.m., by Kollbach—Bachenhäusen—Gross-Nöbach.

"That of the 1st Res. Inf. Bde., at 8.30 a.m., by Vierkirchen—Biberbach—Oberndorf—to the temporary bridge.

"That of the 9th Inf. Div., by Röhrmoos—Ampermoching—Ottershausen.

"The 5th Dragoon Regt. will move at 8 a.m. from Hohenkammer by Pelka on Thurnsberg.

"The enemy is to be delayed if he presses his attack, but decisive action is to be avoided.

"I am leaving Esterhofen at 7 a.m. and going by Rettenbach to Kammerberg, whence I will accompany the rear-guard of the 10th Inf. Div.

P.,
Major-General."

The following was known as to the situation at and above Petershausen at this time:—

The two companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. (Detachment T) had evacuated their position on the Glonn at 7 a.m., shortly before the railway bridge was blown up, and withdrawn to the Höckhof—Asbach lane, behind which trenches had been prepared during the night. The railway bridge was within effective rifle range of this position. The right flank of this detachment was about half-way between Höckhof and Asbach, about 250 metres from the left wing of D Company, which was strongly posted somewhat further to the front.

Both companies were firing slowly at small parties of the enemy, which had come down to the Glonn after the bridge had been blown up.

A small party was pushed slightly forward to the railway embankment, where it completely commanded the bridge from behind a fold in the ground, which afforded sufficient cover.

Beyond the embankment near the first houses of Asbach was a post connecting with the garrison of that place, which was being heavily bombarded, since it had grown light, by hostile artillery in position near Aufhausen. The garrison was also engaged with hostile infantry, which had come down to the Glonn in strength under cover of darkness. At 7 a.m. the enemy had not yet succeeded in gaining Asbach bridge, but it had not been possible to destroy it. Ammunition was beginning to run short here, in spite of the two ammunition carts which had been sent up by Col. C.

The machine gun company had taken up a covered position at 7.30 a.m. east of Höckhof. The positions of the guns could hardly be discerned even from the place where the rear guard commander was standing. At 7.45 a.m. the enemy began to rush forward in thick masses to seize the bridge, and the machine guns thereupon opened a continuous fire. The enemy's losses appeared to be heavy. Numbers of men were seen to fall, a few reached the far bank and at once took cover, but the mass wavered and turned, despite the efforts of the officers to stop them, and took to flight, only stopping when they reached cover amid the first buildings of Petershausen.

A renewed attempt to cross the bridge shortly afterwards was equally unsuccessful.

When this was going on, the rear-guard commander briefly reviewed the situation as follows :—

“The retreat is to begin at 8 a.m. and is to be carried out without committing the rear-guard to a decisive engagement until it has rejoined the 10th Inf. Div. in its position behind the Amper. It therefore seems necessary to begin the retirement at once, leaving sufficient troops on the line of the Glonn. The whole must not, therefore, be withdrawn at the same time.

“C Company, in the small wood north-east of Höckhof, and the two companies of Detachment T, appear to be least threatened. These can be withdrawn quietly; the withdrawal of C Company will, thanks to the wood behind it, probably be unobserved by the enemy. The garrison of Glonbercha, D Company, which is nearest to the Petershausen bridge, the machine gun company and the portions of 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., holding Asbach, must remain. C* Company (*sic*), the machine gun company and the artillery *Abteilung* must be the last to move off. The latter must remain on hill 496, until the machine gun company and C* Company (*sic*) have begun to withdraw.

“Units withdrawn from the front line must form up in column of route on the Kammerberg—Fahrenzhausen road. M. Battalion should move by Kollbach, and Detachment T and the 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., by Piflitz.”

On these grounds the following orders were issued at 7.45 a.m.

1. By telephone to Major M. in Höckhof :—

“The rear-guard will retire, and march by Kammerberg and Fahrenzhausen to the position of the 10th Inf. Div. behind the Amper.

“Withdraw C Company and move it, together with your reserves, by Kollbach to the Kollbach—Kammerberg road, where you will receive further orders. My adjutant has been sent there to marshal the column.

“D Company and the machine gun company will hold off the enemy and retire under orders from me. Detachment T has been ordered to move off at once. The artillery will cover your retirement as long as possible.

“I remain at Kollbach.”

2. By written message to 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt.

“Kollbach, 24. XI, 7.50 a.m.

“The rear-guard will retire, moving by the Kammerberg—Fahrenzhausen road.

“Part of M. Battalion and Detachment T will move off at once; the reserves of the 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., are moving by Piflitz on Kammerberg; the front line holds Asbach until I order it to withdraw. The artillery will cover the retreat. I remain at Kollbach.

3. By signal message to Detachment T.

“Detachment T will move under cover to Piflitz. Orders will be sent to that place.”

4. By signal message to the 5th Dragoon Regt. at Glonbercha.

* D Company is apparently meant.—G. S.

“Rear-guard 10th Inf. Div. withdraws from Glonn at 8 a.m. Line of retreat Kammerberg—Unter-Bruck.”

After issuing the last order the rear-guard commander gave his adjutant the following instructions:—

“Ride back to B Company behind Kollbach, and move it off, in rear of the field kitchens of M. Battalion and the tool carts of the 37th Inf. Regt., in the direction of Kammerberg. Halt the company just short of Kammerberg, and form all detachments falling back to the Kollbach—Kammerberg road in column of route. The column will retire by Bachenhausen and Fahrenzhausen as soon as C Company of M. Battalion and the two companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. have come in. The column will be under the senior officer.

“Report to me when it has moved off; I will then order the front line to withdraw. As you pass, send the under-officer in charge of the relay line to me.”

The commander of the troop of cavalry, who was present, received orders to keep his troop ready to move off and to place 4 orderlies for the rear-guard commander at the western exit of Kollbach.

When this was done, Col. C. turned to him again and said, “Take a message form and write”:—

“Rear-guard, 10th Inf. Div.

Kollbach,

24. XI., 8 a.m.

To the 10th Inf. Div. by Gross-Nöbach.

“The rear-guard is retiring at 8 a.m. under orders from General P. by Kammerberg and Fahrenzhausen. The enemy on the Glonn is in close touch with my front line. The railway bridge south of Petershausen has been destroyed. The 5th Dragoon Regt. was still in possession of the bridge at Hohenkammer at 7 a.m.’

“Give this message to one of your men and tell him to take it to the headquarters of the 10th Inf. Div., going by way of Gross-Nöbach. Pace: trot and walk.”

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN M. BATTALION AFTER 7.45 A.M.

We will now turn to M. Battalion. C Company of M. Battalion was, as has been mentioned, entrenched at the edge of the wood, north-east of Höckhof, and was engaged with hostile firing lines, which had come down to the Glonn, east of Petershausen; the section in Glonbercha, which was in signalling communication, was engaged with hostile patrols which had crossed the Glonn by the ford at Goppertshausen.

D Company was entrenched in front of Höckhof, west of the road, and was engaged with skirmishers, who had taken cover in the bushes on the Glonn near Petershausen. No further attempts were made to cross the bridge after the previous efforts of the enemy had been defeated by the machine gun company. The machine gun company, which was in a well covered position in a hollow north-east of Höckhof, was not firing. Its commander was within shouting distance of Höckhof where Major M. still was.

A Company lay hidden in a fold in the ground about 200 metres behind the machine gun company. The company was in reserve and

its commander was with the battalion commander at Höckhof. Kollbach was connected by telephone with Höckhof on the one side, and with C and D Companies on the other. Signal communication was also established with the two companies in the front line. At 8 a.m. Major M. addressed the commander of H Company as follows :—

“The rear-guard is retiring. Withdraw your company, as far as possible under cover, by Kollbach to the Kollbach—Kammerberg road. You will receive orders there from the adjutant of the commander of the rear-guard.

“C Company, which I am sending back at once, will follow you. The remainder of the battalion and the machine gun company will cover the retirement. I am remaining here. You, as the senior company commander will be in charge of the portions of the battalion which are moving off. Take the 1st line transport of the battalion and the tool carts of the 37th Inf. Regt. with you.”

He then said to the commander of the machine gun company, who had been fetched :—

“Your company is under my orders.

“The rear-guard is retiring by Kammerberg and Fahrenzhausen behind the Amper, where the division has already arrived.

“A Company, which is in reserve behind you, C Company, which is at that small wood on the right front, and the companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. on our left, some men of which you can see lying down over there on the left, near that single bush on the Asbach lane, are retiring first.

“D Company, which is in front of us, and the machine gun company, will cover the retreat. You will prevent the enemy from crossing Petershausen bridge and the portion of the Glonn east of it, so far as you can see the latter from your position. You must watch the small wood on your right, which C Company will very shortly evacuate. You will not move from your position without orders from me.”

The following signal message was sent to C Company at 8 a.m., as telephonic communication was interrupted :—

“The company will retire at once under cover by Kollbach to the Kammerberg road. Orders will be sent there. The section at Glonbercha will remain.”

Shortly afterwards Major M. went to the telephone, called up Captain D., and gave him the following information as to the situation :—

“The rear-guard is retiring by Kammerberg and Unter-Bruck, behind the Amper. C Company and the companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. on your left, have been ordered to withdraw. Your company and the machine gun company remain under my orders, and, with the assistance of the artillery, cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the battalion.

“The machine gun company is bringing fire to bear upon the bridge and the Glonn east of it. You must prevent the enemy crossing the river above the bridge. You will not withdraw without orders from me, and will then retire straight on Kollbach. Reel up the telephone line. Establish signal communication. The signal RR from Höckhof will mean retire. I remain at Höckhof.”

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED IN C COMPANY.

When C Company received the signal message, ordering it to retire, from the battalion commander at 8 a.m., it was disposed as follows :—

One section was in a covered position in the wood as support, two sections, No. 2 on the right and No. 3 on the left, held the line of trenches. Signal communication was established between the right of No. 2 Section and the garrison of Glonbercha, which was holding the edge of the village nearest the Glonn without difficulty against small bodies of the enemy.

Two observation posts were placed in the trees of the wood behind the trenches. They had an extensive view of the surrounding country, one towards Ober—Marbach and the other towards Petershausen. The enemy appeared to have occupied the far bank of the Glonn from about opposite to Glonbercha as far as Petershausen. His firing lines had come down to the banks in no great strength during the night, but had not anywhere crossed the Glonn, which here flows slowly between marshy banks and is fairly deep.

The enemy confined himself to a well-sustained fire, to which C Company hardly replied. It had no great effect owing to the range. The trenches occupied by the company were about 10 metres from the edge of the wood; the left end of the part held by No. 3 Section, however, ran for a short distance inside the wood.

Captain C. was at this point, whence the commander of the reserve section in the wood could easily be reached. He sent for the latter and gave him the following verbal order at 8.10 a.m. :—

“The company is retiring. Move off at once with your section through the wood to the lane from Kollbach, and wait there for the remainder of the company. I will follow with Nos. 2 and 3 Sections.”

The two observation posts were then called in, and the following signal was sent to the section in Glonbercha :—

“C Company is retiring. The section at Glonbercha will remain. Order of the battalion commander.”

Meanwhile, the commanders of Nos. 2 and 3 Sections were directed to come to the company commander, and received the following order from him :—

“The company is retiring. No. 1 Section has already marched off to Kollbach; Nos. 2 and 3 Sections will follow. We will retire under cover through this wood. Cease fire, but don't whistle. The sections will then leave the trenches, No. 3 leading, in single file, and will form column of squads in the wood. I will give the order to move off. Each section will leave one squad, which will be distributed over the whole of the trenches, and will keep up a rapid fire. The squads will follow in ten minutes.”

At 8.30 a.m. Nos. 2 and 3 Sections were in column of squads in the wood, ready to move off; they retired on Kollbach, on a signal from the company commander, by a track leading through the wood, which had been reconnoitred and marked out the previous evening. The men left behind kept up a rapid fire. At 9 a.m. the company was assembled at the eastern exit of Kollbach, and the squads left behind were seen at the edge of the wood nearest Kollbach.

The company commander, who had ridden up the hill close to and south-east of Kollbach, observed a column of troops moving on the road to Kammerberg. This column was followed by some transport, and in the re-entrant at Piflitz, a small hamlet on an isolated knoll, about two companies were seen approaching Kammerberg.

In accordance with orders, C Company also moved off on Kammerberg. The company commander then handed over his company to his 1st Lieutenant and rode on to Kammerberg.

About half-way between Kammerberg and Kollbach, at the point where the corner of the Weissling wood crosses the road, he met Captain A. of the same battalion.

He received the following verbal order from him:—

“Your company, the two companies of the 38th Inf. Regt. coming by way of Piflitz, and my company, will form a battalion under my command.

“The battalion will march by Bachenhäusen and Gross-Nöbich to a position east of the Amper, where the 10th Inf. Div. has already arrived.

“The companies will join my company in the order in which they arrive. The latter is halted close to Kammerberg and will wait for them. The transport of M. Battalion will remain behind my company.

“D Company, the machine gun company, and the artillery remain behind under Colonel C. I will give the order for the column to move off.”

Colonel C.'s adjutant, who was present, was able to calculate that this part of the rear guard would have moved off at latest by 9 a.m. He galloped off to Kollbach to inform Colonel C. of this.

The situation there had hardly changed. The enemy did not appear to have observed the withdrawal of C Company, but he had become more active since 8.30 a.m.

Attempts to cross the Petershausen bridge were frequent, and though the fire of the machine gun company prevented large bodies from crossing, yet the number of the enemy's patrols on the near bank increased steadily, and they troubled the machine gun company a good deal.

At 8.30 a.m. a number of small columns were seen to double down to the Glonn from Petershausen, to a point where the river ran nearest to that place. It was observed from the position of the rear guard commander that a raft was being built at this point, apparently unseen by D Company, for a number of bushes hindered the view.

Colonel C. was about to tell the artillery to direct its fire on this point, for the enemy were already beginning to cross, when the *Abteilung* which had been firing at Petershausen and the ground to the north of it, turned its fire without orders on the enemy, who was crossing. This fire, delivered at close range and easy to observe, soon compelled the enemy to give up the attempt.

At 8.50 a.m. the following brief instructions were given to the *Abteilung* commander as to his further duties:—

“Kollbach, 24. XI., 8.50 a.m.

“I am now withdrawing the last of the infantry detachments by

Kollbach and Piflitz to Kammerberg, and then by Gross-Nöbach behind the Amper.

"The 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., will facilitate the withdrawal of the front line, and at 9 a.m. will form a screen of smoke in front of the enemy at Petershausen and opposite Asbach. The *Abteilung* will then change position to the neighbourhood of Kammerberg, so as to be able to fire upon the enemy if he advances through Kollbach, or from Asbach by Piflitz. I am moving to Piflitz. D Company and the machine gun company are moving off."

The following order was then sent to Major M. by telephone :—

"You will retire at 9 a.m. by Kollbach on Piflitz and thence to Kammerberg.

"The artillery *Abteilung* will cover the retirement and will form a screen of smoke in front of the enemy. Use this occasion to retire. The artillery will afterwards take up a position near Kammerberg.

"The troops holding Asbach are ordered to retire to Piflitz, where I shall be. I will issue further orders at that place."

The detachments of the 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., in Asbach, were given the following verbal order by the rear guard commander's adjutant :—

"Evacuate the village when you see D Company retire through Höckhof. March on Piflitz."

When Colonel C. had told the cyclist under-officer to call in the line of relays to Esterhofen, and to assemble his men at Kammerberg, he mounted and rode off across country with the remainder of the troop of cavalry to Piflitz, where he arrived at 9.15 a.m.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO THE DETACHMENTS OF M. BATTALION STILL IN TOUCH WITH THE ENEMY.

We will now conclude with the instructions issued in M. Battalion, in consequence of the order to retire, which arrived a little before 9 a.m. A message had been prepared some time before for the section which was still in Glonbercha. It ran as follows :—

"Höckhof, 24. XI., 8.55 a.m.

"Evacuate Glonbercha and retire on Kammerberg. General retirement by Gross-Nöbach behind the Amper.

"D Company and the machine gun company have just been ordered to move off and are moving to the Kammerberg--Fahrenzhausen road, where reports will reach me.

M.,
"Major."

When the two dragoons in charge of this message had ridden off (the contents of the order and the way to go had been previously explained to them), the signal RR was sent to D Company at the moment when the artillery *Abteilung*, by rapidly increasing its rate of fire, formed a thick veil of smoke in front of the enemy's firing lines on the Glonn. Directly afterwards the machine gun company was instructed to seize a favourable moment to retire, and, after rejoining its vehicles by way of Kollbach, to move off to Piflitz. It was told to expect further orders at the latter place, and that

the general direction of the retreat was through Gross-Nöbach behind the Amper.

Orders were then issued to reel up the telephone line, and to send off the telephone detachment to Kammerberg. At 9.10 a.m., the whole line of D Company, which had left its trenches on receiving the signal, was seen ascending the slope to Höckhof. The whole valley about Petershausen was filled with the smoke of the artillery fire, when Major M. mounted and rode back through Kollbach. At 9.30 a.m., the commander of the machine gun company, moving at the head of his company under cover just east of the road, met his vehicles at the north-west corner of Kollbach. By 9.40 a.m., the company had limbered up and passed through Kollbach at a trot towards Piflitz, where Major M. had already arrived. From Piflitz the artillery *Abteilung*, which had been firing up to the last moment at the enemy's raft and the Petershausen bridge, was seen to limber up and to move, first of all due south, down the slope of the hill, and then on Piflitz. During this retirement it suffered considerably from the heavy fire of the enemy's artillery.

One gun was left in the position, and another had afterwards to be left behind, as only two of the horses of the team were unwounded and they were unable to drag the gun. Several of the wagons also had reduced teams.

Firing lines were seen retiring at the same time in a south-easterly direction beyond the railway embankment, on either side of the ganger's hut near Asbach. Part crossed the embankment and continued the retirement, the remainder lay down and kept up a heavy fire in the direction of Asbach, the green church tower of which was clearly visible from this point too.

Meanwhile, Major M. had reported himself to Colonel C. in Piflitz, and had received the following order from him:—

"The rear-guard will retire through Bachenhausen and Gross-Nöbach behind the Amper.

"Eight companies under Captain A. constitute the main guard. You will take over command of the rear units, *i.e.*, the machine gun company, D Company, and part of the 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt. Disengage these troops as quickly as possible and follow.

"The artillery *Abteilung* will support you from a position near Kammerberg, and will then trot off to join the main guard. The troop of cavalry which is with me is at your disposal. I will ride off through Kammerberg as soon as the artillery has retired, and will be between you and the main guard."

At 9.45 a.m., the machine gun company reached Piflitz at the same time as a company of the 40th Inf. Regt., in close order, which had marched down a fold in the ground west of Piflitz. A firing line was seen approaching from Kollbach and another from the railway embankment. Some infantry fire was heard at Kollbach.

The commander of the company of the 40th Inf. Reg., which proved to be No. 9 Company, reported as follows:—

"One company of the 40th Regt. marched off an hour ago in the direction of Kammerberg. Nos. 9 and 10 Companies then remained in touch with the enemy. Of these my company was withdrawn first from the front line and ordered to Piflitz, to which place the battalion commander intended to ride on ahead. I was to receive

fresh orders here. The firing line approaching from the railway embankment appears to be that of No. 10 Company. Where is my battalion commander?"

As the commander of the 3rd Bn., 40th Inf. Regt., was nowhere to be found, Major M. assumed direct command of the companies of the 40th Inf. Regt., which had just come up. He told the company commanders, and the commander of the machine gun company, to direct their units to march southwards on Kammerberg, and to remain themselves for further orders. He then addressed them as follows:—

"The company of the 40th Inf. Regt., the machine gun company, and all units of the rear-guard still in touch with the enemy are under my orders, and will follow the companies which have already moved off on Bachenhausen by Gross-Nöbach. No. 9 Company, 40th Inf. Regt., and the machine gun company will wait at the exit of Kammerberg on the Bachenhausen road for D Company and the main body of No. 10 Company, 40th Inf. Regt., to come up. The whole will then move off on my order on Unter-Bruck.

"The detachments in immediate touch with the enemy, including the troop of cavalry, will follow under the orders of Captain D. of the 37th Inf. Regt."

Major M. then turned to his adjutant and told him to ride to meet No. 10 Company, 40th Inf. Regt., to inform the company commander of the above instructions, and then to find Captain D. who would probably be near Kollbach. He was to tell the latter to take over command of the rearmost detachments, to disengage them from the enemy, and to follow the remainder of the rear guard at a suitable distance. He was to say that the half troop of the 5th Dragoons would be at Captain D.'s disposal, and would wait for orders from him at Piflitz.

The rearmost firing line retired from hill 496 without much interference from the enemy, shortly after 10 a.m., and moved on Piflitz. The 1st *Abteilung*, 20th F.A. Regt., was in position on hill 504 near Kammerberg, with its right covered by a section of infantry retiring from Glonbercha; it had not, however, opened fire. At 10.10 a.m., it limbered up and trotted through Kammerberg towards Bachenhausen. The machine gun company and No. 9 Company, 40th Inf. Regt., waited near Kammerberg till 10.15 a.m. and then joined D Company and No. 10 Company, 40th Inf. Regt., which had come up meanwhile. The whole then retired, on an order from Major M., at the moment when the enemy's firing lines appeared near Kollbach on hill 496 and on the railway embankment east of Asbach. The enemy opened fire on the rearmost portions of D Company and of No. 10 Company, 40th Inf. Regt., which were retiring on Kammerberg and Piflitz, but without doing any damage worth mentioning; the range was at least 1,000 metres. At 10.30 a.m., the whole of the rear guard, disposed in several bodies, at considerable distances, was in retreat, and all touch with the enemy was given up.

CONCLUSION.

I must bring my studies to an end at this point. They form the third part of a work which had for its object to show, in a simple manner, the different phases and forms of a battle, while laying special emphasis on training in the preparation of orders. I am well aware that there is no sealed pattern for the form of orders. One man will issue an order in one way and a second in another, and both orders may be equally complete and to the point.

There are, however, certain characteristics which good battle orders must have, and there is, if one must say so, a technique in the preparation of orders with which officers should be acquainted and which can be learnt. But it must be studied by means of frequent exercises under proper supervision. I should like to say, now that my whole work is completed in front of me, that I am of opinion that a real solid foundation is often lacking in the training of our young officers. Those who know the winter training in our regiments, and study the programme of instruction carefully, must admit that war-games between two sides dominate everything else. Junior officers command brigades and divisions against each other, and practise themselves in coming to independent decisions; in the larger garrison war-games captains and field officers command army corps, units which only the very smallest proportion of them will ever be called upon to command.

When it is considered that lieutenants who are capable of coming to the most appropriate independent decisions on paper often fail when they have to issue actual orders in the field, and that senior officers who command brigades and divisions in war-games are often at a loss when they have to issue a single clear battalion order, because they do not know in what form to put it, there can be no doubt that war-games, as they are usually carried out by regimental officers, do not give the instruction which they are expected to supply.

The importance of practice in coming to independent conclusions must not be minimized. It is certainly an admirable thing. But, in trying to form military character in this way, it must not be forgotten that the foundation of all practice consists in knowledge built upon a solid foundation. In other words, junior officers must have a sufficient elementary knowledge of the tactics of the three arms, must have learnt to express their orders in clear language which should carry conviction with it, and must also be clear as to the object in view in the battle, and as to the words to be used to express that object, before they attempt to deal with the problems of a war-game between two sides. When this solid foundation has been laid, the war-game, the great importance of which I have no intention of minimizing, has its proper uses. It is when the course of training has advanced progressively that the war-game is of chief advantage, but the beginner requires other fare if we do not wish to train him to be a mere tactical amateur.

In my opinion, next to exercises on the ground, which of course have the greatest value, come simple exercises on the war-game maps. I here give opportunities for training in giving orders even to the smallest detachments and afford instruction to the beginner in the

tactics of the three arms and the principles of the modern battle.

It has been my object to shôw how to prepare and work out such problems, and to encourage units to practise these simple but useful exercises. If I have succeeded in awakening an interest in them, and in emphasizing the practical in our professional training as opposed to the theoretical, I have fulfilled my purpose.

Such exercises also afford ample opportunity for the training of character. There are often a number of occasions in such battle exercises when an example of the value of independent action in such a situation as the pupil might find confronting him in war, can be pointed out. A clear and precise style in expressing orders, which states what is required without ambiguity, is a sign of a strong character. It should be the high but not unattainable ideal of our winter instruction to train our young officers to acquire this.

HANS VON KIESLING.

München, June, 1909.

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